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Thesis Abstract
Islamic banks have performed remarkably well despite the limitations o f their 
ethical parameters have developed significantly during their relatively short exis­
tence. The Western world’s attention was particularly drawn to Islamic finance dur­
ing the 2007 financial crisis when Islamic banks outperformed conventional banks 
in terms o f profitability, asset growth, liquidity and solvency. The comparative per­
formance between Islamic and conventional banks in the face o f the financial crisis 
deserves special attention for two main reasons. It is the first time that an invest­
ment universe, restricted by the Islamic Law, has outperformed the conventional 
system. Secondly, the predominance within the Gulf states of the Islamic bank­
ing sector, has made the GCC region more resilient to the recent financial crisis. 
The 2007 financial crisis has been the first time that the region maintains a positive 
economic growth amidst falling oil prices. Economic policy measures such as the 
revenue diversification programme and the subsequent development of a strong fi­
nancial sector have paid off. The Islamic banking sector and its contributions to the 
GCC’s economic endurance through the recent crisis warrants interest. The thesis 
starts by investigating two specific topics; the technical efficiency and failure risk 
o f Islamic banks. Building from a somewhat rudimentary basic o f a few years ago, 
in terms o f know-how, restrictions, managerial competencies, Islamic banks have 
managed to close the gap with conventional banks. Their significant rise in techni­
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cal efficiency is attributable to higher revenue and profit efficiency scores, achieved 
by improvements in human resources, compared to conventional banks. To the best 
o f our knowledge this research is distinct in that it encompasses bootstrap tests for 
the equality o f means testing in the context o f financial ratio analysis and a meta­
frontier decomposition of the DEA efficiency scores into; a managerial component 
and to the modus operandi of the bank.
The efficiency of the Islamic banking system together with its investment 
restrictions not only shows in lower failure risk but also in the composition of a 
unique financial product whose characteristics are radically different to products 
of conventional banking. In particular, different sensitivities exist between the two 
banking systems in regard to failure risk. In addition, Islamic banks are less likely to 
be affected by contagion effects found with conventional banking. The study offers 
the first application of survival analysis in comparing the failure risk o f Islamic and 
conventional banks.
From comparisons between the financial sector (stock markets) o f the GCC 
against developed and developing countries, we show that the GCC were among the 
last countries to be affected by the 2007 financial crisis. Furthermore, they recov­
ered much faster than financial systems of many other countries. The predominance 
of Islamic banking in the region with its principles on risk-sharing, investments in 
real assets and the shunning o f conventional debt instruments, has helped the GCC 
to weather the crisis. The chapter contributes to the literature in a number o f ways.
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First it allows for every country an endogenous way of detecting the timing o f the 
crisis. Other studies have taken the route of exogenously imposing a crisis date. 
Secondly it introduces measures o f crisis duration and intensity o f the crisis on 
every country while it distinguishes between global and regional contagion effects.
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Following the two oil crises in the 70s and 80s, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
states embarked upon large-scale investment projects to reduce their dependence on highly 
volatile hydrocarbon income. As a result, many industrial and service sectors were pro­
moted among which financial services sector received the greatest attention. O f special 
interest, Islamic finance evolved to become hugely important in the GCC.
That the 2007 financial crisis spurred Islamic finance to faster growth can be at­
tributed to the fact that Islamic banks were relatively less affected. This can be explained 
by the business model that they follow granting them better capitalization and liquidity in­
dicators, the concept of risk sharing and the disinclination to become involved in high-risk 
products (derivatives, securitization and short sale). Even so, Islamic and conventional 
banks have many similarities. For example they are both vulnerable to credit risk. In addi­
tion they operate in the same environment, facing the same macroeconomic shocks and the 
same regulatory requirements. Recent developments in the Arab world which have led to 
the overthrow of long-standing regimes, might be expected to boost Islamic banking even 
further as newly established governments establish new priorities. For instance, Egypt has 




Islamic finance is an interesting field for research for three main reasons. First, although 
Malaysia remains the market leader in Islamic finance products, the GCC offers a much 
broader client base with even higher Islamic bank penetration (Hasan and Dridi 2010). 
Secondly, the income diversification attempts of GCC countries together with the stronger 
presence o f Islamic banks has helped the GCC sustain economic growth even after oil 
prices plummeted during the 2007 crisis (IMF 2010). It was the prevalence o f Islamic 
banks that insulated the financial sector from the worst repercussions o f the financial cri­
sis. Thirdly, as Islamic banks weathered the financial crisis better than their conventional 
counterparts, the Western world’s attention was attracted (Cihak and Hesse 2010). Conven­
tional investors have become interested in empirical comparative research between the two 
bank types. This remains neglected as the literature on Islamic finance primarily focuses 
on theoretical aspects. By our current contribution, we add to the existing empirical litera­
ture with three studies that compare the Islamic vis-a-vis the conventional banking system 
from two aspects; that of technical efficiency and that o f failure risk. Furthermore, we in­
vestigate the benefits that the presence o f Islamic banks brings to the financial sectors of 
the GCC and we draw comparisons with developing and developed countries in the period 
o f the 2007 financial crisis.
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1.2 Structure of Thesis
The thesis is organized in five chapters o f which this, the introduction is the first. The 
second chapter compares the relative efficiency o f conventional and Islamic banks. Cost, 
profit, revenue and technical efficiency are examined using Financial Ratio Analysis (FRA) 
and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Methods used include a bootstrap test for equality 
o f means testing in the context of FRA and a meta-frontier decomposition o f DEA effi­
ciency scores into managerial efficiency and efficiency due to modus operandi. Results 
show that cost efficiency is higher in conventional banks but Islamic banks are closing the 
gap. The closing gap is due to the importance of human resource development in the recent 
years and the higher spending associated with it. Although the restrictions o f the Islamic 
banking system inhibit efficiency, superior managerial quality offsets this disadvantage.
The third chapter investigates the failure risk o f conventional and Islamic banks us­
ing survival analysis models. Survival analysis has a long history in the fields of health 
economics and engineering. Its application in bank failure studies remains limited. Our 
study is the first application of survival analysis in a comparative study of Islamic and 
conventional banks. The chapter provides an extensive investigation o f the relevance of 
idiosyncratic and systemic factors upon failure risk. We find that Islamic banks exhibit 
lower failure risk and, being less interconnected, there is a reduced likelihood of co-failure.
The fourth chapter focuses on the "synchronization" o f the 2007 financial crisis and 
investigates the contagion effects in developing and developed economies. The GCC is 
compared with other groups o f developing {i.e. Eastern Europe, BRICS) and developed 
{i.e. Core EU) economies to identify their different levels o f dependence to the impact of
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the exposure to the financial crisis. The Markov-Switching framework is used to identify 
the specific crisis transition dates and the crisis intensity for every country.
We find that the GCC was the last group of countries to be affected and that the 
impact of the crisis on the region was minimal. Bahrain, the financial hub of the GCC, 
contrary to other major financial centres like Malaysia or Hong Kong as, is affected with 
a significant delay and at lower intensity. In short, the prominence o f the Islamic banking 
sector has contributed to the region’s weathering o f the crisis. A fifth chapter provides an 
overall summary o f the conclusions of the thesis.
1.3 GCC Background Information
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a political and economic union of the Arab states 
that was founded on May 1981 among the six states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE. The superior economic performance of the GCC relative to other de­
veloping economies as well as the increased integration they have achieved compared to 
other Middle Eastern countries is remarkable (UNDP 2002). The GCC states show signif­
icant homogeneity among them on various geopolitical, macroeconomic and institutional 
aspects (IMF 2005). At first the six countries' share the same language and history. In terms 
o f monetary convergence, all GCC states have generally low inflation rates compared to 
other developing countries (IMF 2005). In addition, they all maintain long-standing fixed 
exchange rates to the US dollar with Kuwait being the only exception after switching to 
an undisclosed basket of currencies in May 2007. The remarkable exchange rate stabil-
1 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE
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ity given the liberalized financial sector has led to co-movements in the interest rates and 
similar sovereign creditworthiness (ECB 2005).
Economic activity in the GCC benefited from rising oil prices in the period 2003- 
2008. Oil prices then rose at a mean annual rate o f 14%. Over the same period real GDP 
growth averaged 6.6% per year, which was roughly three percentage points higher than 
during the period 1997-2002 (IMF 2011b). The strong positive correlation between oil 
prices and real GDP growth is a key characteristic of the GCC economy.
[Table 1 here]
There have been two similar cases in the past where rising oil prices led to signif­
icant revenues for the GCC countries yet these could not be manifested into sustainable 
growth after the oil prices reverted to normal levels due to the dominant size o f the hydro­
carbon sector. Relying on a non-renewable and highly volatile source o f income, such as 
oil and gas, can be an impediment to the growth prospects o f any country. Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar have the largest endowments of oil and gas respectively in the region. By con­
trast, Bahrain’s energy resources are depleted. All these necessitate the need for careful 
investment planning that would diversify the income of these countries away from energy 
towards sources that are non-exhaustible and less susceptible to price fluctuations.
To a degree, the GCC appears to have seized the opportunity better. Fiscal balances 
show increasing surpluses. International reserves soared to a record high level o f 515 USD 
billion in 2008, up from 75 USD billion in 2002 (IMF 201 lb). Having cut their external 
debt obligations from 66% to 12% of GDP, national governments now have the capacity 
to invest in projects designed to sustain economic growth (IMF 2011b). Investments in
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infrastructure and technology at the GCC level increased from 300 USD billion in 2004 to
2.5 USD trillion by the end o f 2008 (IMF 201 la).
[Figure 1 here]
Some countries have taken significant steps towards income diversification with Bahrain, 
which has established itself as a financial hub in the region offering exquisite products such 
as Islamic finance. Tourism and transportation are also promoted. The UAE have diver­
sified into tourism, manufacturing and financial services (IMF 2012d). Although Kuwait 
recently has engaged with financial services, its dependence on oil remains high. Saudi 
Arabia, by far the largest economy in the region (469.4 USD billion - 44.3% of GCC total), 
has the huge revenues from energy related products (89.3% o f total revenue in 2008); con­
struction and manufacturing are increasingly important as revenue sources (IMF 2011a).
As a result o f this diversification process, non-oil sectors in the GCC have been expand­
ing at 7.3% yearly, while the non-oil GDP represented 65% of total GDP in 2008, up from 
about 56-58% in the early 90’s. Economic growth is no longer entirely energy related.
[Figure 2 here]
1.3.1 Financial Sector
During the period 2003-2008 bank credit to the private sector has averaged a mean annual 
growth rate o f 23% (IMF 2010). Credit expansion was stronger in the UAE and Bahrain 
than other GCC states, peaking at 122% o f non-oil GDP in 2008. The availability of credit 
coupled together with low inflation and rapid economic growth prospects gave rise to high 
demand for real estate and equities. The UAE, Dubai in particular, were in the frontline
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of the real estate boom. Stock markets in the GCC region gained 22-60% in 2007 (IMF 
2012d).
The financial sector in the GCC is bank-based, in line with the fact that in most 
developing economies banks have a dominant role in channeling funds. Yet the size of the 
banking sector varies considerably from state to state. Bank assets are highest in Bahrain 
(1200% of GDP in 2008) and lowest in Oman (40% of GDP in 2008) (IMF 2010). In 
2008 absolute values, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are leading by 380 and 345 USD billion 
respectively, while Oman is at the bottom of the ranking scale with 10 USD billion. During 
the boom years, banks with access to international financial markets have been borrowing 
to saturate the need for credit.
The state’s influence in the banking sector and infrastructure investment is signifi­
cant. State ownership is highest in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, accounting for 52% and 
35% of bank assets respectively while in Bahrain and Kuwait it is much lower at 20% and 
13% respectively (IMF 2012a). Infrastructure investments in the GCC region are made 
through alternative (to banks) investment structures like sovereign wealth funds, mutual 
funds and central banks. The Bahraini wholesale banks are amongst the few in the region 
that specialize in project financing, mostly in Saudi Arabia, and pursue aggressive retail 
strategies in the broader MENA/South Asia region due to their less restricted operational 
framework. However, as the energy sector is entirely under state control, the state’s influ­
ence on the non-oil sector, inclusive o f banks, is significant particularly when it comes to 
equity injections needed to avoid financial distress as was the case during the Dubai crisis 
in 2009.
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Stock market capitalization in the GCC has grown to 650 USD billion in 2009 from 
117 USD billion in 2003 (IMF 2010). Although there have been examples o f GCC states 
issuing debt in the past, debt markets never really took off mainly due to the ample state 
liquidity together with the state’s role in investments. Recent developments in the stock 
markets o f the region include negotiations with Western stock exchanges which could help 
in further development (e.g. know-how, innovation) and integration o f GCC region stock 
markets with global financial markets.
1.3.2 Islamic Banking
Islamic banking industry was worth 1.3 USD trillion assets in 2011, representing a 150% 
increase over 5 years while countries like Australia, Nigeria and Russia have expressed 
their interest to promote Islamic banking operations (IMF 2010). Still Islamic banking is 
considered a niche market as Islamic assets represent only 1% o f the global market. Islamic 
bond issuance reached 82 USD billion globally with Malaysia, the largest market in Islamic 
finance, accounting for two thirds.
[Figure 4 here]
Islamic banking industry is particularly strong in the GCC where the presence of 
Islamic banks ranges between 12% and 35% o f total banking assets (IMF 2010). Islamic 
bond issuance (Sukuk) has grown substantially from around 5 billion USD in 2004 to 32 
billion USD in 2007. Islamic bonds represent about one-third o f sovereign and about a 
quarter o f corporate debt obligations.
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[Table 2 here]
Financial products utilized by Islamic banks remain tailor made to client needs. This 
lack o f standardization could be an impediment to subsequent development as it makes Is­
lamic financing options more expensive than those o f conventional finance. In addition 
legal compliance and regulatory issues receive increasing attention as for most o f these 
products there is no precedent to highlight potential issues in case o f dissolution or liquida­
tion. In addition, the Shariah compliance of some financial products and the unstandardized 
Shariah scholar opinion rulings enhance uncertainty.
Islamic banking is fundamentally different than conventional banking as it has evolved 
on the basis o f Islamic Law which prohibits any transaction involving interest. Certain busi­
ness types are not investable with respect to their sector (i.e. conventional finance, pork, 
alcohol, pornography) and their financial characteristics (i.e. debt to market capitalization 
<  30%). Islamic banks are not allowed to utilize complex derivatives (i.e. hedging instru­
ments, credit default swaps, options and short-selling) due to their uncertainty. At the same 
time financial products on the supply and demand side o f credit are built upon the notion 
o f equity participation and that all transactions need to involve a tangible asset. Risk shar­
ing happens with depositors and investors neither o f those having capital protection; hence 
allowing risk to pass through an Islamic bank granting it procyclical protection.
Mudarabah and Musharakah are some contracts that are based on the profit-and-loss 
sharing technique (PLS). In Mudarabah an investor (usually an Islamic bank) and an en­
trepreneur (individual or institutional) enter a joint venture where the investor provides the 
necessary funds and the entrepreneur provides the knowhow. The investor cannot inter-
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fere with the running of the business which is left entirely to the entrepreneur. Both parties 
agree ex ante on a ratio according to which they will split the profits which are unknown 
at the time of the agreement (e.g. 70/30 bank and investor accordingly). In case o f losses 
each party loses what he had contributed to the venture unless negligence o f a party can be 
proven. Musharakah basically differs in the number of participants in the venture and the 
contributions each one is allowed to make.
In practice, equity contracts are overshadowed by fee-based contracts where the bank 
charges a fee on top of the cost of a provided service. Fee-based contracts include the 
widely used Ijarah and Murabahah. Murabahah is in essence a cost-plus-profit sale. The 
bank arranges to sell a good to a customer and it charges a fee on the price which incorpo­
rates risks, costs and a profit margin. Ijarah on the other hand is a lease contract where the 
bank leases an asset to an investor (or consumer) and the latter pays fees for being allowed 
to use the asset. The preference of fee-based contracts is mainly due to the complexity and 
increased risks and costs in the tailor-made equity contracts.
Islamic banks face additional kinds of risk than conventional banks. For example, 
Shariah compliance risk is specific to Islamic banks and it entails potential losses arising 
from the Shariah Supervisory Board ruling a contract as illegitimate. The mission of a 
Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) is to ensure that the products offered by an Islamic bank 
are in accordance with the Islamic Law. Every product needs the approval o f the SSB; 
however as SSBs are unregulated and Scholars may not always agree a Shariah compliance 
risk is applicable for Islamic banks. In addition, other risk types such as operational and 
liquidity risk acquire a different perspective. Operational risk is inherent in Islamic finance
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as it is largely based on bespoke contractual agreements such as the tailor-made equity 
contracts. Moreover the fact that Islamic banks are relatively young, small and typically 
domestically owned may result in cost inefficiencies as there is evidence that cost efficiency 
requires a critical mass (Miller and Noulas 1996). Liquidity risk is crucial for Islamic 
banks given their restricted access to interbank market and the lack o f central bank lender 
o f last resort facilities. These facilities are based on conventional principles which makes 
an Islamic bank less eager to utilize them. At the same time the asset-backed nature of 
Shariah compliant contracts (i.e. collateralized by commodities or real estate) and the fact 
that conventional hedging instruments are banned, makes liquidity management vulnerable 
to market conditions, particularly inflation.
1.4 Appendix
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Table 1. Average Annual Real GDP Growth
Oil Real GDP Non-Oil Real GDP Real GDP
1997-2002 2003-2008 1997-2002 2003-2008 1997-2002 2003-2008
Bahrain 6.7 -3.1 4.0 9.3 4.7 6.9
Kuwait 9.1 7.3 6.8 9.8 7.2 8.7
Oman 15.0 1.0 6.5 9.2 9.3 5.8
Qatar 16.1 10.8 5.5 15.6 10.6 13.0
Saudi Arabia -1.7 5.8 3.5 4.6 1.7 4.9
UAE -0.1 3.9 7.3 9.9 4.7 8.3
GCC 1.7 5.6 4.8 7.3 3.7 6.6
Source: Country Authorities
Table 2. Debt Market in GCC, 2009
Sovereign 







Note: Numbers represent outstanding debt in billions o f USD. Source: IMF
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Chapter 2 
Efficiency comparison between Islamic and 
conventional banks in the GCC region
Abstract
In this chapter we examine the efficiency o f Islamic banks relative to conventional 
banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region over the period 2004 to 2007. We 
employ two o f the most widely used approaches in the literature and expand them further. 
Financial ratio analysis and DEA have been used over the same dataset so that results are 
directly comparable. Evidence from the financial ratio analysis are that Islamic banks are 
more revenue and profit efficient than their conventional counterparts but fall behind in 
terms o f cost efficiency although the gap is closing in the last years o f the sample. Boot­
strapping techniques ensure avoidance of small sample bias. DEA efficiency (from now on 
"gross efficiency") is decomposed into "net efficiency" (reflecting managerial inadequacies) 
and "type efficiency" (reflecting bank type specific inadequacies). In this way the advan­
tages of Stochastic Frontier Analysis are incorporated in the DEA approach since Islamic 
banks are not required to have the same goals as the conventional ones. Conventional banks 
are more efficient, attributable mainly to their higher "type efficiency" rather than having 
more capable personnel. Malmquist total factor productivity results show that productiv­
ity has risen for Islamic banks while it has fallen for conventional banks. Islamic banks 
had a massive expansion in technology, attributable to the new technologies implemented 
by some of the largest banks of the sector. Finally, correlation results between financial ra­
15
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tios and DEA efficiency scores show that these methods should be viewed as complements 
rather than substitutes.
2.1 Introduction
The 2007 financial crisis had a significant impact upon the conventional banking sector 
across the globe in terms of resilience, profitability and growth. By contrast, Islamic banks 
were largely insulated from the crisis (Willison 2009; Yilmaz 2009). The highly regulated 
operating environment which is in accordance with the Shariah principles, prohibits invest­
ments in financial instruments that were largely blamed for aggravating the crisis (Hasan 
and Dridi 2010). Islamic banks are prohibited from investing in complex derivatives (hedg­
ing instruments, credit default swaps), engaging in short-sales, receiving and charging in­
terest as well as investing in certain prohibited lines of business like conventional finance, 
pork and alcohol.
Conventional banks earn profits through the implementation of interest on both the 
asset side, where they offer a low interest rate on deposits, and the liability side, where they 
charge a high interest rate. The difference, or the spread, between the two rates constitutes 
the revenue o f the bank. Additionally conventional banks earn fee-based revenues for some 
o f their services. Islamic banks are essentially partners with entrepreneurs and borrowers 
through the equity-type profit and loss sharing (PLS) contracts2. In addition, Islamic banks
2 Mudarabah and Musharakah are two contracts that are based on the profit and loss sharing (PLS) tech­
nique. In Mudarabah and investor (usually an Islamic bank) and an entrepreneur (individual or institutional) 
enter a joint venture where the investor provides the necessary funds and the entrepreneur provides knowhow. 
The investor cannot interfere with the running of the business which is left entirely to the entrepreneur. Both 
parties agree ex ante on a ratio according to which they will split the profits - which are unknown at the 
time o f the agreement (e.g. bank 70% and individual 30%). In case o f losses each party loses what he had
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offer fee-based services3. Conforming to Shariah principles means that Islamic banks need 
to obtain the approval of each financial product from the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB). 
Islamic banks have taken significant steps towards standardizing their products and prac­
tises, aided by organizations such as the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). Yet many contracts, particularly o f the equity-type remain 
unstandardized meaning that they need to be tailored to each specific client or project and 
subsequently approved by the SSB. As Islamic banks are smaller in size relatively to con­
ventional banks they are unable to reap any benefits o f economies of scale. In addition, 
most Islamic banks are domestically owned and therefore have less opportunities to benefit 
from outside innovations and efficient practises. For these reasons the success of Islamic 
relative to conventional banks at the macroeconomic level is in contrast to expectations of 
performance at the microeconomic level. The characteristics that make Islamic banking 
macroeconomically successful are the ones likely to make it less technically efficient.
The first Islamic bank, the Dubai Islamic Bank, was founded in 1975 at which point 
only fundamental contracts {e.g. safekeeping accounts, PLS contracts) were available. Is­
lamic bonds were launched in 1978 followed by Islamic equity funds and Islamic insur­
ance during the 1990s. More recently Islamic equity indices have been introduced such as 
the Dow Jones Islamic Markets (DJIM) and the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 
Shariah. The first Islamic products were largely developed to cater for government and cor­
contributed to the venture unless negligence of a party can be proven. Musharakah differs in the number of 
participants in the venture and the contributions each one is allowed to make.
3 Murabahah and Ijarah are two widely used fee-based contracts. Murabahah is in essence a mark-up sale. 
The bank arranges to sell a good to a customer and it charges a fee on the price which incorporates risks, costs 
and a profit margin. Ijarah is a lease contract where the bank leases an asset to an investor (or consumer) and 
the latter pays fees for being allowed to use the asset.
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porate funding requirements. But the growth in size and wealth of the Muslim population 
fed the appetite for financial products that would be Shariah-compliant. Response at the 
government level included the introduction o f a dedicated Islamic banking system in Iran, 
Sudan and Pakistan. Today only Iran maintains this system while the rest of the countries 
operate a dual-banking system where conventional and Islamic banks operate alongside. 
At the corporate level the challenge has been to introduce financial products in accordance 
with Shariah that would cover the same needs as the conventional ones while at the same 
time offering similar rates of return. Through the subsequent evolutionary process Islamic 
credit cards and mortgages have been available to the mainstream investors in the recent 
years. Pressure on Islamic banks to continue to innovate is provided by the increasing ap­
peal o f the traditional values of Islamic finance to Western investors who are disillusioned 
with the banking practises of conventional banks in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis 
(Arthur D Little 2009). Appetite for Islamic banks is further enhanced as Islamic banks 
are found to exhibit less failure risk than conventional banks (Cihak and Hesse 2010). As 
a consequence, Islamic financial institutions, more than 300 in around 70 countries, are no 
longer confined to the Muslim world. Indeed, there are 5 Islamic banks in the UK and 19 
Islamic financial institutions in the USA.
A study o f the Islamic banking sector and how it compares to the conventional sec­
tor in efficiency terms receives renewed interest not only because o f the traditional linkages 
between bank efficiency and economic development and stability but also for the increased 
interest from the conventional point o f view. Yet problems may arise from a comparison of 
the two bank types as they do not necessarily share the same goals. While profit maximiza­
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tion is the goal o f a conventional bank, Islamic banks may be willing to operate at a lower 
profitability level in order to remain Shariah-compliant. In addition the accounting state­
ments o f Islamic banks are not readily comparable to those o f conventional banks; hence 
some standardization needs to take place before any analysis.
The paper contributes to the empirical research related to bank efficiency in four 
ways. Firstly by combining two widely used methodologies; bootstrapped Financial Ratio 
Analysis (b-FRA) and a Meta-Frontier variance o f the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
(Chames, Cooper and Rhodes 1978; Banker, Chames and Cooper 1984). The use of two 
estimation approaches allows us to assess whether results and conclusions related to effi­
ciency vary by the type of analysis; hence draw conclusions on whether the two methods 
can substitute one another. Advantages of the FRA approach are their ease o f interpretation 
and the simple econometric analysis involved. As disadvantages the lack of an underlying 
theory as well as the inability to capture the comlexity of a bank in a few ratios. Another 
point o f concern in FRA is the limited sample size that usually accompanies such studies. 
In our case small sample size is not an immediate concern, however we propose a boot­
strapped version of the FRA which corrects for any small sample bias and provides more 
reliable estimates as well as an approach which could be used elsewhere. DEA on the other 
hand does not impose any restrictions on the distribution of efficiency scores (like Stochas­
tic Frontier Analysis). By contrast, it allows for more complicated models that capture 
better than the FRA a bank’s model o f business. Secondly, in contrast to classical finan­
cial ratio analysis which can be affected by small sample bias, we implement a bootstrap 
technique - the first time utilized in banking context to correct for any small sample bias.
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Thirdly, the Meta-Frontier Data Envelopment Analysis (MF-DEA) method decomposes ef­
ficiency into two components; one due to the modus operandi and one due to managerial 
competence at converting inputs to outputs (O’Donnell, Prasada-Rao and Battesse 2008). 
To our knowledge this is the first application of this technique in a comparative analy­
sis o f Islamic and conventional banks. Contrary to original DEA applications, MF-DEA 
does not impose the restriction that both bank types have the same goals. Fourthly, we 
use a large and consistent sample size of 69 banks over the 2004-2007 period in the Gulf- 
Cooperation Council (GCC). The particular strengths o f our sample is the inclusion o f 19 
Islamic banks, much larger than similar studies and the inclusion o f the whole GCC. Many 
studies in the field that compare these two bank types either use small samples, particu­
larly o f Islamic banks due to data limitations or, in an effort to boost sample size, they pool 
observations across a number o f disparate countries which can lead to unreliable results. 
In addition, there have been efficiency studies focusing on the banking sector of specific 
GCC economies, like Darat et al. (2007) for Kuwait or Al-Jarrah and Molyneux (2005) for 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Finally, we complement our study with a productivity analy­
sis and its components under our study period to uncover reasons for the discrepancies in 
the efficiency scores. Policy implications from this chapter comprise the combined use of 
distance frontier methodologies with financial ratio analysis as well as the decomposition 
of efficiency score into a managerial component (this has been the focus o f most studies 
in the past) and a component related to the modus operandi of the banks (Islamic versus 
conventional). We verify that the Islamic banking system is inherently less efficient due to 
its restrictions. By constrast the managers employed in Islamic banks are more efficient in
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dealing with these restrictions. Any policy attempts to further enhance efficiency in Islamic 
banks should target the restrictions of the system first and then the managers.
The paper is organized in six sections o f which this is the first one. A literature 
review is presented in section 2 while section 3 describes the methodological approaches 
utilized. Data are presented in section 4 while section 5 presents the results. A sixth section 
concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Performance evaluation within the banking industry at the macro level is essential to as­
sess governmental policies related to deregulation, mergers and acquisitions and economic 
growth. At the micro level measuring efficiency is essential to promote good practises and 
discourage bad practises which would boost managerial performance and subsequently im­
prove the bank’s efficiency in converting inputs to outputs.
Since the true level of efficiency is unknown there is not consensus in the litera­
ture about the best approach. The common ground among all approaches is the notion 
o f "benchmarking" the performance of selected Decision Making Units (DMUs) against 
themselves or some standards. The notion o f relative comparison is very intuitive and eas­
ily understood by non-technical oriented industry managers. The benefit of combining 
statistical analysis with relative "benchmarking" is the quantification o f the inefficiencies 
(Berger and Humphrey 1997).
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2.2.1 Financial Ratio Analysis
Studying banking efficiency4 can be done in two ways: by the use o f financial ratio analysis 
(FRA) or by the more statistically intense frontier analysis methods (DEA). Financial ratios 
are popular for a number of reasons. First they are easy to calculate and interpret making 
them ideal for non-experts. Secondly the allow comparisons to be made to other banks or 
relative to a "benchmark", which is usually the average o f the industry sector, or against 
time (Hassan and Bashir 2005; Halkos and Salamouris 2004). Despite the wide usage of 
financial ratios they are not without drawbacks. First o f all financial ratio analysis does not 
have any underlying theory meaning that a firm can calculate its own ratios in such a way 
that conceals problems. Secondly, most financial ratios cannot capture the complete picture 
o f performance o f a complex organization over the breadth o f its activities. In addition to 
that there is no criterion for selecting a ratio that is appropriate for all interested parties (Ho 
and Zhu 2004). In the context of Islamic banking there is the additional concern whether 
financial ratios can distinguish between the two bank types. Olson and Zoubi (2008) tackle 
this question by using nonlinear classification techniques such as neural networks and find 
that financial ratio analysis is indeed meaningful within such a comparative context. Yet 
the underlying assumption is that banks pursue such goals {i.e. profit maximization) which 
makes their financial ratios look better than the other banks. That could be a potential 
drawback o f their application in the context o f Islamic banks where these might not be the 
most pressing objectives (Abdul-Majid et al. 2010).
4 A Decision Making Unit (DMU) in this case is a bank. The same approach can be used with firms or 
public organisations.
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Financial ratio analysis can suffer from small sample bias especially in this compar­
ative framework where data for Islamic banks are limited. Still as FRA boils down to some 
sort o f statistical significance test o f the difference in means any small sample bias would 
be eliminated if a bootstrapping methodology is applied. One o f the first applications of 
conducting a bootstrapping version for a mean hypothesis test is found in Allen (1997). 
More recent applications include the Desagne et al. (1998)and the Peretti and Siani (2006) 
in a medical-economics context. The former is a non-parametric version while the second 
compares a parametric and a non-parametric approach. The parametric approach imposes 
a certain distribution on the financial ratios before drawing the bootstrap sample. The non- 
parametric is less restrictive as it is manifested by repeatedly drawing a random sample 
with replacement and each time calculating the test statistic.
2.2.2 Frontier Analysis Methods
The frontier analysis methods are based upon production theory and allow for multiple 
inputs and multiple outputs. The estimation of the production possibility frontier, which 
is tantamount to the efficiency frontier, has been done by at least five different approaches 
that can be broadly grouped into parametric and non-parametric. The differences in these 
methods relate to: i) whether a functional form is imposed for the production frontier; ii) 
the distribution assumption underlying the stochastic error, provided that the latter has been 
specified; iii) the distribution assumption for the efficiency scores.
Parametric approaches impose a functional form for the production function and al­
low for the presence of stochastic errors to affect the efficiency scores o f all units. The
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most common parametric approach is the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) while oth­
ers include the Distribution-Free Approach (DFA) and the Thick Frontier Approach (TFA). 
The functional form that SFA posits is usually the half-normal, as efficiency scores cannot 
be negative while stochastic errors follow the normal distribution. Other distributions have 
been proposed {i.e. truncated normal, gamma) as more appropriate to deal with the issue 
o f firm clustering around full-efficiency levels which occurs under the half-normal (Greene 
1990; Berger and DeYoung 1996; Yuengert 1993). DFA relaxes the assumptions on ef­
ficiency scores and random error of the SFA by assuming that firm efficiency is constant 
across time. Any inefficiencies are then attributed to firm-specific characteristics in a way 
similar to a fixed effects model (Lang and Welzel 1996). Contrary to SFA and DFA, TFA 
only provides estimates of a general level of efficiency in the examined sector rather than 
individual efficiency scores.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is the most commonly used non-parametric ap­
proach. The method, which imposes no underlying assumptions on the production function, 
provides a piece-wise linear frontier that envelops the observed production points {i.e. the 
firms). The firms that constitute the frontier, the efficient ones, are those that make the op­
timal utilization o f inputs to produce outputs. In other words no other firm can create more 
outputs, given inputs or utilize less inputs, given outputs. Moreover, by enveloping the ob­
served production points, the DEA frontier allows each bank to have different objectives as 
it will only be compared with banks o f similar input and output mix. In the present context 
this means that Islamic banks whose main objectives are likely to differ from those of con­
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ventional bank, will not be penalized (in terms of efficiency measurement) relative to their 
conventional counterparts.
There is a considerable literature on the efficiency of banking institutions o f specific 
countries or broader regions. See for example Drake and Simper (2002) for the UK, Berg 
et al. (1993) for Norway, Halkos and Salamouris (2004) for Greece, Berger and Mester 
(2003) for the USA, Altunbas et al. (2001) for Europe, Staikouras et al. (2008) for Central 
and Eastern Europe, Al-Jarrah and Molyneux (2005) for Middle East and Allen and Rai 
(1996)for an international study. Reviews o f studies on efficiency analysis can be found in 
Berger and Humphrey (1997); Berger and Mester (1997); Casu et al. (2001) and Brown 
and Skully (2002). The literature that addresses the issue of banking efficiency specifi­
cally in Islamic banks is less broad. There are studies focusing on individual countries, 
predominantly Malaysia (Kamaruddin et al. 2008; Sufian 2006, 2007) and Sudan (Hassan 
and Hussein 2003; Saaid 2005; Saaid et al. 2003). Others have a regional (El Moussawi 
and Obeid 2010, 2011; Mostafa 2007, 2011) for the GCC, or international focus (Hassan 
2005,2006; Sufian, 2009; Yudistira 2004; Viverita et al. 2007, Brown, 2003). Neverthe­
less of special interest are the studies that compare Islamic and conventional banks. The 
remainder of this section will focus predominantly on studies which compare Islamic and 
conventional banks.
Islamic banks might be expected to have lower efficiency than conventional banks 
for a number o f reasons. First, the strict application o f Shariah rules means that many of 
the Islamic banking products are unstandardized thereby increasing operational costs rel­
ative to those o f conventional banks. Second, Islamic banks tend to be small, in terms of
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accounting profile, compared to conventional banks, and there is consistent evidence that 
technical efficiency increases with the size o f the bank (Miller and Noulas 1996 (USA); 
Bhattacharyya et al. 1997 (India); Jackson and Fethi 2000 (Turkey); Isik and Hassan
2002 (Turkey); Drake and Hall 2003 (Japan); Sathye (2003) (India); Abdul-Majid et al. 
2005 (Malaysia); Chen et al. 2005 (China); Drake et al. 2006 (Hong Kong)). Third, Is­
lamic banks are often domestically owned and the majority o f the evidence suggests that 
foreign-owned banks are more technically efficient than their domestically-owned counter­
parts (Isik and Hassan 2002 (Turkey); Jemric and Vujcic 2002 (Croatia); Hasan and Marton
2003 (Hungary); Weill 2003 (Europe); Sturm and Williams 2004 (Australia); Kasman and 
Yildirim 2006 (Central & Eastern Europe); Matthews and Ismail 2006 (Malaysia); Mokhtar 
et al. 2008(Malaysia)). Yet there are studies suggesting that the opposite is true (Rizvi 2001 
(Pakistan); Sathye 2001 (Australia); Sensarma 2006 (India); Sufian 2006 (Malaysia)).
Three relevant studies adopting FRA methodology have generally found, contrary to 
our ex ante hypothesis, that Islamic banks are more efficient than conventional banks. Has­
san and Bashir (2005) find that Islamic banks are more efficient than conventional banks in 
terms of resource use profitability, asset quality, capital adequacy and liquidity. Yet Islamic 
banks have higher cost inefficiencies which can be attributed to the higher importance of 
human resource development process taking place. Ahmad et al. (1998) finds that manage­
rial staff in Islamic banks are worse qualified to than that o f conventional banks but the gap 
is closing in recent years (Pellegrina 2008). A similar study o f Bader et al. (2007) finds 
that Islamic banks perform similarly to conventional banks in terms o f cost, profit and rev­
enue efficiency. A third study, although not strictly related to efficiency, that of Hasan and
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Dridi (2010)finds that Islamic banks have higher capitalization, profitability and liquidity 
ratios than the conventional counterparts.
The results from studies which use frontier estimation methods are not so clear-cut. 
Three studies (one of which is in the GCC) support our ex ante hypothesis by finding that 
Islamic banks are significantly less efficient than conventional ones (Mokhtar et al. 2007, 
2008 (Malaysia); Srairi 2010 (Middle-East)). The vast majority o f frontier studies find no 
significant difference between the two bank types (El-Gamal and Inanoglou 2005 (Turkey); 
Grigorian and Manole 2005 (Middle East); Mokhtar et al. 2006 (Malaysia); Bader 2008 
(Middle East); Hassan et al. 2009 (Middle East)), while in other studies the significance of 
the difference between the two bank types is not tested (Hussein 2004 (Bahrain); Al-Jarrah 
and Molyneux 2005 (Middle East); Said 2012(International)). The small sample size pri­
marily o f Islamic banks might underpin the findings o f some of these studies. Where sam­
ple sizes are large, the data have often been pooled over a variety o f countries with very 
different economic backgrounds making it difficult to isolate the effect on efficiency on 
Islamic banks. Few previous studies have investigated the reasons why Islamic banks dif­
fer from conventional banks in terms of efficiency. There are four noteworthy exceptions 
which due to their decomposition o f efficiency into "gross" and "net" (Abdul-Majid et al. 
2008, 2010, 201 la, 201 lb). The efficiency attributed to both managerial incompetence and 
the modus operandi is termed "Gross efficiency" while the managerial component can be 
isolated as "Net efficiency". Evidence from Malaysia suggest that "Gross efficiency" is sig­
nificantly higher for conventional banks than Islamic banks. However, differences in "Net 
efficiency" are minimal and suggest that managerial competence does not differ between
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the two bank types (Abdul-Majid et al. 2008, 201 la, 201 lb). A generalized version of the 
study for 10 countries reaches the same conclusion providing more evidence that any inef­
ficiencies are mainly due to the constraints under which Islamic banks operate rather than 
managerial inadequacies (Abdul-Majid et a l 2010). The studies use SFA to achieve the 
decomposition o f efficiency into "Gross" and "Net". Gross efficiency is in essence a SFA 
which makes no allowance for bank-specific characteristics while "Net efficiency" is a SFA 
conditional on bank-specific information.
Finally, various studies have examined productivity (Worthington 1999; Barros et 
al. 2009) but the empirical research comparing the productivity o f the two bank types is 
very limited. Productivity, as defined by the Malmquist productivity index, has increased 
over the period 1996 - 2002 in the banking sector of Malaysia. However this change is a 
consequence of technology innovations rather than improvements in technical efficiency. 
There is no significant difference in the productivity between the two bank types (Abdul- 
Majid et al. 2008). In the GCC there are two studies with opposite findings. The study 
o f Ramanathan (2007) documents an increase in the productivity o f the banking sector in 
the period 2000 - 2004 while that of Ariss et al. (2007) evidences a decrease in, roughly, 
the same period. Yet neither study approaches the issue with a comparative perspective 
between conventional and Islamic banks. Table 1 summarizes the literature that focuses on




2.3.1 Financial Ratios Analysis and Bootstrapping
We adopt six standard financial ratios which assess cost, revenue and profit efficiency. Our 
choice o f financial ratios is motivated by the study o f Bader et a l  (2007), which we restrict 
in the GCC, and also by data availability. Table 2 presents the financial ratios used and 
their definitions.
[Table 2 here]
In every year we report the mean and median ratios for Islamic, conventional and 
all banks. The t-test for equality o f means is applied to test for significant differences in 
the means o f Islamic and conventional banks. We also perform the Mann-Whitney and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric tests which capture differences in the medians and 
in higher moments o f the distributions o f the financial ratios.
To enhance the FRA analysis we adopt the bootstrap approach of Desagne et a l 
(1998) on our dataset o f conventional and Islamic banks in the GCC region. Specifically 
we perform the bootstrap procedure for each o f the 4 years in our sample and again for the 
pooled dataset. We expect the bootstrapped p-values to be much different to the original 
ones in the 4 individual years than in the pooled sample since the small sample bias will be 
more evident there. The bootstrap approach is briefly described below.
The original data sets for the conventional and the Islamic banks are defined respec­
tively as:
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X i T, X l T, . . . , X i iT (2.1)
YlT,YlT,...,Ylr (2.2)
where sample sizes are m  =  50 and n  =  19 for conventional and Islamic banks 
respectively. The superscript i, which is not a power, takes values from 1 to 6 and is used to 
indicate one o f the six financial ratios in the sample5. The subscript r  denotes the specific 
year analyzed and takes values r  =  2004,..., 20076. The hypothesis test o f the equality of 
means is outlined below.
Ho : /xm)T =  /in)r (2.3)
H i : M m .r^ /V r (2-4)
We utilize the t-statistic for two unequal samples with unequal variances to do the 
hypothesis test o f equality of means for the two groups7.
The numerator is composed o f the means values for the two original samples of 
conventional and Islamic banks for each of the i financial ratios at each of the r  years. The 
denominator is composed of their respective variances divided by the sample sizes. The
5 l=Cost to Income; 2=Non-interest expenses to average assets; 3= Return on average assets (RoA); 4=Re- 
tum on average equity (RoE); 5=Net Interest Margin; 6=Other operating income to average assets
6 We also run the bootstrap for the pooled sample in which case the t subscript can be dropped.
7 The assumption o f equal variances cannot be accepted as the Levene’s test for equality o f variances is 
rejected at least at the 95% significance level.
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next step is to calculate the initial value o f the t statistic (tlobs T) directly from the sample. In 
our case there are 24 different values (6 for every year) presented in the table 3.
The next step is to formulate the samples from where we will bootstrap. A prerequi­
site for bootstrapping is that we need respect the null hypothesis o f equality o f means (or 
bootstrap under the null); some transformation is necessary. This is done by changing one 
o f the initial samples, in our case the sample of Islamic banks (Y ). In each observation we 
add the mean of the conventional banks and subtract the mean of the Islamic banks. Again 
this is done over the 4 years of the analysis. Mathematically:
Next we can apply the bootstrap which will create two new samples of the same size
and the modified sample of Islamic banks. The new bootstrapped samples will be:
[Table 3 here]
(2 .6)
by selecting randomly and with substitution from the initial sample o f conventional banks
(2.7)
(2 .8)
From the bootstrapped samples we calculate again the t-statistic:
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We repeat the two final (drawing sample and calculating the t-statistic) steps b times 
and get b different values for the t-statistic. The final step is to calculate the new p-values 
based on the formula:
To give an example8 in case of b =  9999, we have 3 5 9 1 values greater than | t \bs 2004
2.3.2 Data Envelopment Analysis
The DEA technique was first used by Chames, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) [CCR model] 
and developed further by Banker, Chames and Cooper (1984) [BCC model]. It assumes that
technology. The difference between the two models is that the CCR assumes constant 
returns to scale while the BCC allows for increasing or decreasing returns to scale. In other 
words the BCC model allows for conditioning the DM U’s efficiency on its size.
8 The example is based on the Cost to income ratio of 2004
9 The DMUs can be banks, hospitals, educational institutes, supermarket branches, government bodies and 
so on.
*  = * ------------------------—
* €  [1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6]
(2 .10)
(2 .11)
t  € [2004,2005,2006,2007] (2.13)
and 68 values smaller than 1^* 20041* S° according to the formula the p-value will be:
(2.14)
a decision making unit (DMU9) uses similar inputs to produce alike outputs using similar
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One important step in the DEA analysis is the choice o f input and output variables. 
Unfortunately data are not always available particularly for developing countries. Moreover 
when the DMU is a bank there is the long-standing debate on what constitutes a bank’s 
output that must be tackled; for instance there is not unanimity on whether deposits should 
be considered as an input or an output variable (Heffeman 2005). Which measure of bank 
services is better; the number o f transactions or their value? To deal with this problem there 
are two choices one can follow: the production approach or the intermediation approach. 
In the production approach the bank is treated as a firm that produces services by taking 
capital and labour inputs. Usually the number o f deposit accounts is taken as output and the 
number of employees as input. In the intermediation approach banks act as intermediaries 
between savers and borrowers. Usually total loans, total deposits are outputs and operating 
costs are inputs. The intermediation approach is commonly used in banking context (Berger 
and Humphrey 1991).
The production technology of the DMUs is P (x)  and stands for all input vectors 
x  e that aid the DMU in producing all output vectors y e R+
This can be written as:
p (x )  =  {y e  R s+ : x  can produce y}  (2.15)
The output distance function which is non-decreasing in y  and increasing in x, lin­
early homogeneous in y, if y  € P {x ) then D o {x ,y )  5; 1 and D o {x ,y )  =  1 only if y 
belongs to the frontier o f the output set (i.e. lies on the production possibility curve), is 
defined on the output set P {x)  as (Shepherd 1970; Coelli et a l  2005):
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D o {x ,y )  =  mine{9 : (y\0) €  P(a?)} (2.16)
DEA is a non-parametric estimator o f the technical efficiency score o f a DMU through 
the estimation o f the output distance function. The DEA technique calculates an efficiency 




T E k =  ^ -------- (2.17)
'Vi'X'ik
i= 1
Where yr* and a;**. are respectively the r  output and % input o f the k DMU. Each 
DMU therefore uses the set of weights which gives it maximum efficiency (subject to the 
constraint that weights must be universal). Productive efficiency can be split in technical 
efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE)10. Technical efficiency is a measure of the 
firm’s ability to maximize outputs given a set o f inputs. Allocative efficiency measures 
the firm’s ability to minimize the cost of inputs while maintaining the same level of out­
put. Moreover a Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) model can be used which will allow the 
decomposition o f technical efficiency (TE) into pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale 
efficiency (SE). The VRS model allows DMUs to be working at different than optimal level 
(e.g. in some countries state owned banks might be working with more than required per­
sonnel for political reasons). Scale efficiency is the "penalty" that the DMU is paying for 
not working at the optimal level.
10 We do not calculate allocative efficiency due to data limitations
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DEA creates a frontier, or an envelopment surface, from the efficient DMUs. These 
DMUs are the efficient ones in the sample as they produce the most output from a given 
set o f input. These units are assigned an efficiency score of 1 while the rest, least efficient 
units, are assigned scores less than one11.
The following primal linear programming equation set must be solved to get the 
optimal weights and consequently the efficiency scores. However we normally compute 
the dual since the fewer constraints, s +  m  instead o f n  +  1, make computations easier. 
Table 4 lists the linear programming equations required to solve a DEA problem.
The above model is the CCR or constant return to scales (CRS) model; however 
variable returns to scale can be easily incorporated, so that scale efficiency measures can 
be calculated if this additional constraint is included:
Once the VRS model has been estimated, scale efficiency can be estimated by divid­
ing the CRS efficiency score by the VRS efficiency score. DEA is very appealing to our 
context as it allows different banks to have different goals and priorities. Thus there are 
two efficient frontiers; one for the conventional and one for the Islamic banks. Of course 
there is a third, global frontier that envelops every bank. In figure 1 the dots represent Is­
lamic banks and the X represent conventional banks. For the sake o f simplicity there is 
only one input, fixed assets, and one output, loans. The frontier GHI is the Islamic frontier
11 This is the output maximising approach. There is also the option of keeping the output fixed and then the 





and the BCD is the conventional frontier. These were created by running the DEA analysis 
twice; including only Islamic banks and including only conventional banks. Finally there 
is a general frontier, GCD that treats every bank as having the same management priori­
ties. In figure 1 assume for instance bank Y. This bank lies inside the general frontier so it 
is inefficient. We will call this efficiency "Gross efficiency". Bank Y has a gross efficiency 
score o f Oy/Oy” which is obviously less than 1 since 0y” >0y and represents the proportion 
o f output (loans) achieved by bank Y relative to the best possible output in the sample us­
ing bank’s Y input as reference12. Relative to frontier GHI (Islamic frontier), bank Y is also 
inefficient. We call this inefficiency called "Net efficiency" and is represented by the dis­
tance Oy/Oy’ on the graph. Net efficiency shows how well a bank performs relative to its 
type. In this case for instance bank Y is an Islamic bank which is Oy/Oy’ inefficient com­
pared to Islamic banks and Oy/Oy” inefficient compared to all banks. If  we divide "gross 
efficiency" by "Net efficiency" we get a ratio of 0y’/0y” which is the "Type efficiency" score 
giving an indication of the impact of conducting business in a Shariah compliant way can 
have on efficiency.
[Figure 1 here]
The construction of metafrontiers on DEA estimates comes with the assumption of 
convexity. Convexity is particularly important as the enveloping surface o f DEA connects 
via straight lines the efficient banks while all the inefficient are located below the envelop­
ing surface (Beltran-Esteve et a l 2013). However the straight lines imposes a restriction
12 This is the maximising output approach. One could use the minimising input approach where output 
would be used as reference and the DMU achieving that output with the least input would be the most 
efficient.
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that the inputs and outputs are not always divisable. For example, if the input is the num­
ber o f buildings then a bank may have one, two or three buildings but cannot have two and 
a half buildings. If  this assumption is considered restricting then other techniques may be 
prefered like Free Disposal Hull (FDH) which works in the same way as DEA besides that 
it does not impose convexity (De Witte and Marques 2009). However when inputs and out­
puts are in monetary units and when the sample size is large, then the convexity assumption 
would not be as restricting since the frontier o f DEA would tend to be smoother and ap­
proximate that o f the FDH. Hence we employ DEA to maintain the comparability o f our 
results to the majority of the studies which have used DEA approach as opposed to the very 
limited amount of research that has utilised FDH (Tiedemann et al. 2011).
2.3.3 Malmquist productivity
The Malmquist productivity index, another instrument within the DEA framework, is made 
up o f the change in technical efficiency and the change in technology (Malmquist 1953). 
This shows if an inefficient DMU is moving closer to the efficiency frontier (catching up) 
and how much the efficiency frontier is shifting due to technological change.
For the Malmquist productivity index to be calculated a balanced panel of data is 
needed so that cross-sectional data over a period of time are available. Assuming t, t +
1,..., T  as superscripts to denote different time periods we have D ^ x 1, y l) and D ^ l {xt+l, y t+1) 
representing the output distance functions for periods t  and £+1 respectively. The Malmquist 
productivity change index is defined as (Coelli et al. 2005):
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where:
and
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Which can be decomposed further into (Coelli et a l  2005):
(2 .21)
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The first component (E) shows an increase in technical efficiency if it is greater than 
1 or a decrease in technical efficiency if less than 1. It provides evidence on whether DMUs 
become more efficient over time meaning that resources are being used more productively. 
The second term (T) shows an increase (if greater than 1) or decrease (if less than 1) in 
technology. This is explained by shifts, inwards or outwards, in the benchmark efficient 
frontier.
The Malmquist productivity index has certain drawbacks which are elaborated in 
(Aparicio et al. 2013). Here we mention briefly that the main drawbacks are the slacks 
that are left from the previous stage of the DEA analysis and these constitute a non-radial
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form o f inefficiency which is not taken into account. This may be corrected using two 
approaches; i) first the slacks may be incorporated into the analysis as in Grifell-Tatje et al. 
(1998)and Chen (2003)or ii) the use of radial measures in the DEA efficiency stage which 
avoids the existence of slacks as in Dharmapala (2010). We adopt the second and more 
recent approach in our analysis which is found to perform better (Aparicio et al. 2013).
2.4 Sample Data
A consistent sample of all the GCC banks that have a full set of values for the variables 
required for the FRA and DEA over the entire period under study (2004-2007) is required. 
Bankscope is the data provider. Since most banks report their accounting statements in their 
home currency their values were converted to United States Dollars (USD) using exchange 
rates provided by the Financial Times website13. These countries maintain fixed exchange 
rates to the USD so the choice of the date would not change the results. In addition, all 
variables were converted to 2007 prices using the GDP deflator which is calculated by 
dividing the nominal GDP by the real GDP for each country14. The number and type of 
banks included in the sample and population is shown in table 5 below:
[Table 5 here]
To implement DEA we select the intermediation approach as more appropriate for 
our kind o f study (Pasiouras 2008). The choice of input and output variables is motivated
13 1$ = 0.37686BHR(Bahrain) = 0.27283KWD (Kuwait) -  0.38495OMR (Oman) = 3.63871QAR (Qatar) = 
3.74736SAR (SaudiArabia) = 3.67249AED (UAE).
14 Necessary data were collected from the World Economic Outlook 2009
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by previous literature (Abdul-Majid et a l  2008; Casu and Girardone 2004; Casu et a l 
2004)and subject to data limitations. The output variables are:
•  Total Loans
•  Other Earning Assets
The inputs which comprise the funds from depositors as well as capital and labour 
employed by the banks are defined as:
•  Deposits and Short term funding
• Fixed Assets
•  General and Administration expenses (Overheads)
•  Equity
General and administration expenses are used as a proxy for labour input. Better 
proxies exist in the literature to capture labour costs (e.g. number o f employees or wage 
expenditure) yet they are not as easily available. In addition, it has been argued that a large 
share of general and administrative expenses is comprised by personnel expenses (Drake 
and Hall 2003).
Equity is included as an input to capture risk-taking in the banking sector. Charnes 
et al. (1990) first identified the necessity o f a risk proxy to be incorporated in banking 
efficiency models. They identified loan-loss provisions as a valid proxy. However data 
limitations prohibit us from utilizing loan-loss provisions as the sample, particularly that of
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Islamic banks, is reduced heavily. Therefore we include equity as a proxy for risk which has 
also been used in relevant studies (Abdul-Majid et al. 2008; Alam 2001; Mostafa 2007). 
Given the different financial products and practises o f Islamic banks, one would expect a 
difference in risk behavior between Islamic and conventional banks. Hence the inclusion 
of a risk variable in the model could make a difference to results. Indeed, Sufian (2006) 
finds that Islamic banks rank considerably higher in the efficiency scores when a risk proxy 
(loan-loss provisions in this case) is incorporated in the model.
Descriptive statistics for the DEA variables are presented in Table 6.
[Table 6 here]
The upward trend in banking business is clear for both types o f banks. Total loans, 
for example, have grown by around 90% (in real terms) over the 4-year period. For con­
ventional banks the growth is a little above 90% while for Islamic banks it is a little below. 
Similarly Deposits and short term funding  as well as Equity have increased, on average, 
by 62% and 81% respectively. The table also indicates that the average size o f an Islamic 
bank (at least in terms of Total loans) is around half the size o f a conventional bank. How­
ever, Islamic banks have higher fixed assets, on average, than conventional banks a finding 




The evolution of cost, revenue and profit efficiency o f conventional and Islamic banks can 
be seen in Figure 2 and Table 7.
[Figure 2 here]
[Table 7 here]
The Cost to Income and Non Interest Expenses to Average Assets ratios are generally 
higher for Islamic compared to conventional banks. The difference is statistically signifi­
cant in the case o f Non Interest Expenses to Average Assets. Yet the gap between the ratios 
for the two bank types is closing towards the latter years.
The higher expenses of Islamic banks could be associated to the different costs they 
face. An example would be the Shariah compliancy costs that include high salaries for the 
maintenance o f a Shariah Supervisory Board, higher legal costs due to the de facto  higher 
complexity of Islamic finance contracts as well as the legal ramifications for compliance of 
Islamic products with foreign laws. Furthermore the development Islamic financial prod­
ucts is a process which has not yet been standardized; hence many contracts need to be 
tailored made to the specific needs of every project or investor (Willison 2009). Islamic 
banks have been investing significantly in human resource development (Pellegrina 2008). 
The supply o f Islamic information technology solutions is more scarce than for conven­
tional banks which, besides the impact on operational risk, forces Islamic banks to main­
tain in-house technology developers. Moreover, cost efficiency requires a critical size of a 
bank necessary for economies o f scale and scope to emerge. Islamic banks are smaller than 
conventional ones in terms o f assets or almost all accounting measures as well as the vari­
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ety o f financial products they offer. Evidence from these two ratios show that conventional 
banks are more cost efficient than Islamic banks. However the gap is closing partly because 
Islamic banks learn the way of doing business and partly because of increases increase in 
size which allow gains in terms of cost efficiency as time goes by.
The Return on Average Assets (ROA) ratio is higher for Islamic than conventional 
banks. As Return on Assets is defined as Net Income/Assets where the assets are made up 
o f debt and equity. In that sense, ROA is a measure of profitability used to show the level 
o f bank efficiency in generating profits. Higher profit efficiency, verified by higher ROA is 
attributed to better managerial skills or more profitable projects that the Islamic banks are 
implementing and more efficient use of their resources15. The better quality o f resources 
for Islamic banks is verified in Hasan and Dridi (2010) as they find Islamic banks to be 
superior to conventionals in terms of liquidity and assets quality. Reasons for the higher 
profitability o f Islamic banks, which has been verified elsewhere, may be related to the fact 
that their investments are focused in the productive sector rather than in debt contracts (e.g. 
Certificates o f Deposit, Bonds) (Hasan and Dridi 2010). A closer relationship between the 
banking sector and the real economy is evidenced here which could make Islamic banks 
resistant to financial crises as they have less exposure to speculative debt instruments. As a 
consequence, financial products based on the Shariah could lead to risk decrease and better
portfolio diversification.
As Islamic banks are prohibited from debt transactions, that is they cannot expand 
their operations by issuing bonds like conventional banks, their Return on Equity ratios,
15 At this stage FRA cannot decompose the efficiency to a part attributed to managers and another attributed 
to practises. DEA analysis in the subsequent section will provide more insightful results.
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defined as Net Income/Equity is expected to be lower than that o f their conventional coun­
terparts. This is plausible given the higher leverage that CBs can achieve which would lead 
to higher earnings for their shareholders16. Yet, ROE is statistically the same for the two 
bank types. Islamic banks are smaller than conventional banks in terms o f equity however 
their net income is proportionally smaller which ensures the validity o f this result. This is 
indeed an important result highlighting that the stockholder is not significantly disadvan­
taged by investing in a Shariah compliant way. Islamic banks have managed to be equally 
profit efficient to conventional banks despite their restrictions.
Revenue ratios indicate that Islamic banks are more efficient than conventional banks. 
The Net Interest Margin (NIM) is higher for Islamic banks although the difference between 
the two bank types is not statistically significant. Net Interest Margin shows the profit mar­
gin of a bank’s traditional activity, borrowing at a low interest rate and lending at a higher 
one. For Islamic banks, the same concept applies but with reference to the profit-loss share 
ratio instead. Conventional banks working mainly in the retail sector face strong competi­
tion and meaning that they cannot afford to maintain a NIM higher than the (conventional) 
competition. The primary source o f NIM for IBs are large infrastructure and real estate 
projects via equity-type contracts on which they charge a premium. IBs are known to rely 
on connections with large and often family-owned conglomerates and name lending prac­
tises are widespread (IMF 201 lb). Typical IB clientele are governments that pay more 
attention to the ethics aspect o f the investment rather than its higher cost compared to a
16 Consider an IB and a CB of the same asset size and the same income but different capital structure. 
The first operating at 0% leverage (zero debt, only equity) and the second at 50% leverage (50% debt; 50% 
equity). The IB would have ROE=20% while the CB would have ROE=40%.
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conventional alternative; this is termed "Islamicity premium" in the literature (Khalil et al. 
2002).
Figure 3 shows that the GCC countries are developing very fast with an average 
real GDP growth o f 8.1% for the study period and 6.9% for the first decade o f the 21s* 
century. The economic boom in the Gulf region over the examined period can explain the 
higher returns on investments mainly in real assets which through PLS contracts manifest 
themselves into higher Net interest margins. In a period o f economic boom PLS operates as 
a form of equity for the investor (the bank) without capping its potential revenues. Similarly 
the economic boom can explain the "Islamicity premium" as if funds were limited then the 
cheapest option might have been favoured over the more ethical one.
[Figure 3 here]
The Other Operating Income to average assets (OOI) ratio is higher for Islamic banks 
throughout the examined period with the difference being statistically significant for the 
pooled data and for 2006 and 2007. This is indicating that the decomposition o f revenues 
into interest (or share ratio) and fee sources favors more the fee-based revenues (which are 
represented by OOI) in the case of Islamic banks. The reason for this is that the majority 
o f IBs favor the use o f fee-based contracts rather than those of the equity type due to their 




The application o f bootstrapping can avoid problems that arise from small samples 
and distort hypothesis testing. In our case we have benefited from more accurate p-values 
that help us understand better the magnitude of inefficiencies that exist in the banking sector 
of the GCC markets. We run the bootstrapping tests for b=999, b=9999 and for b=99999 
repetitions. Table 8 presents the original p-values as well as the three bootstrapped ones for 
each equality of means test. T-test p-values calculated using the non-parametric bootstrap 
approach are different to the original ones indicating a small sample bias in the yearly 
samples. Pooled p-values are not much different as the yearly ones.
[Table 8 here]
After correcting for the small sample bias, we find that differences in cost efficiency 
between conventional and Islamic banks are not as pronounced as the original p-values 
imply. Thus the "gap" in cost efficiency is adjusted downwards.
Rejecting the null hypothesis o f equality o f the means at the 99%, 95% and 90% 
significance levels based on bootstrapped17 p-values occurs only 1-time, 2-times and 2- 
times respectively18. Using the original p-values we were rejecting the null hypothesis 
2-times, 3-times and 0-times at the aforementioned significance levels. Furthermore all 
bootstrapped p-values are higher (less significant) than the original ones. This indicates that 
cost inefficiency o f Islamic banks was overstated due to a small sample bias. Therefore, in
17 b=9999
18 The null hypothesis of equality of means is rejected at the 99% significance level for Non-interest expenses 
in 2005. The null hypothesis of equality of means is rejected at the 95% significance level for Cost to income 
in 2004 and Non-interest expenses in 2006. The null hypothesis o f equality o f means is rejected at the 90% 
significance level for Non-interest expenses in 2004 and 2007.
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spite o f the Islamic banks still being less cost efficient when compared to their conventional 
counterparts, we argue that the difference is not as pronounced. Secondly Islamic banks 
are closing the gap as it can be observed from the significance level o f rejecting the null 
that is being reduced as we move from 2005 to 2007 in the Non Interest Expenses ratio and 
the rising p-values in the Cost to Income ratio19.
In profit efficiency there are also important differences between the significance levels 
of the bootstrap procedure and the original ones. Although results are not significant in 
the conventional significance levels, we get a less biased picture o f the evolution o f profit 
efficiency across time which was previously less clear. Most important differences are 
found in the Return on Assets ratio in 2005 and 2006 where the original p-values were 0.185 
and 0.09920, the bootstrapped ones being 0.379 and 0.276 correspondingly suggesting that 
profit efficiency was overestimated. The p-value of ROA in 2007 is very close to being 
significant at the 90% significance level both for the original and the bootstrapped ones 
providing clear evidence that IBs develop their processes across time and become more 
efficient. The bootstrapped p-values of Return on Equity ratio retain their insignificance.
Revenue efficiency ratios also have different p-values with the bootstrap approach. 
The bootstrapped p-values of the NIM ratio suggest that there is no statistical difference 
between the two bank types. Clearly the spike of NIM in 2005 was affected by the financial 
crisis in Saudi Arabia which is the largest financial market in the region. The p-values of
19 This fall o f significance across time represented by the rising p-values is observed much more clearly 
using the bootstrapped p-values.
20 Marginally significant at the 90% significance level.
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the OOI ratio have changed slightly without any major change in the significance of the 
results21.
The bootstrapped equality o f means tests do not change the main story. It mainly 
corrects the results for small sample bias. Islamic banks are still less cost efficient though 
the gap is much smaller. In the context of profit efficiency the reliance of Islamic banks 
on favorable macroeconomic environment is highlighted. Profit efficiency based on ROA 
may be overestimated when periods of boom are part o f the analysis. Revenue efficiency 
has improved significantly during the last two years of the analysis with robust results in 
favour o f Islamic banks.
2.5.2 DEA
The results of the DEA are derived using CRS and VRS models respectively. A measure 
of the overall technical efficiency is given by the CRS model while a measure of the pure 
technical efficiency is provided by the VRS model. The VRS model factors out any scale 
inefficiencies; the latter can be calculated as the ratio of CRS to VRS efficiency. The DEA 
analysis has been performed for every year as production conditions, political instability in 
the region and expanding markets are factors likely to affect efficiency scores. However we 
include an analysis for the pooled dataset, this one assuming that environmental conditions 
remain unchanged, basically for comparison purposes.
21 P-values o f Other operating income were 0.021 and 0.027 for 2006 and 2007 respectively and the boot­
strapped p-values are 0.034 and 0.043. Although a bit higher they still reject the null hypothesis o f equal 
means at the 95% significance level.
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Table 9 presents the descriptive statistics of the DEA analysis efficiency scores o f  
the gross, net and type measures of efficiency. Table 10 presents neatly the percentage 
difference in the efficiency score between the two bank types. Figure 4 presents a graphical
representation o f the evolution of the efficiency scores across time.
[Tables 9 and 10 here]
[Figure 4 here]
The mean Gross efficiency (CRS and VRS) for the whole period are a little lower 
than estimates over the 5-year period 2000 to 2004 according to the study o f Ramanathan 
(2007). Looking at the pooled efficiencies, Gross (CRS) efficiency is significantly higher, 
on average, for conventional banks compared to Islamic banks by around 5 percentage 
points. An examination of the VRS and scale efficiency scores suggests that this differ­
ence is caused by size differences (pure technical efficiency) where conventional banks 
outperform the Islamic ones by about 4 percentage points.
Net efficiency scores reveal smaller differences between the two bank types. This is 
in line with literature that utilized SFA (Abdul-Majid et a l  2 0 10)22. The decomposition 
into type efficiency shows that the modus operandi of Islamic banks is less efficient to that 
o f conventional banks. Thus the significant differences in Gross efficiency are mainly a 
consequence o f the rules under Islamic banks operate rather than managerial inadequacies. 
A similar conclusion was reached for the Malaysia case (Abdul-Majid et al. 2008).
When we run the DEA without the equity23 we find that conventional banks have 
(6.1% and 4.1% for CRS and VRS respectively) higher Gross efficiency than Islamic ones
22 We realise that we compare two different methodologies (DEA and SFA) however the fact that the same 
qualitative result is verified by both is reassuring.
23 These results can be found in table A 1 in the Appendix
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with results being statistically significant at the 10% significance level. Scale efficiency is 
4.5% higher for conventional banks, a result statistically significant at the 10% significance 
level. Results without the equity tend to make the differences between the two bank types 
bigger, which is in line with Sufian (2006). In Net efficiency terms, conventional banks 
are still more efficient (6.7% and 0.8% CRS and VRS respectively) with CRS results being 
significant at the 5% significance level. Additionally conventional banks are 8% more scale 
efficient verified at the 99% significance level. Type efficiency shows that Islamic banks 
are 0.2% more efficient when CRS is used but when VRS is used conventional banks are 
3.3% more efficient which is verified at the 99% significance level. Two differences in 
the efficiency scores of the two models (i.e. with and without the equity) are the higher 
efficiency scores when equity is included. Secondly, if equity is not included in the model 
then Gross efficiency differences are attributed both to the modus operandi o f Islamic banks 
and to managerial insufficiencies. The inclination towards risk-taking activity' in banking 
lies with managers and so it is no surprise that the model which does not capture risk- 
taking attributes a greater proportion of inefficiency to managerial shortcoming than the 
model which incorporates risk-taking activity.
Focusing on the evolution of efficiency scores across time, we observe that the gen­
eral picture of all three types of efficiency is a decrease in the first three years o f the study 
followed by a small rise in the last year. A reason for this pattern, which was also iden­
tified in the financial ratios part, could be the political instability in the region during the 
first years o f the study. The increase at the end o f the period is a signal that efficiency will 
increase as the region enjoys greater political and economic stability. An additional year
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could be the positive economic climate that existed in most countries around the world till 
about mid-2007 when the global financial crisis hit. However, the GCC countries were rel­
atively unaffected by the first stage of the crisis due to their significant growth rates. The 
GCC were among the last developing economies to become affected by the financial cri­
sis in mid-2008. Whilst the differences between Islamic and conventional banks that exist 
in the pooled dataset are also showing in the individual years, yet the differences are rarely 
statistically significant.
Table 11 presents mean DEA scores and financial ratios for each country.
[Table 11 here]
Gross efficiency is highest in UAE, Qatar and Bahrain. Evidence shows that Qatar 
and Bahrain, two of the most efficient and profitable countries according to the DEA and 
Financial Ratio results, operate in a concentrated markets (Qatar shows high concentration 
in some years). The comparatively low average efficiency for Saudi Arabia might seem 
surprising given the relatively large level of GDP and population in the country, as well as 
the competitive environment of its banking sector (see table 12).
[Table 12 here]
Concentration has been found to be positively linked to efficiency as efficient banks 
can afford to compete for greater market power (Demsetz 1973). Furthermore investments 
o f a significant size are necessary to boost and maintain high economic growth require 
large banking institutions to mobilize the funds the presence of which can increase mar­
ket concentration. This is in-line with our results for Bahrain and Qatar. However, the 
banking sector of Saudi Arabia is an exception to this rule as there are similar studies
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that also find the country’s banking sector to be less efficient compared to the other GCC 
states (Ramanathan 2007; Al-Muharrami 2008). Banks in the UAE are highly efficient yet 
they operate under a competitive market structure. We believe that UAE is a special case 
however due to its diversified economy into tourism and financial services which make, 
particularly the Dubai emirate, a financial haven in the area with many international con­
ventional banks having established a foothold there (UAE has more than double compared 
to any other country in the sample). Foreign owned international banks are more efficient 
than domestically owned ones see among others Isik and Hassan (2002).
This section concludes with a note on the comparison between the results of the 
FRA and DEA analyses. Table 13 presents the Spearman’s rank correlation for the pooled 
sample and year by year.
[Table 13 here]
The main result is that bank rankings according to Gross efficiency scores show a 
significant positive correlation to bank rankings derived only from the two cost ratios (CTI, 
NIE). Other correlation pairs, in terms of Net or Type efficiency and other Financial ratios, 
do not exhibit any significant relationship. Arguments exist that inefficient banks, accord­
ing to the DEA, could be more profitable than efficient ones (Taylor et a l  1997). The 
Spearman correlation’s negative sign between DEA efficiency scores and profit and rev­
enue efficiency financial ratios (ROA, ROE, NIM, OOI) supports this contention. It can 
be therefore suggested that FRA (particularly the profit and revenue efficiency ratios) and 




Table 14 presents the Malmquist productivity index24 and its decomposition into the 
efficiency (E) and the technology change index (T). The indices are reported for the four 
year interval 2004-2007 under the CRS and VRS efficiency measures. The Equivalent 
Annual Average Productivity Index (EAAPI) is also reported.
[Table 14 here]
Productivity over the four year period (2004 - 2007) has increased by about 1% for all 
banks, which translates to about 0.3% EAAPI. Similar studies of productivity covering the 
period 2000 - 2004 have found no change or even a decrease in productivity (Ramanathan 
2007; Ariss et al. 2007). The decomposition of the documented rise in productivity how­
ever reveals important findings. Technical efficiency has decreased by about 7% (1.9% 
EAAPI) whereas technology has increased by 9.4% (2.3% EAAPI). Broadly the same con­
clusion is reached through the VRS efficiency measures. Our results are contradicting the 
two previous studies for the GCC, namely those o f Ramanathan (2007)and Ariss et al. 
(2007) which document a positive technical efficiency change and negative change in the 
technology. Yet our results show more similarities to the studies covering Malaysia over 
the period 1996 - 2002 and the USA over the period 1990 - 1993 (Abdul-Majid et al. 2008; 
Devaney and Weber 2000).
The considerable economic growth o f the GCC has lead to growth o f the banking 
sector as well, evidenced by the expansion in the banks’ accounting statements (see table 6). 
This has been accompanied by a relatively large increase in technology, where technology
24 The Malmquist productivity index is calculated based on the gross efficiency measures.
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reflects financial products and infrastructure developments. Technology developments have 
shifted out the production possibility frontier and at the same time a detrimental effect 
on technical efficiency (how close the banks are to the production possibility frontier). 
This is plausibly explained by the slow diffusion of the best-practise operations by all 
banks. Especially when best-practises are imported, via international banks, more time 
is needed so that know-how gains are transmitted to the whole banking sector. The fact 
that substantial growth in a sector contributes positively on technology but negatively on 
technical efficiency is not unique to the banking sector; it has been verified for studies in 
the higher educational sector as well (Johnes 2008).
The apparent large improvement in technology over the period can be attributed to 
some o f the drivers for innovation in a financial context, which according to Willison (2009) 
are:
•  Product innovation
• Customer service
• Operational efficiency
• Risk management and control
•  Regulation
The study period is one which has seen considerable product innovation and op­
erational improvements. Historically, the Islamic banking sector has had poor record of 
R&D and innovations because the banks are small with unstandardized products and sys-
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terns (Khan and Bhatti 2008). Indeed, a study of productivity change in Malaysia over the 
1996-2002 period identifies that Islamic banks have the lowest degree o f productivity and 
technology change (Abdul-Majid et a l  2008). Recent increases in size and market cov­
erage has provided strong motivation for change. Customer relationship management and 
reputation are high priorities for Islamic banks as identified by their increased spending on 
human resources compared to conventional banking practises (Pellegrina 2008). Education 
and know-how has been rapidly increasing during the recent years, particularly during the 
period o f study, leading to Islamic banking being promoted to the general public using, for 
example, marketing campaigns25. Increasing customer numbers has put pressure on the de­
velopment o f more Shariah-compliant products and the increase of operational efficiency 
in Islamic banks. The pressure is likely to increase in the coming years as the global finan­
cial crisis has forced conventional customers to look alternative investments with Islamic 
finance being a high priority (Willison 2009).
It is no surprise, therefore, that Islamic banks have seen an increase in productivity 
o f about 8% over the whole study period while conventional banks have documented a 
decrease o f about 1%. A negative technical efficiency and a positive technology change are 
evidenced in both bank types. Yet the differences in magnitude are considerable. Islamic 
banks have witnessed a drop in technical efficiency of nearly 10% over the full period (2.6% 
EAAPI) and a surge o f nearly 18% (4.2% EAAPI) in technology change. Greater growth 
and change have a detrimental effect on technical efficiency and a large positive effect on 
technology. This latter result is a consequence o f the product and operational innovations
25 For example, Bank Syariah Mandiri in Indonesia sponsors documentaries on Islamic finance while Emi­
rates Bank in the UAE waives loan payments during the Ramadan as part o f marketing campaigns (Bloomberg).
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in the Islamic banking sector which have been more prominent than in the conventional 
banking sector.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we provide an in-depth analysis using Financial Ratio Analysis with Boot­
strap tests and Meta-Frontier Data Envelopment Analysis (MF-DEA) of the comparative 
efficiency o f Islamic and conventional banks. We use a consistent sample of banks in 
the GCC region over the period 2004 - 2007. The chapter contributes to the literature by 
introducing a meta-frontier method for decomposing the DEA efficiency scores into two 
separate components; one due to managerial inadequacies and one due to differences in 
the business models o f the two bank types. Secondly we apply boostrap equality o f means 
test in a financial ratio analysis to correct for small sample bias. Thirdly, we investigate 
productivity growth in the Islamic and conventional banking sectors finding significant dif­
ferences.
The FRA suggests that Islamic banks are less cost efficient and more revenue and 
profit efficient than conventional banks. Four o f the six ratios indicate that the differ­
ences are significant at the 5% significance level using a combination of parametric and 
non-parametric tests. The boostrapping confirms the significances and highlights the con­
vergence of Islamic banks to the efficiency levels of conventional banks.
The MF-DEA results provide evidence that gross efficiency is significantly higher, 
on average, for conventional banks. The difference between the two bank types is signif­
icant even when bank size is taken into account. Net efficiency is generally not statisti­
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cally different between Islamic and conventional banks. This gives a clear signal that the 
managerial staff in Islamic banks is not o f inferior quality contrasting previous evidence. 
Clearly the investment in human resources from Islamic banks have paid off. However, any 
difference in efficiency levels needs to be traced to the modus operandi of the bank types. 
The rules under which Islamic banks operate are an important barrier to efficiency. The 
Islamic banking sector might have to address these rules if it is to improve its efficiency. 
The rules underlying Islamic banking are, however, not uniform globally (The Economist 
2009). Banks need to go through various processes to obtain approval for financial prod­
ucts the Islamicity of which varies according to the geographical location. Malaysia for 
instance has traditionally been more progressive by allowing Islamic products that in the 
GCC are forbidden. Within the GCC region, the rules for Islamic banks are more uniform 
compared to other countries. Yet further harmonisation could be enforced under the aus­
pices o f a Financial Services Authority operating at GCC level. Certification o f products 
by such an Authority should be recognized in each o f the countries under the umbrella of 
this regulatory body.
The correlations between the measures o f efficiency using FRA and MF-DEA are 
significantly positive only in the case o f the cost ratios. While significant, however, the 
correlations are not particularly high. The conclusion from this part o f the analysis is that 
MF-DEA and FRA offer different information; therefore the methods should be viewed 
as complements. Parties interested in assessing bank efficiency would have more reliable 
results if using both approaches.
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Productivity change in the GCC has grown slightly over the examined period. How­
ever the components of productivity reveal that technical efficiency change has been nega­
tive while the change in technology positive. It should be noted that the examined period 
has been one o f high economic growth in the region. Increased oil prices meant that oil 
revenues have been fuelling a large rise of GDP. Population growth and political stability 
also contributed to the economic growth of the countries which in turn fueled the growth 
o f the banking sectors and particularly, Islamic banking. Product innovation, improved op­
erational efficiency and higher priorities of customer satisfaction led to higher technology 
change and higher productivity. The stimulus for innovation in the Islamic banking sector 
is likely to continue given the attention the industry has attracted during the 2007 global 
financial crisis.
2.7 Table Appendix
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Table 1. Islamic banking efficiency studies.
Studies
Hassan et al. 2009
Mokhtar et al. 2006 
El-Gamal and Inanoglou 2005 
Bader 2008
Bader et al. 2007
Al-Muharrami 2008 
Srairi 2010
Mokhtar et al. 2007, 2008 








No Significant Difference between IB/CB
DEA Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, Yemen 
Malaysia 
Turkey
Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia 
Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen, UAE 
Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia 
Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen, UAE 
IB significantly more efficient than CB 
DEA Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE
IB significantly less efficient than CB 
SFA Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE
Malaysia
Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia 
Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritania, Qatar 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen 
IB lower efficiency than CB attributed to modus operandi rather than managerial inefficiencies 
Abdul-Majid et al. 2010 SFA Bahrain, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon
Malaysia, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen 
Johnes et al. 2009 DEA Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE
Abdul-Majid etal. 2008, 201 la/b SFA Malaysia
No statistical comparison of efficiency between IB/CB 
Said 2012 DEA CB in the USA & International sample o f IB
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia 
Bahrain
Studies of IB only
Algeria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Gambia 
Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritania 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, UAE, UK, Yemen 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, Qatar, South 
Africa, Sudan, Yemen
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait 
Malaysia, Qatar, Sudan, UAE, Yemen
Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan 
Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Sudan, UAE, Yemen 
Algeria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Jordan 
Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAE, Yemen 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE 






Al-Jarrah and Molyneux 2005 
Hussein 2004













El-Moussawi and Obeid 2010,2011 DEA
Mostafa 2007,2011 
Kamarudin et al. 2008 
Sufian 2006,2007 
Hassan and Hussein 2003 
Saaid 2005, Saaid et al. 2003 
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Non Interest Expenses to Average Assets NIE =
Return on Average Assets 
Return on Average Equity
Net Interest Revenue + Other income 













Net Interest Margin NIM =
Other Operating Income to Average Assets OOI =
Revenue Efficiency Ratios
Net Interest Revenue






Table 3. Observed t-statistics from the original sample.
CTI NIE ROA ROE NIM OOI
fob s,2004 -2 .308 -2 .158 -0 .334 0.848 -1 .386 -1 .267
fob s,2005 -1 .325 -3 .038 -1 .369 -0 .738 -1 .214 -0 .976
fob s,2006 -1 .214 -2 .709 -1 .692 -0 .631 -0 .524 -2 .267
fob s,2007 0.376 -2 .108 -1 .695 -0 .441 -0 .307 -2.291
Notes: These are the t-statistics from the original mean comparison test. CTI=Cost/Income 
NIE=Net Interest Expenses/Average Assets; ROA=Retum on Average Assets; ROE=Retum 
on Average Equity; NIM=Net Interest Margin; OOI=Other Operating Income/Average Assets.
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Table 4. Linear Programming Equation Sets.
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Primal Dual
Minimize Y hL i vix %k Maximize <f>k
Subject to Subject to
Vi% ij  y'j-i— i u r V r j  ^  0  3 ~  T  0fc!/rfc 1 ^ j V r j  — 0  r  z
5 3 r = l  WrV r k  — 1 xik -  *jxiJ > o * =  i
u r , V i > 0  Vr = 1, =  1, . . . ,m Xj> 0  \fj =  1, ...,n
Figure 1. DEA Efficiency/Gross,Net and Type Measures.
Output
A IF0
, . . . , m
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Bahrain 6 8 14 17 13 30
Kuwait 4 6 10 6 7 13
Oman 0 5 5 0 6 6
Qatar 2 6 8 5 6 11
Saudi Arabia 1 9 10 3 9 12
UAE 6 16 22 7 15 22
Sum 19 50 69 38 56 94
Source: Bankscope
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Total loans 4254 2789 4146 2454 741 4440 3758 2049 4273
Other earning assets 3489 1995 4063 912 364 1289 2780 1265 3699
Deposits and short term 6747 3830 7067 3083 934 4819 5738 3335 6697
Fixed assets 73 45 85 59 15 93 69 37 87
Overheads 106 70 113 69 34 112 95 61 113
Equity 1005 753 909 527 283 680 873 507 874
2005
Total loans 5447 3447 5375 3208 1016 5590 4830 2261 5486
Other earning assets 3883 2683 4122 1241 928 1527 3155 1530 3778
Deposits and short term 7842 5039 7779 3831 1243 5817 6737 3573 7470
Fixed assets 82 54 91 84 21 127 82 47 101
Overheads 129 83 130 96 49 139 120 75 132
Equity 1346 930 1213 745 545 947 1180 714 1171
2006
Total loans 6586 4721 6201 3721 1131 6205 5797 2595 6290
Other earning assets 4351 2679 4615 1727 874 2261 3629 2002 4254
Deposits and short term 9349 6351 8861 4500 1364 6670 8013 3945 8551
Fixed assets 93 68 99 167 37 340 113 57 197
Overheads 152 106 146 122 45 173 143 87 153
Equity 1472 1052 1325 1057 535 1362 1358 904 1338
2007
Total loans 8236 5914 7606 4633 1696 7254 7244 3209 7632
Other earning assets 5258 2740 5989 2016 975 2592 4365 2079 5454
Deposits and short term 11840 8138 11410 5549 2241 7831 10108 4364 10866
Fixed assets 111 81 112 172 43 340 128 76 201
Overheads 202 134 217 140 60 183 185 116 209
Equity 1700 1242 1567 1302 557 1638 1591 1093 1585
All Years
Total loans 6131 3815 6101 3504 1074 5894 5407 2574 6148
Other earning assets 4245 2481 4771 1474 838 1995 3482 1612 4370
Deposits and short term 8944 5712 9069 4241 1412 6318 7649 3646 8651
Fixed assets 90 61 98 120 23 253 98 50 157
Overheads 147 91 160 107 45 154 136 76 159
Equity 1381 946 1291 908 506 1226 1251 716 1289
Note: All variables are reported in US $ millions at 2007 prices. The number o f observations in each year 
is 50 conventional and 19 Islamic banks
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f ig u re  3. R eal G D P  G ro w th  (A n n u a l P e rc e n ta g e  C h a n g e )  in th e  G C C  R eg io n .
R eal G DP g r o w th  (%)
2000 2001  2002 2003 2004  2005  2006  2007  2008
■ B ahrain  ■  K uw ait ■ O m a n  ■  Q a ta r  ■  S aud i A rabia a  U n ited  A rab  E m ira tes
S o u rc e : IM F
Table 8. Norm al and Bootstrapped p-values for the equality o f  means test.
2004
C T I N IE ROA R O E N IM O O I
P value (0.024r (0.040)** (0.716) (0.379) (0.169) (0.191)
P value (b=999) (0.044)** (0.095)* (0.736) (0.399) (0.277) (0.262)
P value (b=9999) (0.043)** (0.094)* (0.755) (0.386) (0.272) (0.238)
P value (b=99999) 
2005
(0.044)** (0.090)* (0.746) (0.386) (0.262) (0.241)
P value (0.165) (0.003)*** (0.185) (0.433) (0.247) (0.259)
P value (b=999) (0.186) (0.011)** (0.395) (0.474) (0.429) (0.335)
P value (b=9999) (0.195) (0.008)*** (0.379) (0.479) (0.411) (0.345)
P value (b=99999) 
2006
(0.197) (0.009)*** (0.366) (0.473) (0.401) (0.347)
P value (0.145) (0.006)*** (0.099)* (0.535) (0.571) (0.021)**
P value (b=999) (0.207) (0.013)** (0.260) (0.507) (0.596) (0.028)**
P value (b=9999) (0.238) (0.015)** (0.276) (0.546) (0.615) (0.034)**
P value (b=99999) 
2007
(0.236) (0.015)** (0.271) (0.545) (0.607) (0.034)**
P value (0.449) (0.028)** (0.102) (0.607) (0.312) (0.027)**
P value (b=999) (0.751) (0.058)* (0.114) (0.660) (0.777) (0.039)**
P value (b=9999) (0.729) (0.061)* (0.104) (0.657) (0.762) (0.043)**
P value (b=99999) 
Pooled
(0.731) (0.059)* (0.103) (0.661) (0.761) (0.044)**
P value (0.048)** (0.000)*** (0.018)** (0.557) (0.115) (0.001)***
P value (b=999) (0.046)** (0.001)*** (0.060)* (0.554) (0.246) (0.003)***
P value (b=9999) (0.047)** (0.001)*** (0.065)* (0.554) (0.260) (0.003)***
P value (b=99999) (0.039)** (0.002)*** (0.069)* (0.540) (0.295) (0.005)***
Notes: Y *  ,*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%  and 1% significance level respectively. 
N um bers in brackets are p-values. CTI=Cost/Incom e; N IE=N et Interest Revenue; RO A =Retum  on Assets 
RO E=Retum  on Equity; N IM = Net Interest M argin; 0 0 1 =  Other Operating Income.
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2.7 Table Appendix 69
Table 10. Summary o f DEA results.
M odel w ith equity
CRS VRS SE
Efficiency Difference Best S. Level Difference Best S. Level Difference Best S. Level
Gross 4.9% CB 5% 3.9% CB 5% 1.7% CB .
Net 2.1% CB - 0.2% IB - 2.7% CB 5%
Type 3.3% CB 1% 4.4% CB 1%
M odel w ithout equity
CRS VRS SE
Efficiency Difference Best S. Level Difference Best S. Level Difference Best S. Level
Gross 6.1% CB 10% 4.1% CB 10% 4.5% CB 10%
Net 6.7% CB 5% 0.8% CB - 8% CB 1%
Type 0.2% IB 3.3% CB 1%
Notes: Gross efficiency is decomposed into Net (managerial incompetencies) and Type (modus operandi). 
CRS=Constant Returns to Scale; VRS=Variable Returns to Scale; SE=Scale Efficiency.
Table 11. DEA Efficiency Scores and Financial Ratios by Country.
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi UAE
Gross Efficiency CRS 0.855 0.779 0.826 0.866 0.799 0.875
VRS 0.910 0.858 0.870 0.917 0.913 0.908
SE 0.940 0.906 0.948 0.945 0.875 0.963
Net Efficiency CRS 0.928 0.837 0.897 0.926 0.874 0.934
VRS 0.958 0.900 0.922 0.961 0.927 0.957
SE 0.966 0.931 0.974 0.964 0.945 0.976
Type Efficiency CRS 0.922 0.925 0.917 0.934 0.912 0.935
VRS 0.949 0.950 0.942 0.954 0.984 0.947
Financial Ratios CTI 54.05 39.16 48.88 36.56 29.29 42.65
NIE 3.28 2.63 3.35 2.17 2.48 2.68
ROA 3.83 4.50 2.86 5.33 4.94 4.45
ROE 13.72 25.36 20.84 32.12 34.95 22.43
NIM 4.30 3.47 4.73 5.35 5.49 3.77
OOI 3.07 3.14 1.54 2.30 2.38 2.90
Notes: CRS=Constant Returns to Scale; VRS=Variable Returns to Scale; SE=Scale 
Efficiency. CTI=Cost/Income; NlE=Net Interest Revenue; ROA=Retum on Assets; ROE= 
Return on Equity; NIM= Net Interest Margin; 001=  Other Operating Income.
2.7 Table Appendix
Table 12. Market Structure in the GCC banking sector.
2004 2005 2006 2007
Bahrain 0.150 0.148 0.140 0.141
Kuwait 0.090 0.092 0.084 0.096
Oman 0.079 0.071 0.127 0.138
Qatar 0.192 0.160 0.196 0.186
Saudi Arabia 0.030 0.034 0.032 0.035
UAE 0.057 0.054 0.053 0.051
Notes: Table shows the normalized Herfindahl index of market concentration. 
H I* < 0.1 «=> Competitive market; 0.1 < H I* < 0.18 ^  Moderately 
concentrated market; H I* > 0.18 <=> Highly concentrated market.
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Failure Risk in Islamic and Conventional
Banks
A bstract
This chapter compares the hazard of failure in Islamic and conventional commercial 
banks using survival models. The sample consists of 421 banks from 20 Middle and Far 
Eastern countries observed during the 1995 to 2010 period. The conditioning variables 
are o f both bank-level and country-type. The analysis suggests that Islamic banks have 
lower failure risk and are less interconnected which reduces the likelihood of domestic co­
failure. Differences are revealed in the role played by various bank-level indicators. This 
has implications regarding the information that should be monitored by regulators to iden­
tify fragile banks. For instance, higher leverage increases the failure risk o f conventional 
banks whereas the effect is instead favorable for Islamic banks. At macroeconomic level, a 
relevant finding for policymakers is that failure risk is more strongly driven by inflation for 
Islamic banks.
3.1 Introduction
During the recent global financial crisis, a number of conventional commercial banks (CBs) 
and other financial institutions in the US and elsewhere have experienced massive losses 
on mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. Those losses were amplified by leverage 
from derivatives tied to them. Primary events were the collapse o f Lehman Brothers and
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the bailout o f various commercial banks by national governments. Concerns regarding 
bank solvency, declines in credit availability and damaged investor confidence adversely 
affected stock markets. More general features were the decline in output and employment 
and rising fiscal deficits (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Clearly, a sound banking system that 
maintains the flow of credit to the private sector is a primary objective o f policymakers and 
bank regulators around the world (Levine and Zervos 1998). With this debacle there is 
renewed interest in the analysis o f bank failure risk.
Islamic banking industry attracted a lot o f attention in the recent years for a num­
ber of reasons. Firstly, the increase of Muslim population as well as its increasing desire 
to have financial instruments that comply with its religious beliefs (Seidel et al. 2009). 
Secondly, the high profitability, solvency and asset growth that Islamic banks experienced 
during the financial crisis increasing the appeal of Islamic investment products (Cihak and 
Hesse 2010). Islamic banking is no longer confined to Muslim countries but has expanded 
to Australia, Europe and the USA. The UK and Luxembourg promote themselves as ma­
jo r hubs serving the need for Islamic finance in Europe. The 2008 financial crisis caused 
S&P (Standard & Poor’s) 500 and the Dow Jones Industrial Average, two of the most well 
known equity indices, to fall by 38.5% and 33.8% respectively (Financial Services Author­
ity 2009). By contrast, the Dow Jones Islamic Financial Index recorded a 7% loss for the 
same year highlighting the resilience of Islamic finance. Despite the negative climate in the 
financial markets, growth in Islamic assets across the world reached almost 30%, far greater 
than the 16.3% o f the top 1000 conventional banks (The Banker report 2009). In countries
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with substantial Islamic banking presence26 during the 1995-2010 period there has been a 
higher number o f failures involving conventional rather than Islamic banks. In addition, the 
25 most costly failures during the 2008 financial crisis only involved conventional banks as 
shown in table 1.
[Table 1 here]
Banking failure has been studied in an impressive body of literature (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 1999; Caprio et al. 2000). A bank failure can be due to idiosyncratic reasons 
(i.e. risk mismanagement) or associated with economic downturn; hence put in a context 
o f banking crisis. Banking crises can start when a shock hits the economy or because eco­
nomic agents expect them (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). The shock can be an increase in 
the interest rate (Mishkin 1999), borrowing and lending currency mismatch (Akerlof and 
Romer 1993; Drees and Pazarbasioglou 1995)or speculative attack by foreign investors 
taking advantage o f high interest rates and loose monitoring systems in developing coun­
tries (Calvo et al. 1994). An extensive part o f the literature studies the factors that can 
predict bank failure. Factors related to the macroeconomic environment such as real GDP 
growth or real interest rates (Demirgu9 and Detragiache 1998)and to the banking sector 
such as private sector credit/GDP, a proxy for financial liberation (Levine and Zevros 1998; 
Demirgu9 -Kunt and Huizinga 2001) are used to capture the cause o f financial distress in the 
banking system. Accounting information reflects an individual bank’s financial situation.
In the conventional banking system fixed interest is given on deposits. However re­
turns on investments are driven by economic cycles. Consequently the conventional bank-
26 Albania, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritania, 
Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE and Yemen.
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ing sector becomes fragile and prone to crisis as pressure to meet the fixed obligations 
builds up (Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Ali 2004). Islamic banking promotes ethical in­
vestments by prohibiting any involvement in business lines related with alcohol, pork and 
weapons. Furthermore businesses that their debt is higher than 30% of their total assets 
are screened out. Sale o f debt instruments, derivatives as well as short-sales is forbidden. 
Equity-based contracts are the main financial products promoted in Islamic banking; how­
ever because the industry is still young there is little standardization which can lead to 
higher costs. As a consequence Islamic banking is mainly practiced in project financing of 
large infrastructure projects rather than retail banking. In addition fee-based contracts {i.e. 
Ijarah) have prevailed over equity-based ones {i.e. Mudarabah) because of the lower risk 
they entail, their lower costs and shorter commitment of capital.
Islamic banks are partners with both entrepreneurs and depositors. The deposit ac­
counts available in an Islamic bank treat depositors as preferred stock holders allowing 
them residual claiming on the bank profits and not offering any capital protection (Pelle- 
grina 2008). Islamic banks use deposits to expand and as a type of leverage, alternative 
to equity increases or debt issuing in conventional banks (Karim and Ali 1989). This en­
ables the bank to take on higher risk in its projects but at the same time the risk is passed 
through to depositors whose remuneration is a share ratio tied to the bank’s projects rather 
than being an interest rate as in conventional banks (Olson and Zoubi 2008). All the afore­
mentioned make Islamic banking a unique product in the financial world.
There has been theoretical work arguing why Islamic banking is inherently more 
stable and enhances economic growth (Haque and Mirakhor 1986; Sundarajan and Errico
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2002; Archer and Karim 2007). First, Islamic banks are able to pass through all risks related 
to their investments to their depositors, which are similar to investment accounts, with no 
guaranteed return. Secondly, as Islamic banks act as business partners in their financing 
operations, moral hazard and adverse selection issues are reduced (Harris and Raviv 1991). 
Moreover, the investment type of deposit accounts shifts part of the monitoring task to the 
depositors (Cihak and Hesse 2010). Nevertheless, the lack o f standardization of products 
and procedures leads Islamic banks to focus on the financing o f big scale projects {i.e. 
real estate, infrastructure). The additional, legal mostly, complexities of Islamic financial 
products are impediments to Islamic banks’ expansion in the west.
Our research is motivated by the increased interest in banking failure during periods 
of crisis and the rising interest in Islamic finance. The purpose of this chapter is to compare 
and contrast the information contained in accounting statements preceding bank distress in 
Islamic and conventional banks. The aim is to identify whether Islamic banks are more/less 
prone to default relative to conventional banks and whether similar indicators affect their 
hazard functions. To this aim we use bank-level data (drawn from Bankscope27) for 421 
banks, with 315 conventional and 106 Islamic, covering 96 failure episodes in 20 countries
-  Albania, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Mauritania, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, Yemen
-  over the 1995-2010 period. As banking failures can also be associated with economic
27 The Bankscope database, run by Bureau van Dijk (http://www.bvdep.com/en/index.html) contains infor­
mation on 30,000 banks around the world.
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downturns, a set o f publicly available macroeconomic variables is included28 (Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2009).
This chapter contributes to the sparse empirical research on this issue in two direc­
tions. First, we utilize survival-time analysis to determine whether IBs are less prone to 
failure than CBs. Formal tests of this hypothesis are carried out both unconditionally (on 
the basis o f observed bank failures only) and conditionally on available information at 
bank-level and country-level. The conventional banking literature has shown that relatively 
parsimonious survival-time models can serve as effective early warning tools (Lane et al. 
1986; Whalen 1991; Mannasoo and Mayes 2009). Survival analysis has been recognized 
as superior to conventional classification techniques such as discriminant analysis or binary 
logit modeling29 because: i) it can provide estimates of the expected time to failure; ii) es­
timation can be handled by partial maximum likelihood without invoking assumptions on 
the distribution of the time to failure; iii) it recognizes the continuous-time nature of the 
failure probability (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1999; Kalbfleish and Prentice 2002).
Second, we investigate differences between IBs and CBs regarding the role of firm- 
level characteristics —  balance sheet (stock), income statement (flow) and financial ratios 
—  macroeconomic/structural indicators and latent domestic factors in explaining the haz­
ard o f bank failure. This is achieved through the Cox Proportional Hazards model which 
provides estimates of the probability that a bank with a given set of characteristics and 
operating in a given environment will survive longer than some specified length into the fu­
28 Sources: IMF, The World Bank
29 Logit models are very widely applied in the early warning o f crises although, more often than not, without 
controlling for duration dependence (see e.g., Bussidre and Fratzscher, 2006, Fuertes and Kalotychou, 2007).
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ture. For instance, the level o f cost-to-income will plausibly influence failure risk for both 
bank types but the marginal effect could be different. Country-level variables are included 
to accommodate heterogeneities in economic environment (e.g. real GDP growth and in­
flation) and in financial structure (e.g. banking sector concentration). Given that most IB 
contracts are asset-backed (i.e. collateralized by real estate or commodities), that IBs tend 
to be more closely involved in the construction sector and large infrastructure projects, and 
are unable to use conventional inflation-hedging instruments, they could be more exposed 
to macroeconomic cycles than CBs (Hasan and Dridi 2010; IMF 201 lb).
As a preview of our key findings, unconditional non-parametric survival probability 
estimators and tests that exploit exclusively the observed frequency o f bank failures indi­
cate that IBs are about 55% less hazardous than CBs. Conditional survival models also 
support the hypothesis that, controlling for bank-level and country-level factors, the hazard 
of failure is significantly lower for IBs. The analysis highlights noteworthy contrasts in the 
sensitivity o f bank failure risk to various covariates. Lower capitalization ratios make IBs 
significantly less hazardous whereas the opposite is shown for CBs. This maybe be linked 
to the fact that IBs tend to be under-leveraged (or over-capitalized) relative to CBs and 
hence, further decreases in leverage for IBs could hinder profitable business operations.
The growth o f administrative expenses is favorably linked to survival rates for IBs 
which may be explained by the relatively important human resource development process 
taking place in them. Failure risk is positively tied to net interest margins for CBs but neg­
atively so for IBs, a finding that may relate to differences in their main clientele. IBs are 
often involved in large government-related infrastructure projects, and name lending prac­
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tices prevail as usual clients of IBs are large family-owned conglomerates; in both cases, 
an "Islamicity premium" can be charged. At a macro level, high inflation contributes to­
ward bank financial distress for both bank types. Yet the effect is more pronounced for IBs 
possibly due to their larger cash reserves and widespread use of commodities as collateral. 
Finally, latent country-type factors are found to have a significant impact on survival rates, 
albeit only for CBs. Such latent effects give rise to a domestic correlation in CB failure risk 
and could reflect expectation of domestic contagion. The latter is plausibly smaller for IBs 
given their lesser interconnectedness which stems from their peculiar business model.
The chapter continues as follows. Section 2 provides a review on the literature on 
banking fragility, survival analysis models utilized in banking failure studies and corrob­
orates on some of the theoretical arguments supporting the resilience o f Islamic banks. 
Section 3 outlines the survival analysis methodology used and Section 4 discusses the data 
and transformations used. The empirical findings are presented in Section 5. A final section 
concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
In this section we provide a brief discussion on the literature. The section is divided in 
three subsections; literature on banking fragility, on survival analysis studies and on Islamic 
banking and fragility. In the first subsection we define bank failure and why is different to 
other firm failures. Next, we describe the factors that can lead a single bank to fail. We 
distinguish between internal factors, those being under the bank’s control, and external 
factors that relate to the macroeconomic environment where the bank operates. Negative
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externalities arising from a single bank failure and endanger the rest are also addressed. 
The subsection ends by presenting empirical studies that investigate the determinants of 
banking failure. The second subsection builds on the first by summarizing studies that 
use survival analysis methodology to examine which factors explain banking failure. The 
third subsection expands the previous ones by introducing the theoretical arguments that 
Islamic banking literature puts forward about Islamic banks being less prone to failure. 
The subsection presents arguments that counter this perception and ends by leading directly 
to our empirical investigation of whether Islamic banks are indeed less fragile with their 
survival being affected by different factors than the conventional commercial banks.
3.2.1 Literature on Banking Fragility
The analysis o f banking failures and banking crises has attracted significant attention in 
economics, with extensive literature addressing the issue from different perspectives. Bank­
ing crises have been experienced by developed and developing economies to a greater or 
lesser degree. In the event of a banking crisis, the available credit to households and enter­
prises is restricted thus reducing savings, consumption and investment which in turn will 
force many firms into bankruptcy. Unemployment, a drop in GDP and social unrest are 
likely to follow potentially undermining the country’s reputation thus losing part of the 
foreign markets’ confidence. Single bank failures, where a single bank or financial institu­
tion is affected, can be separated from extended banking events, or banking crises, where a 
larger number of financial institutions fail at the same time period.
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Failure o f banks is not as straightforward as a company’s due to the former’s unique 
role in the economic system, intermediating between surplus and deficit units. Cash flow 
insolvency occurs when a firm is no longer able to pay its debts as they fall due. When a 
firm has liabilities exceeding its assets then it is balance sheet insolvent. It is possible for a 
firm to be "cash flow insolvent" but "balance sheet solvent" if it holds illiquid assets (such 
as buildings or machinery) at its balance sheet which will counter-weigh against its liabil­
ities as the latter fall due. Nevertheless, banks’ assets, such as bonds and certificates of 
deposit, are in a form that could be easily liquidated (UK Insolvency Act 1986). For banks, 
cash flow insolvency can lead to balance sheet insolvency if it is required to sell assets at a 
great discount. At the point when the market value of the bank’s assets is less than that of 
its liabilities, the bank is unable to meet its obligations. The regulators decide whether to 
let the bank go bankrupt or intervene by a restructuring plan and/or financial support. The 
bank can also become an acquisition (M&A) target by another bank; thus cease to exist as 
the single entity it used to. However, insolvency is not the only prerequisite for M&A to 
take place. Capital injection from shareholders might also be decided help through financial 
distress and to avoid potential insolvency. All the aforementioned cause an identification 
problem in all statistical analysis as there is time difference between insolvency, an eco­
nomic event which may not be observed immediately by the outsiders o f the bank, and 
failure, which is a regulatory event (Whalen 1991). The problem was particularly profound 
in the 80’s in the USA where holding companies were facing financial problems mainly 
attributed to some of their larger subsidiaries although smaller subsidiary banks were re­
ported as healthy. Authorities were attempting to dispose o f the entire holding company
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without taking into account some financially sound, though small, subsidiaries (Whalen 
1991; Wheelock and Wilson 1995). Banks can be led to failure due to internal, external 
factors or a combination of them.
Internal factors that can lead to bank failure are related to the bank’s management, 
decision making process and risk-taking behavior. Hence, choices regarding the bank’s 
optimal level o f capitalization, the diversification o f the bank’s investment portfolio, the 
duration mismatch between assets and liabilities and over-exposure to a particular market 
play a vital role to the long-run viability o f the bank. Poor management decisions will be 
reflected upon bank-specific factors like financial ratios, equity prices, bond yields, credit 
default swap spreads and credit rating scores. Financial ratios that have been found to 
affect the bank’s risk profile are regulated by micro-prudential guidelines like the Basel 
agreement.
By contrast, external factors, like changes in interest rates, money supply, real GDP 
growth, uncertainty, business-cycle related events, a drop in asset prices (e.g. real estate), 
would affect all banks. Banks with a stronger internal financial profile are more likely 
to withstand an adverse macroeconomic shock than banks with poor economic record are 
more likely to experience difficulties leading to their potential failure. A problem arises for 
financially stronger banks in the case that they are forced to pay a much higher premium, 
dictated by some banks in distress, than the one defined by their own financial situation. 
This higher premium can be a higher interbank borrowing rate, a higher deposit withdrawal 
rate or a falling market value. Negative externalities originating from informational asym­
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metries and lack o f creditworthiness on behalf o f the government can give rise to contagion 
putting more pressure to banks.
Banks have certain attributes that make them vulnerable to contagion. First of all 
banks are highly leveraged, as they only maintain a small percentage of the deposits in the 
form of cash while they lend or invest the rest. Secondly, maturity transformation is tak­
ing place as banks’ investments maturities do not coincide with those of the depositors’. 
Thirdly, illiquid assets may not be able to liquidate fast enough (or even at all if the market 
for such an asset has collapsed, due to a bubble for instance) or without a discount when in 
need. Contagion is the increased linkage between two (or more) financial institutions that 
occurs when turmoil exists. The fact that banks possess superior information regarding the 
financial condition of their borrowers which can be concealed from regulators and deposi­
tors facilitates contagion (Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Cole and Gunther 1995). Following 
a banking failure, and given that the necessary measures to prevent contagion are not taken, 
(It has been argued that Protectionism is a way to prevent contagion. Protectionism occurs 
when an economy is insulated from external shocks by restricting the flows o f foreign capi­
tal. According to the World Bank, 17 out of G20 countries were reported as imposing trade 
restrictive measures shortly after the burst of the 2008 Financial crisis, though in the Lon­
don summit, the G20 had pledged not to impose such policies) the loss of confidence from 
the public to the troubled lender will disseminate to other lenders. Flight-to-liquidity is 
the phenomenon where investors try to load their portfolios with highly-liquid and riskless 
assets, such as cash or T-bills. This puts pressure in banks as they need to sell illiquid as­
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sets (e.g. bonds or real assets) with the aforementioned problems, thus a liquidity shortage 
problem could arise making insolvency more likely.
Informational asymmetries exist because depositors have imperfect information on 
the extent that an economic shock affects the bank. Consequently depositors not only with­
draw deposits from troubled banks, but from banks that would have been untouched by 
the shock. The creditworthiness of the deposit insurance mechanism plays a crucial role 
in limiting the contagious impact of a bank-run. Deposit guarantee schemes usually of­
fer less than total protection, thus leaving depositors with large deposited funds exposed. 
Furthermore the deposit guarantee scheme is designed to withstand a limited number of 
bank-failures. However the exact limitations o f the system are not known to the depositors. 
Therefore when an economic shock hits the economy and banks face problems, deposi­
tors will react based on their expectations about i) what is the minimum number of banks 
that can fail before the deposit insurance mechanism collapses; ii) what are the expectations 
from the government. Is it likely that the government will provide adequate and timely sup­
port to the mechanism? In the occurrence of a bank run, there is an incentive to be among 
the first to withdraw deposits as the insurance scheme’s resources might be insufficient and 
also due to the bureaucracy involved which means that it could take a considerable amount 
o f time between the bank run and the compensation from the deposit insurance scheme. 
Hence depositors will display "herding behavior" in the sense that a few agents withdraw­
ing money from a troubled bank may turn into a bank run affecting other banks’ depositors 
as well (Hermosillo et al. 1996). Moreover, banking crises can unravel quickly when they 
are initiated by changes in the macroeconomic environment.
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First, an increase on the interest rate offered on deposits, which could happen due to 
increased inflation or an increase in the international interest rates can start a banking crisis 
(Mishkin 1999). The increase will decrease the bank’s profits as the interest rate charged 
on loans cannot be adjusted quickly enough. Additionally, an increase on the interest rate 
on loans is likely to render borrowers unable to repay thus increasing the fraction of non­
performing loans.
A second reason for a banking crisis to start is related to borrowing and lending 
currency mismatch. This has caused several banking crises in the past, for instance, Chile 
in 1981, Mexico in 1995 and the Nordic countries in the early 90s (Akerlof and Romer 
1993; Mishkin 1999; Drees and Pazarbasioglou 1995). Even if currency risk is shifted to 
borrowers, by issuing foreign denominated loans, devaluation could still threaten the bank’s 
viability through a rise in non-performing loans.
A third reason for the emergence o f a banking crisis can be foreign investors seeking 
to exploit the higher interest rates in conjunction with the inadequate or loose monitoring 
usually following financial liberalization enactment in developing countries. The initial 
large inflows o f foreign capital into countries will be withdrawn at the smallest sign of 
discomfort, be it some equalization between international and host-country interest rates 
taking place or political turmoil, causing illiquidity to the banking system and making a 
banking crisis more likely (Calvo et al. 1996). According to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) 
a speculative attack on a country’s currency, when the country maintains a fixed exchange 
rate system, may cause distress among depositors who would send the money to foreign 
deposit accounts in fear of a devaluation thus restricting liquidity in the banking system.
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However, banking crises do not need an economic shock to emerge. Hence a forth 
reason can be that economic agents are expecting them. In other words if depositors believe 
that funds are being withdrawn, they will rush to withdraw their funds as well causing 
others to imitate them and consequently starting a bank run out o f nowhere as the "self- 
fulfilling" principle dictates (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). For the likelihood and magnitude 
o f such an event to be reduced, many countries have opted for a deposit insurance system 
which will prevent economic agents from rushing to the bank as they will be confident that 
their money are guaranteed by the government (or some insurance agency). However for 
the scheme to operate properly it has to be accompanied by effective judicial and regulatory 
systems. The judicial system must prevent "looting" practises, like in the case o f Chile 
where managers invested in very-risky projects only to obtain some personal benefit, by not 
leaving any events to elude punishment (Akerlof and Romer 1993). The regulatory system 
needs to be closely monitoring the banks as they, in the presence of the deposit insurance 
scheme, have incentives to choose riskier investments (moral hazard) (Kane 1989).
Once a banking crisis has started, authorities will respond quickly to prevent the 
crisis from gaining greater magnitude and expanding into other sectors of the economy. 
Authorities can use a variety of instruments to achieve this such as bailouts and quantitative 
easing (Demirgu? and Detragiache 1998). However, ex post rescue operations can cause 
trouble with the government’s budget, inefficient banks with inadequate management and 
risk assessment controls may be granted a second chance on tax-payers’ or financially 
sound banks’ money. Moreover, expectations about future bailouts are created causing 
bank managers to take excess risks knowing that they will not be left to fail by the state.
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In addition, quantitative easing can trigger hyperinflation and speculative attacks against 
the country through the currency market especially if the country is maintaining a fixed 
exchange rate (Demirgu? and Detragiache 1998). Next we are presenting some empirical 
studies with an aim to identify some of the early warning signals of banking crises.
Accounting data have been found to be relevant in modelling firms’ likelihood of 
default (Bartelsman et al. 2005; Duffie et al. 2007). In a banking context accounting data 
have been used by Lane et al. (1986), Whalen (1991), Gonzalez-Hermosillo et a l (1997) 
and Mannasoo and Mayes (2009) among others. Macroeconomic factors (i.e. GDP growth 
and concentration) that also affect the likelihood of failure o f a bank have been incorporated 
in several studies.
One of the first comprehensive studies in the field was the one by Demirgu? and De­
tragiache (1998). They investigate using logit model approach the macroeconomic factors 
that were related to banking crises during the period 1980-1994 in a number of countries. 
They conclude that low real GDP growth, worsening in the terms of trade; high real inter­
est rates, external vulnerability (i.e. M2-to-reserves ratio) and inefficient judicial system 
increase the probability of a banking crisis. Similarly, the existence o f a deposit insurance 
scheme increases the likelihood of a banking crisis. The authors fail to find any statis­
tically significant evidence that financial liberalization, as measured by the credit to the 
private sector-to-GDP ratio and the change in real credit could increase financial instabil­
ity. Moreover, the government surplus as a percentage of GDP, a proxy used to reflect the 
government’s ability to address long-standing issues with banks (i.e. weak balance sheets, 
bad credit practises), does not have any relationship with banking failure. Financial de­
3.2 Literature Review 90
velopment was found not to endanger the stability of the financial system; however it has 
positive effects on economic growth (Stulz 1999).
These positive effects o f development o f financial systems is verified statistically by 
Stultz (1999)and Levine and Zevros (1998). They find that financial systems’ development 
has significant impact upon economic growth and firm profitability (Stulz 1999; Levine and 
Zevros 1998). As argued by Demirgiif-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), firms operating in 
a highly developed financial system grow faster than what their individual characteristics 
suggest. The impact of different stages of financial development and structure, as a coun­
try’s financial system develops and evolves from bank-based to market-based, upon the 
performance o f the banking sector is investigated in Demirgu9-Kunt and Huizinga (2000).
Central bank’s size is likely to be much more pronounced in developing countries. 
By contrast market-capitalisation-to-GDP and value of traded stock-to-GDP will be very 
low for developing countries as stock markets are either non-existent or very little trad­
ing takes place (Demirgu^-Kunt and Huizinga 2000). Bank-based financial systems have 
higher bank credit-to-GDP ratios as banks play a more important role in firm financing. 
In underdeveloped financial systems the ratio of deposits-to-GDP tends to be significantly 
lower than developed countries. A plausible explanation could be the lower number of 
firms operating, the lower wealth and the people’s lack of confidence on government which 
leads them to keep their money in a form that will not depreciate (e.g. gold) (Cagan 1956). 
By contrast in market-based systems firms can resort to stock markets to finance their op­
erations or expansionary projects. Demirgu9-Kunt and Huizinga (2000)use a statistical 
approach to verify the above mentioned points.
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The methodology followed by Demirgii^-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) is standard re­
gression techniques with two profitability measures (profit-to-total assets and net margin- 
to-total assets) on a set o f bank specific, macroeconomic and financial development and 
structure variables. According to their findings, banks operating in developed countries 
are less profitable than those in developing ones, possibly due to tougher competition 
(Demirgiif-Kunt and Huizinga 2000). Moreover the presence of stock markets enhances 
bank profits. This can be attributed to the more funding alternatives enjoyed by companies 
leading to a greater expansion of the business sector without the banks incurring all default 
risks (as companies will also get financing from stock and capital markets). Addition­
ally greater transparency and dissemination of firm-related information is enforced in the 
presence o f stock markets thereby reducing monitoring costs previously incurred only by 
banks. However this effect is subject to decreasing returns to scale. In other words there is 
an optimum level o f stock market development at which banks gain most (DemirgUf-Kunt 
and Maksimovic 1998). Consequently banks in developing countries are the ones to ben­
efit the most from stock market development. So far Demirgiif-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) 
have established a relationship between different degrees of financial development and dif­
ferent levels of financial structure. The next step is to see how these are related to banking 
fragility, a topic addressed by Ruiz-Porras (2006, 2008).
Ruiz-Porras (2006, 2008)in two of his studies links financial development and bank­
ing fragility. Using data on banking crises worldwide extracted from Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1996) and explanatory variables from Beck et al. 2006he finds that financial development, 
defined as the level of efficiency, know-how and technical innovation existing in banks and
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stock markets, is higher in market-based systems and particularly during periods of bank­
ing crises. Moreover banking crises encourage the transition from a bank-based system to 
a market-based one, a result consistent with previous studies (Allen and Gale 2000). The 
author does not give any explanation regarding the factors that might drive such changes. A 
plausible explanation could be attributed to the fact that banking insolvency episodes could 
cost above 15% of a country’s GDP to "clean up", a cost that will ultimately be shifted 
to taxpayers and potentially endanger the government’s stay in power (Caprio and Klinge- 
biel 1996). Additionally there are increasing returns to scale by the development of a stock 
market both for the country’s economy and the banking sector’s profitability (Demirgu?- 
Kunt and Huizinga 2000). In his second study, Ruiz-Porras (2006, 2008), he concludes that 
market-based systems are less likely to experience banking crises. However there is an op­
timum level o f financial development30 (for instance financial liberalization is comprised 
within the financial development category) after which the likelihood of banking fragility 
increases (Loayza and Ranciere 2006; Diaz-Alejandro 1985). Finally the author fails to 
find any statistical significant link between concentration and bank fragility.
Maechler et al. (2005) limit their study within the European territory. They inves­
tigate whether Eastern and Central European (ECE) countries have a different risk profile 
compared to some of the least advanced EU-12 members (i.e. Greece, Portugal, Spain 
or EU-3). ECE countries were considered developing countries31 at the time the paper was 
published which makes the study close related to Demirgiis-Kunt and Huizinga (2000). The
30 The author has already shown that market-based systems enhance financial development (Ruiz-Porras, 
2006).
31 Eastern and Central European countries, especially the new-EU members, are now considered as “gradu­
ated developing countries” according to the IMF and UN.
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study focuses on the effect of financial risks (liquidity, credit and exchange risk) upon the 
risk o f banking default and the differences between groups of European countries. The se­
lected methodology involves the z-score as the dependent variable regressed (pooled OLS) 
on a set o f explanatory variables necessary to reflect bank-related sources o f risk as well 
as macroeconomic and supervisory ones. Findings show that EU-3 countries are less cap­
italized and profitable but with lower earnings volatility than ECE countries, which is at­
tributed, according to the authors, to lower lending opportunities. The finding is consistent 
with Demirgu9 -Kunt and Huizinga (2000) who also find that underdeveloped financial sys­
tems are more profitable than developed ones. Additionally the direct relationship between 
inflation and the likelihood of default found by the authors is also validated by D e m ir g U 9 -  
Kunt and Detragiache (1998). Credit growth enhances banking stability through increased 
activity, particularly when directed to the private sector (i.e. a rise in credit to private sector- 
to-GDP ratio is observed), a finding that is usually associated with financial development 
(DemirgU9-Kunt and Huizinga 2000). Nevertheless, excessive high growth can jeopardize 
banking fragility through rises in bank portfolios’ risk and non-performing loans. The non­
linear effect of credit growth expansion which was also evidenced by Demirgu9-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) is also found to be statistically significant here (Maechler et al. 2005). 
The author’s finding that more liquid banks are more likely to experience insolvency prob­
lems is probably sample-specific. ECE countries bear higher country risk than other EU 
members mainly because they are undergoing a convergence process to become affiliated 
with the rest o f EU. This involves undertaking a lot o f measures to improve transparency 
and governance. Changes to the exchange rate regime may also have to be taken. All
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these implementations could be problematic and lead to turmoil. Hence the higher like­
lihood for bank default may be more associated with country-specific risk, which would 
also explain the riskier profile of foreign bank also found in the study, than pure liquid­
ity risk. Finally the authors fail to find any statistically significant link between bank size 
and banking fragility in spite o f the literature arguing that larger banks are less likely to fail 
(Demirgtt9 -Kunt and Detragiache 1998).
In this subsection we defined bank failure, summarized the factors that can lead a 
bank to fail and how can this turn into a bank crisis. Finally we reviewed some empirical 
studies in order to see which variables have been found to be statistically significant in 
identifying troubled banks. The next subsection continues from where this one finished 
but now we review only studies that used survival analysis methods as it is the one we 
implement later on.
3.2.2 Literature on Survival Analysis
Survival analysis has been used extensively in medical statistics and industrial reliability 
studies, however, results from the seminal paper of Lane et al. ( 1986)show that the method­
ology can be applied within finance and economics context. The benefits of the application 
of the survival analysis methodology32 in finance can be summarized below. Firstly, regres­
sion analysis and logit model techniques estimate the probability that a bank with some 
given characteristics will (or will not) fail at some point in time within an interval set by
32 The authors make use of the Cox Proportional Hazards model which is a semi-parametric approach in 
the survival analysis methodology. It would be more appropriate therefore to say the benefits of the Cox 
methodology in finance. However, as the Cox model has not been formally introduced yet (see methodology 
section) we believe that the used term will lessen confusion among the readers not familiar with survival 
analysis methodology.
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the study design (Whalen 1991). Survival analysis, as opposed to regression analysis and 
logit models, incorporates the bank’s time to failure as a variable in the analysis instead of 
whether it failed or not (Dabos and Escudero 2004). This allows subjects with different 
history before the event to be included in the analysis. Hence observations one year prior 
to failure can be mixed with observations three years prior to failure (Lane et al. 1986). 
Most importantly, survival analysis assumes that the probability of failure is not constant 
over time, as such it is preferred to logit models (Mannasoo and Mayes 2009). Secondly, 
parametric models of survival analysis are known to have shortcomings when certain as­
sumptions (e.g. distribution o f variables) are violated. By contrast the Cox model, which is 
a non-parametric survival analysis model, has been very useful due to its lack of underlying 
assumptions (Crowley and Hu 1977).
The seminal paper of Lane et al. (1986) focuses on banking failures and whether 
an early warning system could identity them prior to their actual failure date. They focus 
their analysis in the USA and their sample ranges from 1979-1984. At that time, the three 
regulatory agencies of the USA, namely the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
the Federal Reserve Board and the Office of the comptroller of the currency had resorted to 
the CAMEL rating system to assess a bank’s soundness. CAMEL stands for capital, asset 
quality, management, earnings quality and liquidity comprising the five categories in which 
accounting ratios are divided into. The CAMEL system was adopted in 1978 but since then 
there has been little consensus on which variables are the best predictors of banking failure. 
Given that stock market data are only available for the largest banks, accounting data need 
to be used for the sample size to be relatively large. However, accounting data suffer from
3.2 Literature Review 96
low update frequency (as financial statements are usually published yearly or quarterly) 
and creative accounting, which can distort results (Randall 1989).
Lane etal. (1986)use 21 accounting ratios covering all five categories of the CAMEL 
system. According to the authors’ findings, an increase in the commercial and industrial 
loans-to-total loans as well as total operating expense-to-total operating income results in 
decreased survival probability. Similarly, a rise in loans-to-deposits ratio leads to decreased 
survival probability for the banks. Conversely, an increase in total capital-to-total assets ra­
tio is associated with an increase in bank’s survival probability. Although the study is 
primarily about the determinants of banking fragility in the United States, the efficiency of 
the CAMEL rating system is implicitly tested. According to the authors, there is no statisti­
cally significant connection between any of the asset (loan) quality ratios (i.e. provision for 
loan losses-to-total operating income, net loan recoveries/total loans) and banking failure. 
However a measure of non-performing loans, which is considered to be a better leading 
indicator o f asset quality problems that could lead to bank failure, is not included in the 
pool of asset (loan) quality variables as only a few banks at that time were reporting such 
an index (Whalen 1991). There has been some criticism on the Lane et a l (1986) paper 
focusing mainly on two points that are discussed next.
The first point of criticism relates to the sampling method employed by the authors. In 
a survival analysis study the sample needs to comprise an adequate number o f failed banks 
so that reliable results can be reached. Random sampling does not ensure that too few failed 
banks might be included (Whalen 1991). In the matched sample approach, which is used 
by Lane et a l  (1986), the researcher adds one or more non-failed banks for every failed
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bank in the sample. The non-failed banks are selected according to some characteristic that 
they have in common with the failed ones such as (Lane et a l  1986):
i. Geographic location
ii. Charter status (state or national bank)
iii. Size (according to assets, deposits or loans)
iv. Age
The shortcoming o f the matched sample approach is firstly its vulnerability to subjec­
tive judgements (i.e. which cut-off size value should be selected) and secondly its inability 
to be applied in countries with a small number o f banks (Whalen 1991).
The second point of criticism to Lane et al. (1986) was the lack of any macro- 
economic variable in their analysis. Whalen (1991) addresses mainly the matter of non­
inclusion of macroeconomic variables and identifies several issues regarding the inclusion 
of macroeconomic variables in a model. At first a selection of the area represented by 
the macroeconomic variables needs to be made. For countries such as the USA covered 
in the study of Whalen (1991), macroeconomic variables can be chosen at the state level, 
at metropolitan areas level, at local level which would be identified by the researcher (i.e. 
Mainland and coastline areas, urban and rural areas-higher degree of monopoly power 
and/or profitability is more likely to be observed in rural areas (Cole and Gunther 1995), or 
finally at the country level. Secondly, sector-specific macroeconomic variables, like farm or 
energy sector, should not be included although they have been found to be correlated with 
bank failures. The author argues that there is no reason to assume that the pattern will re­
peat itself in the future. Hence he supports the use of variables that cover a larger area such
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as unemployment or production level (Whalen 1991). Thirdly, as macroeconomic variables 
are published with a certain lag it is reasonable to assume that economic agents form ex­
pectations on these variables and act according to these. Using forecasted values for these 
variables or the difference between expected and realized values might yield better results 
(Goudie 1987).
Whalen (1991) includes the percentage change in state residential housing permits 
over the three-year period preceding the bank failure to account for the different economic 
background. The estimated coefficient has a negative sign giving indication that a positive 
change in the construction of new houses increases the survival probability of banks. This 
is attributable to the good economic climate that motivates agents to shift from renting a 
house to buy one. Other variables used in the model comprise return on assets and non­
performing loans-to-average assets a rise in which results in higher survival probability. By 
contrast, loans-to-assets, operating expenses-to-assets and certificate of deposit dependence 
ratio are negatively associated with the bank’s probability of survival. An extension to the 
papers o f Lane et al. (1986)and Whalen (1991) comes when Wheelock and Wilson (1995) 
combine methodologies from survival analysis, bank fragility and cost efficiency studies.
In their paper Wheelock and Wilson (1995) combine the methodology found in tech­
nical and cost efficiency studies with survival analysis in order to assess the linkage between 
poor management and banking failure or acquisition. A competing risks framework is used 
under which every bank can either fail or be acquired by another bank. Moreover the Cox 
model is enhanced by using time-varying covariates33 which allow for more information on
33 The Cox model with time-varying explanatory variables (covariates) is called "extended Cox" as opposed 
to Cox Proportional Hazards which assumes constant variables (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980).
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the banks’ condition throughout the experiment. The selected explanatory variables cover 
all five areas o f the CAMEL ratings system. Under the management category however, 
the authors have used variables (cost inefficiency, technical inefficiency) estimated by Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Several miscellaneous factors are also incorporated so that 
size, the presence o f holding companies and restrictive bank-branching laws are consid­
ered. The fact that a bank might be part of a holding company could increase its survival 
probability due to the transfer of financial and other resources from the parent company to 
the subsidiary. Additionally the dissolution of a subsidiary bank could be more complicated 
and more costly than a stand-alone one; hence increasing the time between insolvency and 
failure (Cole and Gunther 1995). The ban of bank branching could expose banks to idio­
syncratic risk, like in the case of oil-dependent states in the USA during the oil-price shock 
o f the late 1980’s, which led to a higher number of bank failures (Cole and Gunther 1995; 
Brown and Hill 1988). Results show that managerial inefficient banks are more likely 
to fail. However as cost efficiency rises, the likelihood of a bank being acquired drops 
indicating that costs for reorganization and other potential problems discourage takeover 
by ambitious managers. The authors also find that bank survival is higher among states 
permitting state/nation-wide branching, which is in favour of the claim that unrestrained 
branching enhances diversification and lowers the exposure to localized risks.
The impact of bank concentration on bank failures for developed and developing 
countries is examined using parametric survival analysis techniques in Evrensel (2008). 
Banking concentration has caused a lot o f contradiction in the literature. Some studies 
find that a higher level o f banking concentration leads to higher survival time for banks
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mainly for two reasons. Firstly, concentration lessens competition and increases profits 
and capital buffers; hence managers can lead an "easy life" without taking excessive risks, 
an argument known as “franchise value” (Keeley 1990; Schaeck et al. 2009). Secondly, the 
regulatory mechanism may be working in a less costly and inefficient way, partly because 
high competition can undermine banks’ prudent behavior (Evrensel 2008; Heilman et al. 
2000). As stated by Mishkin (1999), welfare may be decreased in the presence of high 
competition. In addition to this point, Allen and Gale (2000) claim that competition may 
be less socially preferable to concentration. By contrast more concentration may create 
very large banks that implicitly fall under the “too-big-to-fail” doctrine which can lead to 
more loans being granted, potentially without so stringent credit rationing (Stiglitz 1972; 
O ’Hara and Shaw 1990). However, to get a clearer picture o f the differences that affect bank 
failures in developed and developing countries several other factors need to be taken into 
account. For instance the presence and type o f a deposit insurance scheme is analyzed in 
Matutes and Vives (2006) and Cordelia and Yeyatti (2002) as well as the political system’s 
impact in terms o f banking restrictions, entry barriers and government intervention which 
are examined within Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), DeNicolo et al. (2003) and Beck et 
al. (2006).
Evrensel’sstudy (2007a)focuses in the period 1980-1997 having a sample of 79 coun­
tries and 50 episodes of banking crises. Because some countries (e.g. Malaysia, Turkey) 
faced more than one episode during the examined period, the data can be described as 
multiple-failure data rendering the study the first one to do so. The explanatory variables 
are selected to capture the macroeconomic, financial and regulatory specialities of every
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country. The findings, which are consistent with Beck et al. (2006) and Schaeck et al. 
(2009), show that, higher values of concentration, banking restrictions {i.e. restrictions 
in bank ownership, operating in real estate market and insurance), banking freedom (i.e. 
whether banks can operate freely, degree of regulation in the financial markets), real GDP 
growth, economic freedom (i.e. policies related to trade, wages and government finances) 
and political accountability in the banking sector are associated with higher survival prob­
ability. Conversely, higher levels o f moral hazard-reflected in the generosity of the deposit 
insurance scheme, money growth rates, inflation rates and real interest rates decrease the 
banks’ survival probability.
Although the study reaches some conclusion on how certain variables affect banking 
fragility, it fails to produce robust results on the difference of these factors between devel­
oping and developed countries. For instance the author finds that higher concentration is 
associated to lower hazard but for the developing countries, where concentration is higher, 
banking fragility is also higher. Clearly the channels among concentration, competition 
and bank failures have not been fully investigated (Matutes and Vives 1996; Claessens and 
Laeven 2004; Beck et al. 2006; Schaeck et al. 2009). A possible explanation could be that 
concentration in developing countries is imposed by government practises (governments 
in developing countries intervene in the market for political reasons) rather than being the 
outcome of market pressure leading to a more consolidated and efficient banking sector 
(Evrensel 2008). As far as bank regulations are concerned, it could be the case that in de­
veloping countries they are not properly enforced due to corruption or inadequacies of the 
judicial system (Evrensel 2008).
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The studies presented so far examine the survival time of banks given some financial 
ratios relating solely to the bank (i.e. technical inefficiency) or the banking industry (e.g. 
Ioans-to-deposits). The studies reviewed next take a macroeconomic shock as the starting 
point o f their approach in the context of a generalized financial crisis.
The collapse of the Mexican peso in December 1994 is an adequate macroeconomic 
shock to cause a banking crisis. Although no banks were liquidated during the crisis, the 
majority o f banks received various forms o f financial assistance from the Mexican govern­
ment (Hermosillo et al. 1996). The most commonly used support mechanisms comprise 
financial support from the deposit guarantee fund, temporary recapitalization and sale of 
bad loans to the government. The deposit guarantee fund is financed by the banks in pro­
portion to their deposits and according to the cap set by the government/regulator. At that 
time the Mexican government guaranteed all deposits. In Europe the deposit insurance 
limit is in the range of 35-50,000 euro, although some countries temporarily eliminated 
it -  or raised the limit - during the 2008 financial crisis. During distressed times banks 
will get funds from the guarantee fund. Temporary recapitalization involves the problem 
bank getting an emergency budget from the government or some other organization for a 
pre-negotiated period of time (e.g. 6 months). During this period the bank needs to estab­
lish a restructuring plan, to identify the reasons for that led it to financial distress and to 
restore its viability (World Bank website). Finally the government can buy at a discount a 
portion or the whole o f the banks’ non-performing loans. The last method was used in case 
of "Northern Rock" when it was returned to public ownership in January 2010 stripped of 
its book of bad loans, which remained under government possession (Guardian 2010).
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Hermosillo et al. (1996) examine the determinants o f banking failure and provide a 
case study for Mexico during the currency crisis. To their aim they make use of logit mod­
els and survival analysis techniques to estimate the impact o f bank-specific, bank-sector 
and macroeconomic factors upon the probability of failure and the survival time of banks. 
They find that higher values of Non-performing loans, Non-securitised loans and more 
Interbank deposits are associated with a higher probability of failure. By contrast, they 
fail to find any statistical significant link between profitability, as measured by Return on 
Assets (RoA), Return on Equity (RoE) and Profit margin, and liquidity, as measured by 
Liquid assets to total assets and bank size, proxied by Bank assets to total banking as­
sets. The theoretical grounds for the statistical significance of the first three variables are 
self-explanatory; thus non-performing and non-securitised loans are a measure of banks’ 
exposure to credit risk. Additionally increased interbank activity could signify higher ex­
posure to risk as the problematic bank seeks for additional funds to prevent insolvency. 
However we would expect profitability to be negatively related with probability of sur­
vival as a more profitable bank would have higher financial flexibility, higher operational 
efficiency, greater research and development capabilities and more efficient risk manage­
ment (Willison 2009). On one hand, liquidity would be expected to be positively related 
to banks’ survival, especially when the economic shock comes from the macroeconomic 
environment, thus affects all banks. Hence when interbank lending is restricted due to the 
uncertainty for other banks’ creditworthiness, the bank with the more liquid assets would 
clearly be in a better position as it would have a larger cushion to absorb shocks. On the 
other hand, if the economic shock comes from within the bank then the impact o f liquidity
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may not be as straightforward since high levels of liquidity could be related with inactiv­
ity. Therefore bank inactivity, proxied by liquidity and not liquidity per se, would be the 
reason for financial instability. Size and the "too big to fail" doctrine has gained a lot of 
popularity lately after the bailouts in the US and the UK that followed the 2008 financial 
crisis. Moreover, larger banks are more able to diversify credit risk and enjoy more flex­
ibility in financial markets (Cole and Gunther 1995). Therefore it would be expected that 
size would be positively related to banks’ survival time.
An adverse macroeconomic shock can affect the banking environment o f another 
country. A number of studies that have examined the effects o f the Mexican devalua­
tion upon the banking systems of Argentina (Dabos and Escudero, 2004), Brazil (Sales 
and Tannuri-Pianto 2005), Venezuela (Molina 2002) and Colombia (Gonzalez and Kiefer 
2009), are presented below.
Dabos and Escudero (2004) examine in one of their studies the impact of the Mexican 
devaluation upon the Argentinean banking sector. The selected explanatory variables cover 
all five categories of the CAMEL ratings system. The sample period 1994-1996 is selected 
and the Cox model is used. Their findings give support to the positive effect of increased 
liquidity and profitability, as measured by cash plus public securities-to-deposits and return 
on equity respectively, upon banking survival. By contrast, higher levels of equity-to-assets, 
as a proxy for capitalization, and less efficient management, evidenced by higher levels of 
expenses-to-liabilities, have a negative effect upon banking survival. Similar to the study of 
Lane et a l  (1986), the authors here fail to reach robust results (significance level and sign 
o f the variable is not consistent between the two groups of banks selected by the authors)
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regarding the impact of asset (loan) variables upon the soundness o f the banking system. 
However this could be due to their poor choice of proxy variables (they selected arrears 
portfolio minus loss provisions-to-equity) which is not found anywhere else in the related 
literature.
The impact of the Mexican currency crisis upon the fragility of the Brazilian banking 
system is studied by Sales and Tannuri-Pianto (2007). The examined period covers 1994 
to 1998 and parametric survival models are used by the authors. Brazil uses the FNDCON 
system which, similarly to the CAMEL ratings system in the USA, uses quarterly financial 
ratios at the bank-level. Similarly to the CAMEL system, financial ratios in the INDCON 
system use the same classification. Macroeconomic variables (consumer price index, in­
dustrial production indicator, and average spread of Brazilian over US government bonds) 
and contagion variables (total loans-to-monthly GDP, monthly percentage change of loans) 
are also included. Contagion variables are used to assess the effect o f the government’s at­
tempt to minimize the likelihood of a system-wide banking crisis by promoting mergers and 
bank restructuring34. Results show that an increase in two financial ratios (recovery of the 
administrative expenses through service’s income-a proxy for efficiency and loan reserve 
coverage, a proxy for credit risk) decrease the probability of a bank failure. Conversely in 
all other statistically significant variables (industrial production as a proxy for economic 
environment, atypical assets-to-total assets, a proxy for fraud risk, operational margin, a 
measure o f profitability, leverage ratio and other liabilities-to-total liabilities as proxies for
34 The Brazilian Central Bank launched the "Proer" (Program of incentives to the restructuring and strength­
ening of the national financial system which ended in 2001 when the enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility 
Law forbid any state support to troubled banks (Sales and Pianto 2007).
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credit risk and non-performing loans-to-total loans, a measure o f asset (loan) quality) o f the 
model will increase the probability of a bank failure. The authors’ results agree with Rocha 
(1999) who used the Cox proportional hazards model for the period 1995-1996. However 
they are not supportive of Janot (2001) probably because of the sample choice (1994-1995) 
as the effect o f the Mexican devaluation (occurred in December 1994) would have taken 
some time to impact on the, already, cash-flow problematic Brazilian banks (Central Bank 
of Brazil website).
The financial turmoil of the mid-90s in Latin America had an impact upon Venezuela, 
which is examined by Molina (2002). During that time the weak and volatile macroeco­
nomic environment o f the region, the inadequate banking supervision and regulation cou­
pled with bankers’ corruption, mismanagement and the untrustworthy government as well 
as the shift o f all interest rate restrictions fuelled the Venezuelan banking crisis (Garcia 
1997). The sample period ranges from January 1994 to August 1995 when 17 banks, ac­
counting for more than half of the system’s assets, failed. Due to the less developed banking 
system of the country, there are no financial indicators for all categories of the CAMEL rat­
ings system. Moreover, the percentage of bad loans at the bank-level was unavailable at 
that time. The paper’s findings are that banks with higher return-on-assets and a greater 
investment in government bonds than loans have higher survival probability. During the 
mid 90’s, Venezuelan government bonds were considered as a low-risk/medium-return in­
vestment, hence banks would discard the risky loans and assign a higher proportion of 
their assets to government bonds, in accordance to the flight-to-quality principle. Lower 
operational costs in association with more financial expenses give rise to higher default
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probability. The author’s explanation for this finding is that troubled banks cut operating 
expenses and increase the interest rate offered on deposits to attract more depositors. Sim­
ilar results have been also found to hold for the USA and the UK (Weelock and Wilson 
1995; Logan 2001).
Colombia’s banking system was also affected by the mid-90’s crisis of Latin America 
(Gonzalez and Kiefer 2009). A total o f 53 banks, accounting for more than 20 percent of 
the system’s assets, failed between 1998 and 2001. Before the nineties, Colombia’s finan­
cial system was heavily regulated with high reserve requirements, constraints on foreign 
investment and a large proportion of nationalized banks. Financial liberalization started 
during the nineties and led to a rise in the operating financial institutions, a higher percent­
age o f foreign assets circulating in the system and a transfer o f the previously government- 
owned financial institutions to private ownership. The credit boom that followed led the 
ratio o f loans-to-GDP to grow steadily until 1998 when a capital reversion followed by 
deterioration in the terms of trade coupled with the country’s abandonment of the pegged 
exchange rate system over a free floating one, caused the worst banking crisis in Colom­
bia’s history. Utilizing the Cox proportional hazards model and a, rather limited, set of 
bank-specific explanatory variables, the authors find that a rise in capitalization (equity-to- 
assets) affects positively the survival time of the banks. Moreover they find that the effect 
diminishes as the banks’ capitalization level increases. Size and profitability (proxied by 
annualized profits-to-average annual assets) also affect the survival of a bank in a positive 
way. Larger banks are expected to be less likely to fail given their higher diversification ca­
pabilities, economies o f scale and publicity. When management efficiency or loan quality
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data are unobservable by the public, profitability is more likely to be used as a proxy for 
them (Molina 2002). Hence more profitable banks are expected to have a larger clientele 
particularly in distressed times.
In this subsection we reviewed some of the literature on banking fragility that used 
survival analysis. All literature with survival analysis methodology focuses on fragility of 
conventional banks whereas there is no comparative empirical study between Islamic and 
conventional banks. There are however, theoretical arguments that Islamic banks are more 
resilient to financial crisis and are they do not share the same early warning indicators to 
conventional banks. The next subsection presents these arguments as well as their counter 
arguments, leading to the methodological part of this chapter where all the arguments are 
empirically tested.
3.2.3 Islamic Banking and Fragility
In the conventional banking system fixed interest is given on deposits. However returns 
on investments fluctuate according to the economic cycles. Consequently the conventional 
banking sector is fragile and prone to crisis as pressure to meet the fixed obligations builds 
up (Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Ali 2004). There has been a lot of theoretical work arguing 
on why Islamic banking is inherently more stable and enhances economic growth (Haque 
and Mirakhor 1986; Sundarajan and Errico 2002; Archer and Karim 2007; Mehta 2008). 
Below we summarize some of the arguments that are in favour of Islamic banks enhancing 
the stability of the financial system and present some of the counter-arguments as well.
3.2 Literature Review 109
First, Islamic banks are able to pass through all risks related to their investments to 
their depositors. This is possible because of the way balance is maintained in the account­
ing statements of Islamic banks. Islamic banks do not use interest to channel funds; they 
rely mostly on fees for simple "trade contracts" and on equity for "partnership contracts". 
Murabahah for example can be classified as a "trade contract". In the contract of Muraba- 
hah, the Islamic bank buys an asset and sells it at a mark-up which takes into account the 
bank’s expenses and profit margin. Partnership contracts work on the profit and loss shar­
ing (PLS) principle on the asset and liability side o f the bank. The PLS principle is similar 
to preferred stock without contractually agreed interest payments (Ebrahim 1999). On the 
asset side the Islamic bank will contract with the entrepreneur so that the former provides 
the necessary capital and the latter the expertise. Profits of the joint venture will be dis­
tributed on a pre-agreed profit share ratio between the bank and the entrepreneur. In case 
of losses, the bank will be the only part to bear the financial loss. On the liability side 
the Islamic bank has two types of deposit accounts. A safekeeping account where all the 
money is 100% available on request but a zero rate of return is offered and an investment 
account where money is not guaranteed and its rate of return is tied to the bank’s invest­
ments. The rate of return is unknown beforehand as it is directly related to the performance 
of the bank’s investments. If the investments are profitable, a higher rate of return is of­
fered. However the account does not guarantee a minimum rate o f return or even explicit 
capital protection. In case o f some shock, due to the special link between depositors and 
investors offered by Islamic banks, the liability side will always adjust automatically to the 
value o f the asset side. In other words, Islamic banks are able to pass through all risks re­
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lated to a venture (i.e. credit, default, market) to their depositors thus enhancing stability 
and avoiding bank runs (Ali 2004; Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007; Gangopadhyay and Singh 
2000).
A second benefit to the financial system by Islamic banks is the elimination of moral 
hazard and adverse selection issues (Harris and Raviv 1991). This is ensured by a more 
frequent monitoring of the entrepreneur by the bank, because the latter acts as a business 
partner who has an interest in ensuring that the joint-venture is profitable, to ensure his 
own profit share (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007). In other words, Islamic banks, tie the remu­
neration to the project’s performance which is different to the conventional banks tying the 
remuneration to the input of capital (Haque and Mirakhor 1986). Moreover, the use of PLS 
transfers part of the monitoring task to the depositors as they share the risks and are closer 
to equity investors rather than holders of debt (Cihak and Hesse 2010).
Thirdly, Islamic banking does not aggravate the down-phase of the economy as is the 
case with conventional banking (Iqbal and Mirakhor 1999). In the event o f a crisis, banks 
restrict liquidity in the financial system by increasing the interest rate on loans or halting 
them completely for certain ventures. This can be worsened further if banks need to make 
adjustments to comply with liability management policies, which align the behavior of 
all banks. An increase of deposit interest rates at that time to attract more depositors has 
occurred many times in the past and most of the times it has led to a banking crisis. By 
contrast, Islamic banks do not need to adjust any deposit rate. In fact they do not have one 
to adjust. The profit of the depositors is tied to the performance o f the bank’s portfolio and 
will adjust by itself.
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However, Islamic banks also face problems that could invalidate the aforementioned 
arguments in favour of financial stability besides making their expansion more difficult. 
First of all operational risk is much higher partly because o f the lack of standardization of 
products and procedures in the business and partly due to the complexities involved in PLS 
contracts. Islamic banks are not yet fully standardized, hence working at the micro level 
would incur higher costs as contracts need to be created from scratch every time. Conse­
quently they are forced to operate mainly at the macro level financing big scale projects, 
like real estate and infrastructure projects. Secondly, the legal system, especially in non- 
Muslim countries and the incompatibilities with the Shariah Law which Islamic banking 
abides by, can invalidate Islamic banking contracts. Shariah compliance risk is caused 
when a financial product offered by an Islamic bank is deemed as unlawful and thus void. 
As most Islamic banks operate in countries with dual banking system, competition from 
conventional banks, which face no investment restrictions, is severe. Islamic banks need 
to cover the investment needs of their clients which lead to research for new products that 
could potentially be unlawful (Sundararajan and Errico 2002; Iqbal and Llewellyn 2002). 
Thirdly, competition from conventional banks and guidelines from various organizations 
{i.e. World Bank, IMF, BIS) necessitate the practise o f profit smoothing in Islamic banks. 
A set of reserves is created which act as buffer for hard times so that profit can still be dis­
tributed. Although this, in theory, is opposite to Islamic banking it is found that Islamic 
banks in many countries do profit smoothing to a greater or lesser degree (Sundararajan 
2005).
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Despite the theoretical arguments about the difference of Islamic banking and its 
unique risks, there is lack o f empirical analysis in the context o f financial stability. Ques­
tions like Islamic banks being less vulnerable to systemic shocks than conventional ones or 
simply that they are affected by different factors have not been adequately addressed. Rea­
sons for this lack o f empirical work comprise the much smaller size of the Islamic banking 
sector, the unavailability of reliable and high frequency data, differences in how Islamic 
banking is perceived and practised (e.g. Malaysia versus GCC states), inconsistencies be­
tween databases on how to measure (the equivalent of) interest income and how to make 
accounting statements from conventional and Islamic banks comparable. So far only one 
empirical study comparing conventional and Islamic banks has been brought to our knowl­
edge.
The study of Cihak and Hesse (2010) is the first one to address the issue of compar­
ing banking fragility profiles for the two types of banks. In their sample 18 countries with 
adequate presence of Islamic banks are included. The range covered is 1993-2004 while 
Islamic banks account for less than one-fifth of the total sample. The methodology, simi­
lar to Maechler et al. (2005), involves regressing the banks’ z-score indicator, a measure 
o f how close a bank is to being insolvent, on a set of bank specific and macroeconomic 
explanatory variables necessary to reflect both the economic events and regulatory or gov­
ernance issues. The authors find that size is inversely related to the likelihood of a crisis in 
an Islamic bank. This is opposite to what literature has found for conventional banks where 
size seems to affect positively survival (Demirgti9-Kunt and Detragiache 1998; Maecher et 
al. 2005). The finding is plausibly attributed to the problems faced by Islamic banks due to
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the lack o f standardization in products and procedures. As contracts need to be redesigned 
from scratch and be tailored specifically to each client, operational risk is significant. More­
over larger banks are more likely to be involved in profit-and-loss sharing which is riskier 
than the non-PLS contracts (e.g. Murabahah, Ijarah) used by small banks35. With regards 
to conventional banking, the authors find small Islamic banks to be less likely to face in­
solvency than small conventional ones. However when bank size gets bigger, the situation 
is reversed. The rest o f the results comply with the rest of the literature with increases in 
loan-to-assets and cost-to-income ratios leading to increased banking fragility. Income di­
versity and bank size (which is likely to be biased by the high proportion o f conventional 
banks in the sample) tend to decrease the likelihood of banking failure when they increase. 
Last but not least better governance would lead to higher z-scores, hence higher survival 
probability (Maechler et al. 2005; Evrensel 2008).
In this subsection we reviewed some of the reasons put forward about Islamic banks 
being less affected compared to conventional ones by financial crises. Next we will be 
introducing the survival analysis methodology that we will be using to assess whether the 
aforementioned arguments can be verified empirically.
3.3 Methodology
In this section we outline the survival analysis methodology we will be using. We start by 
comparing survival analysis with linear regression. Then we summarize the key charac­
teristics o f non-parametric (Kaplan-Meier), semi-parametric (Cox model) and parametric
35 The authors use arbitrarily a cut-off value of $1 billion assets.
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ways o f implementing survival analysis. Moreover some basic concepts referring to data 
organization are presented, like censoring, different explanatory variables that could be in­
cluded and "ties". Finally we describe the robust standard errors and the model selection 
methodology.
In survival analysis the time to the occurrence of an event is analyzed. Time is usually 
measured in years, months, days but can have any measurement unit. The event monitored 
varies depending on the area of research; it could be related to engineering, the time until 
a piece of machinery fails, to medicine, the time until a patient infected by some disease 
dies or economics, the time until a firm goes bankrupt. The event needs not be a failure, 
although it is very common in the literature to refer to the time to an event as "time to 
failure". There are studies where the event is the employment o f an individual (Yamaguchi 
1992).
3.3.1 Survival Analysis and Linear Regression
Survival analysis estimates the instantaneous rate of failure (force of mortality or hazard 
function) subject to time and a set of explanatory variables affecting the subject’s history. 
Suppose we have the following dataset (Table 2) where t ime  measures the time till the 
occurrence o f an event and x  is an explanatory variable (covariate) (Cleaves et al. 2010).
[Table 2 here]
A linear regression model would be of the following forms:
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t imej  = PQ + PiXj  + ej £ j ~ N ( 0 , a 2) (3.1)
In(timej) = PQ +  P xXj +  £j £j~N(0,  cr2) (3.2)
There are however problems if linear regression is applied in a survival analysis con­
text. The most important problem is that the residuals are assumed to follow the normal
distribution. However, there are many cases in survival analysis context that we need to 
assume that subjects might face constant hazard (risk of an event occurring) or that haz­
ard can be bimodal. For instance, after having a heart transplant the patient might die very 
shortly after the operation or some days later. Although linear regression is known to be 
robust to small deviations from normality, it is not safe to assume that the deviations in­
herent in a survival analysis context fall in this category as they can be very asymmetric or 
multi-modal.
Other problems rendering linear regression unsuitable exist but they can be circum­
vented. The fact that time to failure cannot be negative is not in line with the normal 
distribution. Censoring is very frequently encountered in survival analysis. Linear regres­
sion models can be modified to handle such problems with tobit models being the most 
widely used. The following two subsections give a more detailed presentation of censor­
ing, a problem unique to survival analysis, and different explanatory variables that can be 
used within survival analysis. Thirdly, survival analysis assumes the probability of fail­




Censoring is a form of missing data problem that arises in survival analysis studies. It is 
observed because we cannot run an experiment starting at t  =  0 at the birth of a new subject 
(a living organism, a firm, one’s employment) and wait until the subject fails because o f the 
unknown time the experiment would take, the fact that a failure may not occur and even 
if we run the experiment the results would be outdated by the time the experiment ended. 
Hence we choose to run an experiment for a pre-specified time and this causes various 
types o f censoring.
Right censoring happens because some subjects do not fail within the time bounds 
o f the experiment. An independent right-censoring method ensures that the failure rates 
applicable to the observed subjects are the same if right-censoring did not exist in the data. 
In other words, the hazard conditional on the process hazard at time t should only depend 
on survival to time t.
Left censoring occurs when the subjects start date is not observed. Patients may only 
be diagnosed for AIDS after their annual exams which cannot tell us exactly how many 
days is the patient sick. A bank is in existence for some time before the sample period. In 
the same sense if we are modelling the survival of a bank according to its age and do not 
have the necessary financial statement going back to t =  0 when the bank was founded, we 
could use the first of the available financial statements from, say t =  10, in which case left 
censoring arises.
Other forms of censoring exist like (the combination o f right and left censoring) 
interval censoring meaning that failure time falls within some time frame rather than a
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specific date. Random censoring occurs if a subject leaves the experiment not by the exit 
we are currently studying. For instance, an insurance policy holder may cancel his policy 
without dying. A bank may be "lost" from the database for reasons other than failure, for 
example the bank may choose to stop publishing its accounts with Bankscope or any other 
database. However there can be other causes of random censoring. Subjects may move 
away from the study area for various reasons (students may leave their current school as 
they changed house, or an investment bank may be forced to work as a commercial bank 
thus leaving the group o f investment banks that the researcher was monitoring. Subjects 
facing deteriorating or improving condition may move to a different category (patients with 
AIDS in the monitoring room with certain characteristics may deteriorate; thus moving to 
emergencies or improve; thus leaving the hospital, banks may move from a high growth 
category to a low growth one. Random censoring can be informative, when the subjects 
that moved away from the experiment, may have some effect on the survival time (AIDS 
positive individuals being studied and some are imported in the hospital as ill) or non- 
informative when subjects leaving are independent of life time; thus not introducing bias to 
the results. Type I  censoring occurs when all the subjects will be censored at a specific time 
known in advance. An application could be to pension schemes where individuals retire at 
65 years of service. Type II  censoring occurs when the experiment will go on until a certain 
number of failures has been achieved. Applications of this type of censoring are largely 
found in the industry where machinery (e.g. motors) is tested until a certain proportion has 
failed (Nelson and Hahn 1972). Table 3 summarizes all types o f censoring36.
36 As survival analysis was primarily designed for medical and engineering experiments some types of 
censoring are hard to to be found in economics context. For example Type II censoring is hard to imagine
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[Table 3 here]
For studies involving banks and our study in particular right censoring is the most 
relevant. Banks that are right censored are those that have survived till the end o f the 
experiment and we cannot observe what happens after that time. The way we deal with this 
problem involves using a dummy variable for every period that takes the value o f 1 when 
the bank fails and 0 when the bank has survived that particular time period. Once a bank 
has been classified as failed (state 1), it stops from being monitored and cannot return to 
the pool with the survived banks (state 0). Because only banks identified by the dummy 
variable are the ones that actually failed, the analysis is not biased. This approach has been 
used extensively to deal with this problem in the literature (Hermosillo et al. 1996; Dabos 
and Escudero 2004).
3.3.3 Explanatory Variables
The most basic survival analysis approach is the non-parametric which makes use of the
Kaplan Meier estimators o f survival rate. It is a mechanical process that estimates the
survival function from a pool o f observations where failures occur. The formulae describing
the Kaplan-Meier estimator are introduced formally in a later paragraph. One drawback of
a non-parametric estimator is that it does not take into account various characteristics of
the sample. So if we carry out the same experiment again by simply changing the sample,
results can be completely different. The cause of this is that non-parametric estimators
do not incorporate variables that allow us to categorize a sample. For instance, we might
in a bank failure example as typically firms and banks fail once. However, a situation where the event is an 
agent being fired (or hired) can be subject to Type II censoring.
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want to examine separately males from females only, commercial from investment banks 
or firms with more than 1 million in assets. Variables like these are known as explanatory 
variables or covariates in the survival analysis context and have a dual role. First they are 
used as categorical variables to separate the sample into different and mutually exclusive 
categories (strata). Secondly they are used as explanatory variables when a model is fitted. 
Covariates are split into three categories according to what data they represent and into two 
categories according to how many times their values are recorded during an experiment. 
Hence we can have:
•  A direct quantitative measure (age, weight, assets, loans, return on assets)
•  A dummy variable indicating two different and mutually exclusive categories (sex, 
smoker, member of EU, Islamic bank)
• A dummy variable indicating more than two different and mutually exclusive 
categories. This is used to give some quantitative representation on qualitative data 
and the number of states is chosen arbitrarily, (mg of dosage taking 5 different 
values, GDP growth of countiy taking 6 different values)
Covariates are also categorized as:
•  Time independent, where their value is recorded once, usually before the start o f the 
experiment, and does not change until the end o f the experiment
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•  Time varying, where for every period of the experiment we have a new value for 
every observed variable. Time varying covariates can be further split into external 
and internal
-  External are the covariates that affect the time to failure but they are not affected 
by failure occurrences. They can be classified as fixed, where their value is 
measured in before the experiment starts and does not change for its duration 
and are practically the same as time independent covariates; defined, when the 
future evolution of the variable is known to the researcher a possible application 
being a temperature factor that varies in a predetermined way to assess its impact 
on machinery; ancillary, where the future evolution of the variable follows a 
stochastic process and is not affected by the experiment.
-  Internal covariates are the covariates that the subject generates while under 
study. Their values can carry information useful to predict the time of failure and 
in many cases after the subject has failed, it is not possible to obtain information 
on them. The essential difference from defined or ancillary external covariates is 
that internal covariates can affect and be affected by the failure time.
3.3.4 Parametric Models
We mentioned previously that the distribution o f the residuals cannot be assumed to be nor­
mal. Parametric survival analysis requires imposing a certain distribution on the residuals 
which can be done in two formations; the Proportional Hazards (PH) formation and the
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Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) or log-time metric. The linear regression (1) introduced 
in a previous paragraph can be rewritten as follows:
hj(t) = h0(t)ex.-p(P0 -\-xj Px) (3.3)
Info) =  X j ^  + ej (3.4)
Equation 3 is known as the PH formation. The distributional assumption we impose 
on the error term of the residual in equation 1 is now embedded within the baseline hazard 
function ho(t). The proportional hazards terminology refers to the fact that the hazard 
faced by the subject is multiplicative to the baseline hazard. In parametric survival models 
we can fit a positive function for h0(t) that describes out data in the best way. Some of 
the most commonly used distributions are presented below alongside with their baseline 
hazard functions, their instantaneous and cumulative hazard functions and their survival 
functions:
[Table 4 here]
Once the appropriate distribution is selected, the coefficients of the covariates can be 
estimated. A positive coefficient shows that an increase on the covariate leads to higher
survival rate, hence lower hazard for the subject. By contrast, a negative coefficient shows
that an increase on the covariate means that survival rate is lowered, hence the subject faces 
higher hazard. When a distribution with more than one parameter is selected, for instance 
the Weibull has a scale and a shape parameter (p), the covariates are used to model the 
scale parameter while the shape parameter is assumed to be constant. However, we can
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choose to model the shape parameter in the case we have evidence that the shape of the 
hazard function might be different for two groups of observations (e.g. gender, bank type). 
In other words we allow the baseline survivor function to be different in the groups we 
have specified. This is referred to as a stratified model. Extending the notion of creating 
separate groups from the full sample based on some identification variable, we have the 
shared frailty concept. Shared frailty is the equivalent of random effects on a survival 
model. Shared frailty is an unobserved factor that causes observations within groups to 
be correlated. In other words, these subjects will be facing an additional source of risk 
(e.g. some random-effect) whose variance can be estimated from the data and measures 
the extent o f different frailty quantities in the groups . The frailty for each group is usually 
assumed to follow a gamma or inverse-Gaussian distribution and is described by equation 
5 where denotes the groups and the observations within a group.
hj(t) = otihij(t) (3.5)
In the accelerated time formation (equation 4) the distribution assumption is embed­
ded in the quantity:
In fo )  =  exp ( - x j P J t j  (3.6)
Equation 6 is then used to substitute the residual term in equation 4 giving equation
7:
Info) =  XjPx +  In fo ) (3.7)
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Depending on the values the acceleration parameter, exp(—Xjpx), takes we identify 
three cases:
•  exp(—Xj{3x) >  1 <$> Tj > tj : Failure o f the subject is expected to occur sooner, as 
time for the subject is accelerated.
•  exp(—XjPx) < I <=> Tj < tj : Failure of the subject is expected to occur later, as 
time for the subject is decelerated.
• exp{—XjPx) — 1 Tj — tj : Time for the subject passes at its normal rate.
Hence in the equation 6, the distribution o f ln (r j)  is restricted to follow a certain 
distribution. Some of the most commonly used are the gamma, the log-normal and the log- 
logistic. Interpretation of the coefficients for an accelerated failure time model states that 
an increase in the covariate having a positive coefficient leads to increased time to failure, 
which is equivalent to decreased hazard rate.
Conversely to PH formation, the AFT gives more weight to the analysis time. This 
formation is preferable when predictions o f failure time are our priority. However, there is 
a problem associated with this approach. The problem relates to the use o f time-varying 
covariates in conjunction with failure time predictions. In essence we are calculating 
E(ln( t j\xj )  for different values of Xj. Given that different values o f Xj are only available 
for the recorded observations and timings there is no way of obtaining the values in inter­
mediate times or times outside those observed. For instance we might have: t  =  1; x  =  5.2 
and t =  2; x  =  4.9. Assigning a value for x  at t  =  3 is required to predict the time to
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failure, however this requires some assumptions to be made. Should we assume that the 
quantity measured by x  continues to drop? And what rate would that be?
Due to the problem mentioned above as well as our desire to maintain as much com­
parability o f our results with other approaches we opt for the PH formation of parametric 
models.
3.3.5 Semi-Parametric Models
Parametric models can be problematic when an inappropriate distribution for the data is 
selected. An alternative would be to remove any assumptions we impose on the time to 
failure by focusing instead on the ordering o f the events. Going back to the sample dataset 
of table 2, suppose that the first failure in our dataset has occurred, and we want to calculate 
the probability of failure after being at risk for t ime = 1, which leads to an application of 
logistic regression. In fact we could have chosen to analyze the second event, that is at 
t im e  =  5 or the third at t ime  =  9. Nevertheless, by not selecting the first we are missing 
some information due to the observations we are not considering. Semi-parametric models 
and Cox (1972) in particular proposed a solution that overcomes this selection problem 
by fitting a conditional logistic model, conditioned on the fact that only one observation 
fails in each analysis. The analysis is repeated for every failure time and the results are 
combined (Cleves et al. 2010). The benefit is that the combination of the analyses imposes 
no assumption on the distribution of failure times, indeed time is only used to order the 
observations. Therefore time is not parameterized, but the covariates are. Hence the method 
falls under the category o f semi-parametric models o f survival analysis.
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The Cox (1972) model is the most popular choice of semi-parametric models and its 
hazard function is defined as:
hj(t) = h0{t) exp (xjPx) (3.8)
Where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function which in the case o f semi-parametric 
models is not assumed to follow any distribution. Nevertheless, all subjects are required 
to have the same baseline hazard function. The reason why we do not parameterize the 
baseline hazard function is that it drops out from further calculations since our analysis is 
confined only to times when failures occur. To realize how this is the case, we use the data 
of table 5 to demonstrate the analysis.
[Table 5 here]
Suppose that at time t — 9 only subjects 3 ,4 ,5  survive and subject 3 fails. Using the 
hazard equation 8 we get:
h3(t =  9) =  ho(9) exp(/?0 +  Apx) (3.9)
hA(t =  9) =  h0( 9) exp(/30 +  9/3J (3.10)
hs(t  =  9) =  ho(9) exp(/30 +  10p x) (3.11)
Since only one failure occurs at t ime  =  9, the probability that subject 3 has failed is:
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Pr(3 fa i ls \ fa i lure) (12)
ho{9) exp(/30 +  A(3X)
(13)
h0{ 9) exp (/30 +  A(3X) +  h0{ 9) exp (/30 +  9/3J +  /i0(9) exp(/30 +  10/3J 
_  exp(4 Px)
(14)
exp(4/3x) +  exp(9 (3X) +  exp(10 (3X)
Hence, the baseline hazard function has dropped out.
3.3.6 Ties
A shortcoming of the semi-parametric model coming from the fact that only failures times 
enter the estimation procedure is that two or more failures can occur at the same time. Con­
sequently we cannot be sure which subject failed first and this can affect the estimates. To 
deal with the problem there are four approaches; the marginal and the partial calculations as 
well as two approximations; the Breslow (1974) and Efron (1977). The marginal approach 
assumes that because time is continuous, ties do not really exist, consequently some sub­
jects failed earlier than others. However we do not know the exact ordering of the events, 
hence this approach assumes that we can calculate the probabilities for all possible order­
ings of the events and use this sum for further calculations. Suppose we have 5 subjects 
( n i ,n 2,ra3,n 4,n 5) and at time t = 1 two failures are recorded (n2,n 3) we do not know 
whether n 2 failed out of a sample of 4 subjects (n1, n 3, n 4, n 5) or 3 subjects (n i ,n 4,n 5). 
A drawback of this method is the computational time required if there is a large number of 
events within a period. For instance, if we have 5 failures in a year, all possible orderings 
are 5! =  120. The partial approach is similar to the marginal but it assumes that the subjects
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fail at the same time and this is not down to incorrect measurement o f time but because we 
are assuming time is discrete. Consequently the calculated conditional probabilities will be 
altered to accommodate that. These methods do not deviate much from one another, they 
do however pose calculation difficulties in case of big samples or many tied events; hence 
two approximations are most commonly used. Breslow (1974) uses the largest pool of data 
as we do not know the precise ordering of the events. Hence in our previous example sub­
jects (n2, n 3) both failed from the pool of ( n i ,  n 2 , n 3 , n 4 , n 5 ) .  This is the faster method but 
if ties are many, it will give misleading results. The Efron (1977) approach assumes that 
the first (arbitrarily) subject failed from the pool (nl7 n 2 , n 3 , n 4 , n 5 ) while the second either 
from the pool ( n i ,  n 3 , n4 , n 5 ) or ( n i ,  n 2 , n 4 , ra5). Hence there is 50% probability of n 2 and 
n 3 to be in the second pool. So 0.5 x  ( n 2 +  n 3 ) +  n i  +  n 4 +  n 5 . Efron’s approach is more ac­
curate but more time consuming than the Breslow. We are using the Efron’s approximation 
as it is the best of compromise between accuracy and time.
3.3.7 Extensions to the Cox PH model
Strata and Frailty
The baseline hazard function can be different among subgroups o f the full sample 
while the estimated coefficients remain the same. In other words, every subgroup is al­
lowed to have its unique shape of a baseline hazard function upon which the covariates act. 
Different models for every subgroup also allow for different shapes of the baseline haz­
ard functions but they give different coefficient estimates at the same time. In that way the 
stratified Cox PH model is a more efficient way when we are not concerned about how dif­
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ferent variables affect different groups but we are looking for a single, efficient estimate 
(Cleves et a l  2010). Provided that the hazards of the groups are proportional, then the 
estimates o f the two methods, stratified Cox as opposed to a model with an indicator vari­
able for every group, would give very similar results. The greater the deviation among the 
results, the more likely the hazard is not proportional at which case the stratified model 
should be preferred (Cleves et al  2010). Strata can be defined by a single dummy variable 
or by a categorical variable to identify more than two strata. The Stratified Cox model is 
used to identify groups.
hj{t) =  h0ji(t) exp(xj(3x) (3.15)
Shared frailty can also be applied to the Cox PH model to account for increased 
correlation within a subgroup of observations. Equation 4.10 is the Cox PH model with 
shared frailty:
hij(t) = hotyoLiesxpixijP,,.) (3.16)
Which can also be written as:
hij(t) = h0{t) exp(xij(3x +  (3.17)
A use of the shared frailty model is to identify omitted variables at which case the 
estimated variance (9) will be significant. This is because the omitted variable might be 
a source o f unobserved heterogeneity that is captured by the frailty model; however once 
accounted for, the frailty term will lose its significance. Given that the group effect is
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directly incorporated in the hazard function, we can obtain estimates o f the a ; or Vi the of 
every group and since we can get an estimate o f the least frail and frailest group. In terms 
o f interpretation, the highest the value o f the , the higher the hazard for the group.
Vi < 0 <==$ d i <  1 hazard  j  (3.18)
Vi > 0 <=> ai > 1 <=> hazard  |  (3.19)
Testing the Proportional Hazards Assumption
The proportional hazards assumption states that the effect o f the covariates does not 
change over time. In other words the interaction of analysis time with covariates should 
have no explanatory power if included in the model. The ways of testing the validity of this 
assumption can be divided into two categories; the first requires additional models to be 
estimated so that the interaction between analysis time and the covariates is incorporated in 
the model. If these variables turn out to be statistically insignificant then we can conclude 
that the proportional hazards assumption is not violated as it would mean that the effects 
do not change in ways besides the ones we have already accounted for. The second way
involves the use o f the scaled Schoenfeld (1982) residuals from the original estimation
and test whether they are have a statistically significant relationship with some specified 
function of time. The statistical test is essentially a test of a non-zero slope of the fitted line 
on residuals (Grambsch and Themeau 1994).
If we define an explanatory variable x u with u =  1 , . . , k  and j  observations with 
j  =  1 , . . . ,  n  then the Schoenfeld residual is defined, at the time when a subject has failed
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j  — 1, as the difference between the covariate value for the subject that failed and the 
weighted covariate average of the non-failed (at-risk) subjects.
YTi-1  x u,j exp(xjPx) 
ruj  =  x uJ -  1 ’ (3.20)
E j= i exp(x;l6x)
If  the coefficient on x u does not vary with time, as the proportional hazards assump­
tion requires, then qj =  0 and time, expressed as a function g(t), does not have an impact.
P u ( i ) = P u  + Qj9(t) (3-21)
It can be shown (Grambsch and Themau 1994)that the Schoenfeld residuals can be 
scaled and re-arrange the previous equation into:
* K , - )  +  /3„ =  A . «  (3.22)
Where r* ■ is the scaled Schoenfeld residual. Consequently plotting r*j  versus time 
would lead to a graphical assessment of the proportional hazards assumption where the 
latter will hold if the slope of the best fit line is zero. A formal statistical test of zero slope 
can also be performed the null hypothesis being H 0 : qj = 0
Time-Varying Covariates -  The Extended Cox Model
The proportional hazards assumption is a way of verifying whether measuring co­
variates one time for the experiment is adequate. If there is not supportive evidence of 
the PH assumption then the extended Cox should be used. The extended Cox allows for 
time-varying covariates, thus allowing multiple values o f the covariates, obtained at differ-
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ent times, to be used in the analysis. The equation giving the instantaneous hazard rate is 
given in the equation below where is the time index indicating that covariates vary with 
respect to time:
hj(t) = hQ(t) exp (xu (3x) (3.23)
Time-varying covariates can be combined with strata and shared frailty. However 
there might be some additional reasons to why an extended Cox model should be used 
even when the proportional hazards assumption is not violated. First o f all the proportional 
hazards assumption says nothing about other variables that are not included in the model. 
An explanatory variable might be insignificant in capturing banks’ failure dynamics in one 
year but in subsequent years the variable might become significant. Hence moving from a 
proportional hazards Cox model to an extended Cox could lead to the inclusion of certain 
variables that otherwise would have been rejected.
Secondly while both methods are an ex-ante way of modelling survival rates, in a 
long time frame (e.g. four years) deviations within a variable will always be monitored by 
a small lag (which is going to be the examination period selected by the researcher (e.g. 
years, months etc) using the extended Cox. By contrast, a proportional hazards Cox model 
will ignore completely these deviations.
Thirdly estimated coefficients from the extended Cox model are likely to correct for 
any bias that the Cox proportional hazards might introduce. To clarify the point made 
above, suppose that 15% of the banks that are included in the sample fail in the first year 
whereas in each o f the subsequent years the failure ratio is much smaller. Using a pro­
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portional hazards model will introduce upward bias in this case as the variables will be 
measured just before the failure o f 15% of banks; therefore the hazard ratios will be greater 
than what they should be as the model implies that this high ratio o f failures will be re­
peated in the rest of the examined period. By contrast an extended Cox model will be 
taking measurements of variables at the intervals specified; hence the coefficients will be 
adjusted for any bias.
Interpretation of Coefficients
Inspecting again the Cox PH model, equation 8 repeated here for convenience, we can 
have two alternative formulations of the estimated coefficients; the first being the linear and 
the second the exponential. In survival analysis we refer to the first as "coefficient" and the 
second as "hazard ratio".
hj(t)  =  exp (xjPx) (3.24)
The coefficient (/3X) makes discrimination between two variables, one increasing the 
risk o f a subject and the other decreasing it, easier as the first would have a positive sign 
and the second a negative sign. To convert to hazard ratios we need to take the exponential 
o f the coefficient = H R .  Now the variable that decreases the risk of an event has a 
hazard rate lower than 1. Conversely, the variable increasing the risk has a higher than 1 
hazard ratio. The advantage of this formulation is that we get an estimate of how much the 
risk o f an event will decrease (or increase) by a 1-unit change in the explanatory variable. 
To give an example we assume that we are interested to measure the impact of weight (in
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kilos), sex and doctor’s fee (in hundred pounds) in the hazard o f an event (death) happening 
after an operation. Suppose the model is estimated and the following results are obtained:
[Table 6 here]
A rise by 1-unit (1 kilo) in the patient’s weight leads to a 20.30% rise in the risk of 
an event (e0 185 =  1. 203). By the same token, a rise by 1-unit (100 pounds) in the doctor’s 
fee leads to a 57.00% decrease in the hazard of an event occurring. Lastly, females face 
a hazard 42.50% lesser than males. The coefficient has another significant attribute as it 
allows us to scale the results for use with another measurement scale. Suppose that we 
want the weight to be measured in pounds rather than kilos. Knowing that 1 kg =  2.2 lb we 
can obtain the new coefficient expressed in pounds simply by dividing 0.185/2.2 =  0.084 
and then the new hazard ratio is e0 084 =  1.087 which means that a rise in the patient’s 
weight by 1 pound (0.45 kilos) increases the hazard faced by the patient by 8.70%
Diagnostic Tests
The goodness of fit of the Cox PH model can be assessed using the Cox-Snell (1968) 
residuals. The model fits the data well if the plotted cumulative hazard of the Cox-Snell 
residuals approximates a line with slope of one (Cleaves et al. 2008). Nevertheless, this 
measure’s effectiveness is reduced as the ratio of failures in the sample increases; thus some 
variability around the diagonal line is expected as analysis time increases.
Besides goodness of fit tests, additional checks for outliers and highly influential 
points can be done. The approach followed is to compare the estimated coefficient /3X from 
the full model to the coefficient obtained after an observation j  (the outlier or assumed
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outlier) is removed from the sample and the model is re-estimated yielding j3x . If the
A O') Adifference (3X — (3X is close to zero then the observation is not considered to be an outlier. 
However, this approach has the disadvantage o f having to repeat the process k(n  — 1) 
times, where n  is the number of observations and k  the number of covariates. Moreover, 
discrepancies might appear as an observation might be classified as an outlier when one 
covariate is examined and not as an outlier for another covariate. An alternative that reduces 
calculations is to use D x V ( ^ )  where D  is a matrix containing the efficient score residuals 
and V  is the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients. This way we get k 
different outcomes. Another alternative is to explore the impact on the model of several 
observations including all covariates. This can be achieved by using either the likelihood 
displacement values or the LMAX scores (Colletti 2003). The likelihood displacement 
value for subject is given by:
2 [ l o g L 0 9 J - l o g L ( ^ ))] (3.25)
The value L(-) is the partial likelihood from fitting the Cox PH model. If there is 
large discrepancy between the two coefficient vectors then the observation is identified 
as influential. LMAX works in a similar way but it is making use of the efficient score 
residuals (D) and the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients (Cleaves et 
al  2008). LMAX represents absolute values of a B  matrix, where:
5  =  D x  V 0 X) x D ' (3.26)
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The largest values in the B  matrix correspond to the most influential observations. 
Outliers and influential points in survival analysis should not be removed from the sample 
before their attributes are checked. Influential points might turn out to be the subjects that 
have failed; hence they should be kept in the analysis.
Param etric  and Sem i-Param etric Models: A Com parison
The semi-parametric approach is a combination o f separate binary outcomes as we 
are combining individual analyses that occurred exactly at the times when an event was 
recorded. For instance in our example the first two analyses would be:
Pi(fai lure \ t ime  = 1) (3.27)
Pi(fai lure \ t ime  =  5) (3.28)
A way to increase the efficiency of our estimates, by decreasing the standard errors,
is to include more analyses. For instance:
Pi(fai lure \ t ime  = 1.1) (3.29)
Pi(fai lure \ t ime  =  1.2) (3.30)
However, doing this implies some assumptions about the distribution of time to fail­
ure which is only the case in the parametric approach. Due to this fact, the parametric 
approach is entirely different to the semi-parametric. The fact that no failures are observed
at a time interval is informative for parametric analysis but not for semi-parametric analy­
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sis. Suppose the following profile of a subject where time is measured in a certain unit, x  
is a covariate and outcome takes the value of 1 when the subject fails:
[Table 7 here]
If this is the only subject in the experiment, then the rise in the value of the covariate 
between t im e  = 1 and t im e  = 2 will have no effect in the case o f semi-parametric ap­
proach as no failure has occurred in that interval. If the rise had not taken place the result 
would have been the same. By contrast, in parametric analysis this rise will be informative 
as with this approach all data points up to the failure are taken into account. If our assump­
tion is that higher values of x lead to higher failure rates, then under parametric approach 
we can argue that the effect of the covariate might not be as strong as we assumed ex ante 
since the subject managed to survive its rise. The semi-parametric approach would have ig­
nored completely the rise in the covariate value, unless failures of other subjects had been 
recorded at that interval, thus being more inefficient.
Another drawback o f semi-parametric models as opposed to parametric ones is that 
the former require the observation of the subjects to overlap each other. If  the first and 
only subject in our pool fails before the second comes under investigation then the semi- 
parametric approach cannot be used as it only takes into account the timing o f the failures 
and not the time passed between them (Cleves et al. 2002).
N on-Param etric Models
Semi-parametric models sacrifice some of the efficiency in favour of less distribution 
assumptions. However, under semi-parametric models the assumptions on the way covari-
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ates affect the survival probability are not relaxed. Non-parametric models are a way of 
loosening the restrictions even further. Non-parametric regressions using splines or local 
polynomial regressions cannot deal effectively with censoring which is present in survival 
analysis data (Cleves et al. 2002; Kaplan and Meier 1958; Nelson 1972; Aalen 1978) pro­
posed ways o f estimating the survival probability when no covariates are included, or the 
covariates used are qualitative and are used to distinguish between homogeneous subgroups 
(e.g. gender, age, bank type).
The Kaplan and Meier (1958)estimator calculates the probability of survival after 
some time and it is given by:
Where rij is the number of subjects at risk and dj the number of subjects that have 
failed up till time tj. By contrast, the Nelson (1972)and Aalen (1978)estimator is a formula 
for the empirical cumulative hazard function given by:
Where nj  and dj follow the same definition as above. The two estimators are linked 




According to Klein and Moeschberger (2003) the two estimators are consistent. How­
ever for small samples the Kaplan and Meier gives superior estimates for the survival
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function while the Nelson-Aalen should be preferred for the cumulative hazard function 
(Cleaves et al. 2008).
After the survival functions have been estimated, statistical tests can be used to test 
if they are different across two or more groups. Most approaches available rely on the 
rank test methodology but differ on the weights they assign to observations. The rank 
methodology assumes there are i = 1 , . . .  , r  groups and k  distinct failure times (£*). At 
each failure time (£*) a matrix can be created to tabulate the subjects at risk (ny),  the failed 
(dij) and the survived (n^ — dy) for every group. The matrix would look like the following:
The whole duration of the experiment is taken into account with the rank tests rather 
than comparing the functions at a distinct time. Under the null hypothesis that the survival 
functions of the groups are the same; hence at time tj we only need to know the number of 
failures for group A, (dAj), and the number of subjects at risk for the two groups (nij, n 2j) 
to calculate the conditional probability:
[Table 8 here]
n A j \ p d A j  ^ 1  p ^ n A j  d j \ j  ^  ( 1 — p ) nBj ^Bj
(3.34)P r(dJ4j\dj, n i j , Ti2j)
(3.35)
Because dAj follows a hypergeometric distribution it can be shown that the expected 
number o f failures in group i is:
3.3 Methodology 139
(3.36)
The hypothesis test is based on the chi-squared distribution with r  — 1 degrees of 
freedom. The test statistic is calculated as u 'V _1u  with u  and V  defined as:
where W( t j )  is the weight function; i = 1, r and I =  1, r while the following 
restrictions 6 a  = 1  V i  = I  and 5 u  = 0 V i  ^  I  also hold.
According to the specification of the test, a different weighting scheme is selected. 
The log-rank test, which is an extension of the Mantel-Haenszel (1959) test, assumes that 
W( t j )  — 1. The log-rank test is used when the hazards differ in a proportional way as 
it is the most powerful (Cleves et al. 2007). By contrast, when hazard are expected to 
differ in a non-proportional way, two variations of the Wilcoxon test are considered more 
appropriate. The Breslow (1970) and Gehan (1965) version of the Wilcoxon assumes that 
the weighting is equal to the number of subjects at risk at every point in time, W (t j)  = rij. 
The advantage of the Wilcoxon test is that it does not assume that the hazards differ at 
a proportional way. The drawbacks are that it can be it’s not clear that a single group 
has higher hazard or in other words if the hazard functions are crossing. Another issue is 
that the weighting scheme assumes that as the experiment evolves the number of subjects 




the weighting scheme will be influenced by the rate of delayed entries in the experiment. 
Another specification of the Wilcoxon test is the one proposed by Tarone and Ware (1977) 
where W (t j ) =  which can be thought of as a mid-point between the equally-weighted 
log-rank and the early weighted Wilcoxon of Gehan and Breslow. The Peto-Peto-Prentice 
test uses an estimate of the overall survivor function as a weight (Peto and Peto 1972; 
Prentice 1978). The weight is given as W (t j )  = S( t j )  where the estimate of the survivor 
function is similar to the Kaplan-Meier estimator. Finally the Fleming-Harrington (1982) 
test assumes that the weight function is:
=  (3-39)
S( t j )  is the Kaplan-Meier estimator and p , q are positive numbers used to control the 
weighting scheme with respect to time. When p > q more weight is given to earlier failure 
times; when p < q more weight is given to later failure times. When p = q =  0 the test 
collapses to the log-rank.
Robust Standard Errors and Model Selection
In the Ordinary Least Squares estimator the squared residuals are summed while in 
the robust estimators (unclustered and clustered) the residuals are multiplied by the pre­
dictors then squared and summed. For clustered robust errors the summation takes place 
within each cluster. Under the OLS assumptions correlation between explanatory variables 
and residuals should be zero corr(xi , e*) =  0 If not then the robust estimator would provide 
a better estimate o f the variance of the coefficients as the OLS estimator would be overes­
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timating (or underestimating depending on the nature o f correlation) the variances. In the 
case o f sampling for survival analysis, we have sampled the subjects we are interested in 
(banks in this case) but we believe that a bank failure in a certain country is more likely to 
increase the probability of another bank failing in the same country. In other words, correla-
provides a more precise estimate without making any model assumptions about the under­
lying correlation process. Stated differently, the clustered estimator not only preserves the 
panel nature of the data, but allows ensures that a high correlation in one sub-panel does 
not affect the estimates elsewhere.
The OLS variance estimator is given below:
tion on failure times might be observed for banks within a country. The clustered estimator
Vols  = S2 X (X ' X )-* (3.40)
where:
(3.41)
The robust (unclustered) variance estimator is given below:
Vrob =  { X 'X )  1 x [ Y „  ^ e j  x Xi)' x (e* x a;*)] x { X 'X )  1 (3.42)
The robust (clustered) variance estimator is given below:




Uj = Y ] c ei x x i  (3.44)
and n c is the number of clusters, is the residual for the i observation and Xi is a row 
vector o f predictors.
Stepwise selection algorithms can implement a general-to-specific or a specific-to- 
general approach. In the general-to-specific the algorithm starts with the full model and 
step by step the insignificant explanatory variables are eliminated. The specific-to-general 
is the exact opposite. When the number of candidate variables in the model is large there 
are many different "paths" as removing one variable will affect the significance of the re­
maining ones. Hence the use o f an algorithm that exploits all possible alternative "paths" 
is necessary. This technique is known as forward and backward elimination and the al­
gorithm’s goal is to minimize the specified information criterion (i.e. Akaike, Schwarz, 
Hannan-Quinn). Other methods o f assessing each model include the likelihood ratio and 
the wald tests.
The likelihood ratio test is based on the deviance, which is —2 x log likelihood on a 
fitted model. The lower the deviance is, the better the fit. In the case of two nested models, 
with the restricted model having less explanatory variables than the unrestricted one, the 
difference in deviance between the two models is used to construct the likelihood ratio 
test. The number of covariates (q) dropped from the unrestricted model are the degrees of 
freedom and the chi-square distribution is used for the test (x2q)- The null hypothesis is that 
the restricted model is better while the alternative is that the unrestricted should be used. If
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the difference in deviance is higher than the critical value we reject the null; therefore the 
variable(s) we dropped should be put back into the model.
Alternatively a Wald test could be used to test the joint significance o f the variables 
that are about to be dropped. The null hypothesis that all the selected variables equal zero is 
tested against the alternative that they are not. If the calculated Wald statistic is higher than 
the critical chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the variables in null hypothesis, 
then the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative and the variables cannot be 
dropped.
We adopt a forward-and-backward elimination approach is followed until a satisfac­
tory regressor set is encountered. For each full set of K  bank-level (i.e., balance sheet, 
income statement or financial ratio) variables and macro variables we start by comparing 
the K  regressor and K  — 1 regressor models and one model is retained on the basis of 
two criteria: insignificance of covariates according to the /7-values of individual LR tests, 
and the models’ degrees-of-freedom-adjusted explanatory power as given by the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). The term forward-and-backward refers to the fact that the 
algorithm both drops and adds covariates sequentially.
3.4 Data and Variables
Annual accounting data from 1995 to 2010 are obtained from Bankscope for 421 banks lo­
cated in 20 Middle and Far Eastern countries.37 The sample countries host about 77% of
37 Bankscope is run by Bureau van Dijk (http://www.bvdep.com/en/index.html). The countries are: Al­
bania (4 CBs/ 1 IB), Bahrain (9/17), Bangladesh (28/2), Brunei (2/3), Egypt (31/2), Indonesia (74/1), Iran 
(0/15), Jordan (11/2), Kuwait (6/8), Malaysia (35/14), Mauritania (2/1), Pakistan (21/6), Palestine (1/1), Qatar
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the total IB industry but have also a large CB sector (excluding Iran, Sudan and Brunei 
where the IB share is above 50%). A bank is deemed as "failed" when at least one o f the 
following criteria is met: bankruptcy, dissolution, liquidation, negative net worth, state in­
tervention, forced (involuntary) merger, and acquisition (Heffeman 2005). The data pertain 
to 106 IBs and 315 CBs with 8% and 28% failures in each group, respectively.
The restricted models include an Islamic Bank Dummy that equals 1, where the bank 
operates under Islamic finance law, and 0 otherwise. All other bank-specific covariates are 
stochastic and represent the three dimensions o f the accounting statement: balance sheet, 
income statement and financial ratios.38 Financial ratios are subcategorized in four groups 
(Capital quality, Asset quality, Earnings and Liquidity) following the CAMELS system.39 
The country-level covariates are controls for the macroeconomic conditions and banking
sector structural indicators. Table 9 provides a full list of the covariates.
[Table 9 around here]
We consider as potential drivers of failure hazard the firm-level variables listed in 
Table 1 in levels or logarithmic levels for those that preclude non-positive values, and (log) 
growth rates. Variables from the balance sheet (stock) and income statement (flow) are 
inflation-adjusted using the appropriate country GDP deflator.
(6/4), Saudi Arabia (10/3), Sudan (2/8), Tunisia (11/1), Turkey (41/4), United Arab Emirates (UAE;16/9) and 
Yemen (5/4). We focus on countries where IBs have a non-negligible share of the financial system. Follow­
ing Cihak and Hesse (2010) we select all the countries where IBs account for more than 1% of total assets 
in the banking system during at least one year in the observation period. The banks included within each 
country are dictated by data availability.
38 CBs and IBs are required to follow national and international regulatory requirements under the supervi­
sion o f the banking authorities of their host country. Both bank types adhere to the same accounting standards. 
IBs must also abide by the Shariah supervisory board which monitors the compliance of financial products 
with the Islamic law (Alexakis and Tsikouras, 2009).
39 Variables from the Management and Sensitivity to risk categories are not included due to data unavail­
ability.
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The country-level variables are Growth o f  Real GDP, Inflation, Unexpected Inflation, 
Banking Sector Concentration, Sovereign Credit Rating, FXR ate Depreciation, Financial 
Openness and Islamic Bank Share.
3.4.1 Variable Definitions and Transformations
Income diversity, which is a measure of the diversification of the bank’s operations. The 
higher the income diversity, the more diversified the bank is. According to Cihak and Hesse 
(2010) it is defined as:
,Net  Interest Revenue-Other Operating Income,
ID=1 - ------------------------- T7— =---------- --------- 5-----------  (3.45)Diet Income
Z-score is a measure o f bank fragility (Cihak and Hesse 2010) defined as follows. 
Banks with higher values of z-score are considered less prone to insolvency.
+ RoA
Z= — --------------  (3.46)
Volatility o f RoA
Volatility o f RoA is proxied by the standard deviation of the RoA. According to Maechler 
et al. (2007), return on assets (RoA)  should be used on a moving average basis40 rather 
than the current value. We experimented with this approach but found it to underperform 
compared to the version utilizing the current value of RoA.
Inflation is computed as the year-on-year logarithmic change o f the GDP deflator.
Unexpected Inflation is computed as the difference between forecasted or anticipated in­
40 A backward moving average is one that in period t averages only periods before time t, that is t-1, t-2, t-3 
and so on. By contrast, a centre weighted moving average is one that averages periods equidistant from time 
t, that is t-2, t-1, t, t+1, t+2 and so on. We opted for the backward as data on t+1 and t+2 are not known in 
time t (though agents could be using expectations of them that we, however do not have access)
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flation o f the next period (i.e. year) minus the actual inflation that occurred. To estimate 
the forecasted inflation we fit an ARMA(p, q) model on the inflation series and generate 
1 -step ahead forecasts for the period of the analysis. The models are fitted with respect to 
minimize the Bayesian information criterion (BIC)41. The rationale for the inclusion of the 
unexpected inflation is that a high inflation that is forecasted can be incorporated in the con­
tracts o f the bank. By contrast, the bank will not be hedged if the actual inflation turns out 
to be higher than expected. Following Busse et al. (2007) and others, our Banking Sector 
Concentration covariate is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) computed as the sum 
of squared normalized market shares at year end. As in recent studies, the market share o f a 
bank is calculated according to total assets (Bikker and Haaf 2002; Cihak and Hesse 2010). 
The HHI measure is bounded by 0 (highest competition) and can take a maximum value of 
1 (monopoly). There are two opposing schools of thought on the link between banking sec­
tor concentration and stability. One view sustains the "too-big-to-fail" tenet according to 
which a more highly concentrated (i.e. monopolistic) banking environment increases moral 
hazard and risk-taking behavior. Another view suggests the opposite by the argument that 
larger profits in more highly concentrated banking sectors lessen the need for excessive 
risk-taking. Sovereign Credit Rating takes a value of 1 for countries with a Standard & 
Poor’s rating BBB~ or better (investment grade), 0.5 for BB+ or below (non-investment 
grade), and 0 for not-rated countries using year-end data. A sound economic system with 
sustainable output growth, low inflation, an appreciating currency and a high credit rating
41 We are using the BIC as it settles for a more parsimonious model than the AIC. In ARIMA methodology 
using the AIC leads to overfitting whereas the stricter BIC settles for lower order models. In this case the 
AR(1) model was selected at over 90% of the cases.
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is expected to have a favorable influence on bank survival rates. A positive year-on-year 
logarithmic change in the spot exchange rate, defined as local currency vis-a-vis US$, rep­
resents currency depreciation. Financial Openness is a composite measure capturing the 
extent of capital controls within a country. We use the Chinn and Ito (2007) measure due to 
its wide coverage across countries and time. Chinn and Ito (2007) report that their measure 
is highly correlated with the Quinn (1997) and the IM F’s AREAER measures o f financial 
openness that are also widely used in the literature. Islamic Bank Share is defined as total 
assets managed by IBs over total banking assets at year end. A negative coefficient for this 
indicator in the restricted (all-banks) hazard model would indirectly suggest that the larger 
the presence of IBs in a country, the greater the stability of its financial system. We have 
converted the index to a percentage scale where 100% indicates the most open economy.
Finally we define Duration for every bank in the analysis as in Evrensel (2008):
Duration = Establishment Year - Current Year (3.47)
3.4.2 Preliminary Data Analysis
The summary accounting profiles for different bank categories are set out in Table 10 along­
side mean difference pairwise Mests. The averages reported are for the original variables 
without transformations. Balance sheet and income statement variables are reported in $US 
millions and financial ratios in percentages. Although the main comparison is between CBs 
and IBs, we further subdivide the two bank types into those that failed and those that sur­
vived within the 16-year sample period. We also proceed in reverse: we first group the
3.4 Data and Variables 148
entire sample o f banks into failed and survivors, and further subcategorize each group into 
CBs and IBs. In the columns of Table 10 labelled Fail we report averages pertaining to the 
accounting statement on the year-end prior to the failure event.
[Table 10 around here]
The first two columns reveal significant differences between CBs and IBs. On av­
erage the total Equity stands at US$ 0.40 billion for IBs against about US$ 0.50 billion 
for CBs. The mean size of total Deposits is only US$ 2.78 billion (IBs) against US$ 4.00 
(CBs) and, similarly, total Assets are US$ 3.65 billion (IBs) against US$ 4.94 billion (CBs). 
These balance sheet statistics confirm that IBs are small by conventional banking standards. 
The income statement profile also bears this out. Net Income for CBs is US$ 227 million 
on average compared with only US$166 million for IBs. A break-down of Net Income 
into earnings from interest bearing financial products {Net Interest Revenue) and fee-based 
services {Other Operating Income) reveals interesting information.42 CBs and IBs gener­
ate comparable fee-based income (US$ 71.08 million and US$ 64.31 million respectively). 
By contrast, Net Interest Revenue is higher for CBs (US$ 155.90 million) than IBs (US$ 
103.60 million) because most IBs, except relatively large ones, prefer to use fee-based con­
tracts than PLS ratio arrangements due to their lower administration costs and complexities, 
shorter duration and lower risk (Khalil et al. 2002).
In respect of the financial ratios, on average IBs exhibit significantly larger liquidity 
buffers than CBs as borne out by a Liquid Assets/Deposits ratio o f 55.6% (IBs) and 40.3%
42 IBs do not offer interest but share ratios of profits instead. However, the same “net interest margin” 
principle applies. Depositors are offered a low share ratio of the bank’s profits whereas banks charge a high 
share ratio when taking part in a venture through a business loan.
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(CBs), and a Net Loans/Assets ratio o f 49.8% (IBs) and 51.5% (CBs). The higher liquidity 
o f IBs has been attributed to managerial choice rather than to lack o f investment opportuni­
ties (Pellegrina 2008; Olson and Zoubi 2008). Large liquidity buffers are a crucial feature 
o f IBs for two reasons. First, IBs need more protection against deposit withdrawal given 
their limited access to liquidity from interbank, conventional money markets and lender- 
of-last resort because Islamic finance law prohibits any interest payment (riba).43 Second, 
they cannot utilize hedging instruments as a way of mitigating liquidity’ risk.
Low leverage is one of the cornerstones of Islamic finance as borne out by Eq­
uity/Assets and Liabilities/Equity ratios at 21.7% and 9.0% for IBs which are significantly 
different from the corresponding 10.8% and 15.8% for CBs. Leverage levels are expected 
to be lower for IBs compared to CBs because Islamic finance law discourages debt-based 
funding and promotes asset-backed investments. Bonds issued by IBs need to be backed by 
tangible assets (e.g., real estate or commodities) which puts a constraint on leverage. The 
most common sources o f funding for IBs are profit-sharing investment accounts and safe­
keeping (Hasan and Dridi 2010). Low leverage can have a favorable effect on survival time 
by reducing business risk ceteris paribus. As IBs do not offer deposit insurance schemes, 
lower leverage can signal a higher degree of bank solvency (Galloway et al. 1997; Kahane 
1977). There is evidence in the recent literature that the higher leverage of IBs is related to 
their business model rather than managerial inadequacies (Johnes et al. 2012).
43 However, there are regulatory requirements that force them to maintain an interest-bearing account with 
the central bank in order to obtain a banking license. To maintain their ethical principles, any interest income 
is typically donated to charity.
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IBs are significantly better capitalized than CBs as borne out by respective average 
Tier 1 ratios o f 25.0% and 15.8%. This is in line with IBs having to withhold more capital 
to balance their greater exposure to liquidity risk (Bashir 1999). On the other hand, asset 
quality indicators such as Loan Loss Reserves/Loans suggest a tendency for IBs to hold 
lower reserves than CBs, which can be linked to their greater ability to pass risks on to 
depositors (Olson and Zoubi 2008). In terms o f profitability, the results in columns 1-2 of 
Table 10 suggest that, while IBs show significantly larger Return on Assets (RoA) than CBs, 
the opposite applies to Return on Equity (RoE). Given that IB contracts are based on asset- 
backed transactions (e.g., collateralized by real estate), the direction o f the discrepancy for 
RoA can relate to the fact that IBs also earn income by letting those assets. Moreover, the 
higher RoA of IBs can also be linked to their large involvement (relative to CBs) in major 
governmental infrastructure projects which offer a safer income than private sector projects. 
The significantly larger Cost/Income Ratio of IBs is in line with existing evidence which 
suggests that IBs are typically less cost efficient than CBs and have larger operational risk 
(Cihak and Hesse 2010).
Table 10 also sub-classifies survivors (cols. 5-6) and fa iled  banks (cols. 7-8) into CBs 
and IBs. As noted above, for the failed banks the reported means are based on accounting 
figures for the year-end prior to the failure event. Notable differences are observed in 
the accounting profile of survivor IBs and CBs but those differences narrow for banks 
prior to failure. The only clear exceptions are in the income statement where failed IBs 
show significantly lower Net Interest Revenue, Net Income and Overheads than failed CBs. 
Overall it seems fair to conclude that the accounting profiles o f IBs and CBs get very close
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once they get into severe distress, ending in failure. However, it cannot be inferred from 
mean difference t-tests that the marginal influence of accounting factors on failure risk 
is identical for both bank types. For instance, a 1% reduction in liquidity could have a 
stronger effect on failure risk (reducing the time to failure at a faster rate) for IBs than CBs 
even though, once banks fail, their mean liquidity levels could be similar.
Next we split the entire cross-section of 421 banks into those that survived during 
the observation window and those that failed (cols. 3-4). Unsurprisingly, failed banks are 
in a significantly worse financial position on the year prior to failure than survivors. For 
instance, they show significantly lower Net Income and RoA, and inferior capital quality 
ratios {i.e., smaller Equity/Assets and Equity/Net Loans) and liquidity ratios (i.e., larger 
Net Loans/Assets). Such differences become apparent two years prior to the failure event. 
For instance, the average Assets, Net Interest Revenue and Tier 1 Ratio for failed banks 
in the year-end prior to failure (year t) are US$ 1.81 billion, US$ 59 million and 13.1% 
against US$1.87 billion, US$63 million and 12.1% in year t - 1  which suggests that failed 
banks show early signs of vulnerability. Columns 9 (survivor CBs) and 10 (failed CBs) 
reveal significant differences in all balance sheet and income statement information and 
various financial ratios (e.g. capitalization, liquidity). Likewise, survivor IBs and failed IBs 
(last 2 cols.) show significant differences in balance sheet and income statement variables 
but their mean financial ratios are indistinguishable, the only exception being Net Interest 
Margin (NIM) which is significantly greater for survivor IBs. Regarding profitability, failed 
CBs show significantly lower RoA than survivor CBs, and although the direction o f the
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discrepancy in RoA for failed IBs against survivor IBs is the same, the magnitude is much 
smaller and statistically insignificant.
To sum up, this preliminary analysis providesprim afacie  evidence that: i) it is possi­
ble to distinguish between IBs and CBs on the basis o f financial information obtained from 
company balance sheets, income statements and financial ratios; and si) for both CBs and 
IBs the accounting profile of survivors presents significant differences from that o f failed 
banks. Taken together, both aspects suggest that IBs and CBs may need separate attention 
in the design o f appropriate early warning systems.
Table 11 presents summary statistics for the country-level covariates over the 1995- 
2010 period. Among the 10 largest banking systems by assets are those o f Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE.44
[Table 11 around here]
The table show large country heterogeneity. Qatar has the highest real GDP growth 
rate at 11.8% while that of Saudi Arabia is 2.8%. Iran, ranked 2nd by total banking assets, 
suffers from high inflation and low GDP growth. Mauritania, Yemen and Palestine have 
the smallest banking systems. The average annual inflation rate for Turkey at 43.2% is 
by far the highest among all the sample countries and is reflective o f persistent economic 
problems during the 1990s that brought the country to recession in 2001. The Turkish lira, 
which was pegged to the US$ prior to the 2001 crisis, had to be floated and lost an important 
amount o f its value. The 2001 financial meltdown shrank the number o f banks in Turkey 
from 72 to 31 (with only one IB among the failures). The Malaysian banking system is the
44 The GCC region also includes Oman which is excluded from our analysis because it does not have IBs.
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least concentrated, with a HHI of 10%, and the highest degree o f concentration is observed 
in Palestine (76.6%), Albania (46.4%) and Mauritania (38.9%). Within the GCC group, 
Saudi Arabia (12.7%) and the UAE (10.4%) show the lowest concentration. After Iran, 
whose banking system is exclusively Islamic, the largest Islamic Bank Share is observed in 
Sudan followed by Brunei. Indonesia has the lowest IB presence.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Non-Parametric Analysis
Figure 1 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival estimator separately for conventional and Is­
lamic banks. This estimator is testing the hypothesis that failure risk is lower for IBs than 
CBs using a non-parametric estimator of the survival function S(t).  These estimates are 
unconditional because they are based only on the observed frequency of bank failures; i.e., 
8/106 and 89/315 for IBs and CBs, respectively. Hence, this approach does not control 
for differences in bank-specific accounting characteristics nor for different macroeconomic 
conditions o f the country in which a bank is located.
[Figure 1 here]
It can be observed that Islamic banks have higher survival rate than conventional 
banks for all the examined period. The majority of Islamic banks are established after 1975 
and only a few exist before 1950. Dubai Islamic Bank, established in 1975, is regarded as 
the world’s first private interest-free bank. The first Islamic bank in the sample is estab­
lished in 1908 in Iran. The flat line in the graph for Islamic banks for analysis time higher
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than approximately 30 is explained by the few Islamic banks in existence at that time and 
the lack o f any failure. The probability of survival beyond 20 years is 91% (IBs) against 
84% (CBs) and 86%, falling beyond 30 years to 86% (IBs) and 77% (CBs).
Table 12 shows the numerical value o f the survivor function (Kaplan-Meier Esti­
mator) and the cumulative hazard function estimator (Nelson-Aalen Estimator) which are 
calculated after every failure separately for the two bank types. The Net Lost column com­
bines the information from censored subjects and late entries into one number. Hence at 
every time t :
N e t L ostt =  Censoredt — Late E n tr ie s t (3.48)
[Table 12 here]
In order to assess whether the differences are statistically significant, we deploy a 
non-parametric rank test for the equality of survival functions among the two types of 
banks: up to 20 years (log-rank 4.09; p-value 0.043); and up to 30 years (log-rank 4.17; 
p -value 0.041). For our relatively large sample, cross-sectionally (421 banks) and in time 
span (16 years including the post-Lehman crisis), these findings suggest that the failure risk 
o f IBs is significantly lower than that of CBs. A drawback of the log-rank test is its reliance 
on the assumption that hazards differ at a proportional way. The Wilcoxon test relaxes this 
assumption by allowing the hazard functions to differ in non-proportional ways. Result 
of the Wilcoxon test suggests that hazard do not vary in non-proportional ways (p-value 
0.155). Hence the Log-Rank test is correctly used. However, as Islamic banks have been 
in existence for fewer years than the conventional ones, it may be plausible to assume that
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giving more weight to newer banks corrects the bias introduced by a non-weighting test like 
the log-rank. The Fleming-Harrington test allows for a customized weighting scheme of 
the failure times. Hence, when earlier failure times, or equivalently banks that have been in 
existence for a few years, are given more weight then the survival functions are different at 
the 5% significance level. To conclude, there is statistical evidence, especially for the more 
recent past, that the survival functions between the two bank types are different. In addition 
subsequent modelling using the Cox PH model can be applied. Table 13 summarizes the 
results o f the statistical tests.
[Table 13 here]
3.5.2 Cox PH Results
The Cox Proportional Hazards model is fitted separately on the three parts o f the accounting 
statement; namely balance sheet, income statement and financial ratios.





The models differ according to the assumptions imposed on the baseline hazard func­
tions o f the two bank types as well as the application o f the stepwise selection algorithm.
In the restricted we are asserting that conventional and Islamic banks face the propor­
tional risks over time and that the same explanatory variables can explain their probability
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of failure. An Islamic bank dummy variable is included to measure the difference in risk 
faced by the two bank types. The advantage of this model is that we can quantify the differ­
ence in the Islamic banks risk profile with respect to the conventional ones. The drawback 
is that the same explanatory variables might not be appropriate for modeling both bank 
types fragility. As the model assumes that risks faced by the two bank types are propor­
tional to each other the only difference is on the mean level o f risk (captured by the Islamic 
bank dummy) but not on higher moments of the baseline hazard function. In other words, 
the baseline survival functions are assumed to have the same shape (but different levels). 
The selection of the explanatory variables is based on the stepwise algorithm employed on 
conventional and Islamic banks.
The semi-restricted model does not restrict the baseline hazard function to differ in 
a proportional way between the two bank types. The semi-restricted is in essence a strat­
ified Cox model estimated for the pooled sample o f conventional and Islamic banks. The 
semi-restricted model imposes the same explanatory variables for both bank types which 
are obtained from the restricted model. Hence no further optimization with respect to ex­
planatory variables occurs between the restricted and semi-restricted models.
However it might be argued that as Islamic banks have a different modus operandi 
then the same indicators might not be revealing the same information; hence a semi­
generalised model is also proposed. If the two bank types share the same characteristics 
then the covariates selected by the stepwise procedure should have the same significance 
levels when applied separately to Islamic and conventional banks. The semi-generalised 
model is estimated separately for conventional and Islamic banks but uses the explanatory
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variables from the restricted model and inferences can be drawn from coefficient mag­
nitudes and significances between the two bank types. Hence the restricted, the semi­
restricted and the generalized share the same explanatory variables.
Finally a generalized model is proposed which, in addition to the semi-generalized 
models, makes use of the stepwise selection algorithm for conventional and Islamic banks 
separately. This model allows the baseline hazard functions and the explanatory variables 
to be different.
The bank-level variables represent information from either the balance sheet (stock), 
income statement (flow) or financial ratios, entered separately in three sets of models. 
The restricted, semi-restricted and semi-generalized models for the Balance Sheet, Income 
Statement and Financial Ratios sections are presented in tables 14 through 19.
[Tables 14 - 19  here]
Among the diagnostics reported in Tables 14-19 are: a) a test o f the proportional- 
hazards assumption, b) a test for overall model significance, and c) a pseudo-i?2. The 
proportional-hazards assumption is assessed via the Schoenfeld residuals-based test which 
is equivalent to testing via a LR statistic that the specific influence of the covariates (or log 
hazard-ratio function) on the level of failure risk is time independent; the time variation 
in failure risk is dictated by the baseline hazard function h0(t) as formalized in equations 
in the methodology section. Consistently across all models shown in Tables 14-19, we 
find no evidence against this assumption. Finally, the Wald test statistic (H0 : {3 =  0) is 
strongly significant in most cases for the CBs which serves to validate the PH Cox models 
as statistically significant. For IBs there is evidence that a model with only bank-specific
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covariates is not able to adequately capture their failure risk. Hence in the next section we 
enhance our analysis by including macroeconomic variables.
Under all three data sections (i.e. Balance Sheet, Income Statement and Financial 
Ratios) the semi-restricted models have better fit than the restricted according to the AIC. 
However, the hazards between the two bank types are proportional at conventional signifi­
cance levels according to the relevant statistical test. The generalized model has superior fit 
compared to the semi-generalized with the analysis of financial ratios displaying the great­
est differences between the two bank types. This emphasizes the necessity to identify the 
determinants of failure risk individually for the two bank types. The common conclusion 
from the three parts of the accounting statement is that the Islamic bank dummy is statis­
tically significant with a negative coefficient suggesting that IBs exhibit about 66% lower 
failure risk than conventional banks.
Balance Sheet Data
The models based on the Balance Sheet are presented in Tables 14 and 15. The 
positive coefficients on Assets for conventional and Islamic banks indicate that large banks 
of either type are substantially more likely to fail than small banks ceteris paribus. The 
coefficient of Assets around 0.6 for conventional banks is notably smaller than that for 
Islamic banks at about 2.3 which indicates that large IBs are substantially more likely to 
fail than large CBs. This confirms a similar finding in Cihak and Hesse (2010), despite their 
different sample period and methodology, suggesting that large commercial banks tend to 
be financially stronger than large Islamic banks. Large Islamic banks tend to become more
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involved in PLS partnerships which are relatively risky and difficult to monitor whereas 
small Islamic banks tend to engage in low-risk investments and fee income contracts (Khalil 
et al. 2002).45 Furthermore, a large IB is more likely to have expanded its operations in 
other countries, especially Western economies where legal issues can arise due to lack 
o f compatibility of the Western laws and the Islamic law for the IB contracts to be valid 
(Archer and Karim 2007).
Equity-type contracts (represented by Loans) because of their aforementioned prob­
lems are utilized by the largest Islamic banks. The negative and statistically significant 
coefficient is attributed to the utilization of such contracts to finance large infrastructure 
and real estate projects on which IBs can charge a premium (Khalil et a l  2002).
The coefficient estimates of Other Earning Assets are significant but have a larger 
marginal effect to the failure risk of Islamic banks. In particular, a rise of Other Earn­
ing Assets by 1% decreases the risk faced by a conventional bank and an Islamic bank by 
29.53% and 62.93%. This can be attributed to the fact that Islamic banks rely heavily on 
trade (fee based) contracts rather than the equity-type (PLS) contracts. These contracts are 
tailor-made as many of the relevant parameters (such as maturity, repayments and collat­
eral) are specific for every client. The bank, as the financier, needs to conduct a feasibility 
and profitability analysis for equity-type contracts; this is costly and time-consuming. Sec­
ond an Islamic bank needs to gain approval for its financial products from the Shariah board 
of the bank. This is done for every Islamic bond issue (sukuk) and also for the majority of 
equity-based contracts, although the fee-based contracts are more standardized and hence
45 Frequently used trade contracts are lease contracts (Ijarah) and cost plus profit sale (Murabahah).
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rarely require the approval o f the Shariah board. Hence the lack o f standardization in prod­
ucts and practices leads to greater administration costs, higher operational risk as well as 
the greater monitoring costs (Sadr and Iqbal 2001). Secondly, Islamic banks are highly reg­
ulated as to where investments can be placed; hence complex derivatives or conventional 
finance products are prohibited.
Income Statem ent Data
The models based on the Income Statement (Tables 16 and 17) suggest that Net Inter­
est Revenue is statistically significant only for conventional banks. An explanation is that 
an Islamic bank operates mainly with fee-based contracts rather than the equity-type (PLS). 
The estimated coefficient of Other Operating Income suggests that the marginal effect for 
Islamic banks upon failure risk is larger than that of conventional banks. An increase in the 
Other Operating Income by 1-unit leads to 1 — e-0 017 =  1.69% and 1 — e-0 002 =  0.20% 
decrease in risk for Islamic and conventional banks respectively.
Growth o f  overheads (administrative expenses) is statistically significant at the 10% 
and 1% significance level for conventional and Islamic banks respectively. An increase in 
the overheads reduces hazard in both bank types but has a more pronounced for Islamic 
banks. Reputation and relationship management are high priorities for IBs. Consequently 
they rely and spend more on human resources compared to CBs (Pellegrina 2008). Educa­
tion and technical expertise in Islamic finance have increased significantly in recent years. 
Ahmad et a l  (1998) find that staff members in the IB industry are not sufficiently quali­
fied. Hence the negative and statistically significant coefficient o f the Growth o f  Overheads
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for IBs can be explained by the human resource development process taking place. A more 
recent study o f Johnes et a l  (2012) documents improvements o f the managerial efficiency 
in Islamic banks due to the increased investments in human resources in recent years. As 
a consequence Islamic banking is promoted to the general public using, for example, mar­
keting campaigns46.
The generalized model verifies that survival of the two bank types is explained by 
different factors although the results are not very different to the previous models. Exam­
ining table 17 we find that higher levels of Net Income decrease the risk for Islamic banks 
whereas for conventional banks this effect has the opposite direction though much less pro­
nounced. This is possibly a reflection of our broad definition of "failure" which includes 
merger and acquisitions (M&A) activity. To date, however, there is no instance of M&A 
among IBs.
Financial Ratios
The models based on financial ratios (Tables 18 and 19) suggest that larger Cost/Income 
ratios have an adverse effect on failure risk but the magnitude o f the effect is more pro­
nounced for IBs.
The coefficient of the Equity/Assets ratio reveals opposite effects for both bank types. 
The negative sign appearing in the conventional banks shows that better capitalization 
decreases the hazard of a bank failure. By contrast, in an Islamic bank the opposite is 
true. A rise o f 1% in Equity/Assets (better capitalization) decreases the failure risk by
46 To this end, Bank Syariah Mandiri in Indonesia sponsors documentaries on Islamic finance while Emirates 
Bank in the UAE waives loan payments during the Ramadan as part o f marketing campaigns (Bloomberg).
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1 — e-0,039 =  3.82% for conventional banks, while it increases it by e0 047 =  4.81% for 
Islamic banks. These contrasting findings are consistent with the stylized fact that CBs 
are typically less liquid and more highly leveraged than IBs. They are also broadly in line 
with the accounting profile presented in an earlier section where failed CBs show lower 
Equity/Assets ratios than survivor CBs, but failed IBs show lower (or similar) leverage lev­
els than survivor IBs. This evidence supports the notion that the failure of an IB is less 
likely (than that of a CB) to have wide implications for the banking system. CBs are of­
ten deemed “too big too fail” not only on account of their asset size but also of their high 
leverage. Liquidity, represented by Liquid Assets/Deposits, although not statistically sig­
nificant for either bank it is closely linked to the capitalization ratio. In particular, better 
liquidity for Islamic banks is negatively associated with the hazard of an event happening. 
The finding is plausibly associated to the increased importance of liquidity management in 
Islamic banks business model which constrains access to money markets (interbank) and 
lender-of-last-resort (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007). By contrast, in conventional banks higher 
liquidity increases the likelihood of bank failure. This is because conventional banks are 
able to obtain liquidity from the interbank market or via secondary markets without having 
to forgo revenues by the retention of large liquidity buffers.
Coming now to the other variables we find z-score to be marginally insignificant 
for Islamic banks with the sign suggested in the literature (Cihak and Hesse 2010). By 
contrast, for conventional banks, despite the high significance of the estimate, the sign 
is not the expected. Considering also the descriptive statistics from a previous section we 
believe that this proxy of bank failure is not performing very well. It is possible that the few
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variables included in the calculation o f this ratio are not able to capture the complexities of 
failure risk.
Net Interest Margin (NIM) shows the profit margin of a bank’s traditional activity, 
borrowing at a low interest rate and lending at a higher one. For IBs, the same concept 
applies but with reference to the profit-loss share ratio instead. The results suggest that 
for a 1% increase in NIM the failure hazard of CBs increases significantly by about 10.4% 
while the effect goes in the opposite direction for IBs by a magnitude of 16.4%. The 
contrasting impact of the NIM covariate on failure hazard for the two types of banks is 
plausible given important differences in their clientele. These results are in line with the 
accounting profile shown earlier in the section of descriptive statistics, namely, IBs show 
significantly higher NIM than CBs on average. CBs working mainly in the retail sector 
face strong competition and can lose market share if NIMs are high. The primary source 
of NIM for IBs are large infrastructure and real estate projects via PLS contracts on which 
they can charge a premium. IBs are known to rely on connections with large and often 
family-owned conglomerates and name lending is widespread (IMF 2011b). Typical IB 
clientele are governments that pay more attention to the ethics aspect of the investment 
than to its high cost (had they instead sought financing in a CB); this is termed "Islamicity 
Premium" in the literature (Khalil et a l 2002).
Baseline Survivor Functions
The estimated baseline survivor functions from the previous models are presented 
in the sets of figures 2-4 for each of the three parts of the accounting statement. The
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graphs reveal two findings. First the baseline survival function is decreasing across time 
meaning that both bank types face increasing hazard with respect to time. Secondly the 
slope o f the baseline hazard function is varying both across time and among the three parts 
o f the accounting statement. Using the Income Statement, the survival curve decreases 
more rapidly, or conversely the hazard increases faster, across time. A steeper slope of the 
baseline survival function suggests that the respective set of the explanatory variables is 
less informative about the hazard of an event occurring.
[Figures 2-4 here]
To realize how this is true we consider a Cox PH model with no explanatory vari­
ables. The estimated baseline survivor function in that case would coincide with the non- 
parametric Kaplan-Meier estimator. In that case failure would be explained solely by time. 
However it is not time per se that causes the failure of subjects; it is rather used as a proxy 
for things that can not be measured. For example an old man has higher probability of dy­
ing not due to time itself but due to fatigue of his organism or deterioration of his immunity 
system which may not be measured perfectly. It’s not time itself that is responsible for the 
failure but some latent variable that is correlated with time. By contrast, in a perfect model 
we would be able to measure and include such covariates. Then we would have shifted all 
the explanatory power from time and place it on the covariates themselves. In that case the 
estimated baseline survivor function would have been a straight and flat line47 (Cleves et al. 
2007).
47 A downward slopping straight line means that time has a constant effect on survival. A straight and flat 
line indicates that time has no effect on the survival - everything is explained by the covariates.
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All three baseline survivor functions have varying slopes (there is no straight line) we 
can see that the Financial ratios model is the most informative, based on the smoother slope 
of the baseline hazard function, followed by the Balance Sheet and the Income Statement. 
The result is not surprising as the Financial ratios combine information present in Balance 
Sheet and Income Statement. Between the latter two parts of the accounting statement, the 
Balance Sheet is a continuing record of the banks operations (stock) as opposed to the only 
one year that the Income Statement covers (flow). Hence, the Income Statement provides 
the least information to assess a bank’s failure risk. Islamic banks have lower failure risk 
at any point in time, a consistent finding among all three parts of the accounting statement.
3.5.3 Macro Cox PH Results
The four specifications utilized in the previous section can be split into two categories. Re­
stricted and Semi-restricted are a single model for both bank types while Semi-generalized 
and Generalized models are separate for CB/IB. In this section we augment with macroeco­
nomic covariates the best specifications of the two categories; the Semi-restricted and the 
Generalized models. Tables 20-22 present the results of the survival models augmented by 
macroeconomic covariates. Panel A of every table is the Semi-restricted model and Panels 
B and C are the Generalized models for CB/IB respectively.
[Tables 20-22 here]
At this stage we fit separate models for each of the eight macroeconomic variables 
under consideration to assess the different impact on the failure risk for the two bank types. 
There have been arguments suggesting that Islamic banks are more closely linked to the
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productive economy, due to their investments in real estate and infrastructure (Haque and 
Mirakhor 1986; Aziz and Yilmaz 2009).
Controlling for macroeconomic characteristics leads to better models under all parts 
of the accounting statement as evidenced by the lower information criteria in these models 
compared to those of the previous sections. Hence, both banking systems are affected by 
the macroeconomic condition of the country they are operating in. Failure risk is more 
strongly influenced by inflation for Islamic banks. Our findings are robust across all three 
different datasets and they are described next.
We find that the evolution of the business cycle as measured by the lagged Growth o f  
Real GDP influences the hazard of bank failure. The coefficient is significant for conven­
tional banks and suggests that an increase in economic growth by 1% materializes in about 
1 — e-0 099 =  9.43% reduction in default risk. By contrast the the impact of Growth o f  Real 
GDP on Islamic banks is not statistically significant.
Inflation is found to increase the risk of failure for both bank types; however the effect 
is more pronounced for Islamic banks due to the larger coefficient. A 1% increase in lagged 
inflation leads to about e0 017 =  1.71% and e0 031 =  3.15% higher risk for conventional and 
Islamic banks respectively. The stronger effect for Islamic banks is plausibly attributed to 
the special attributes of the financial products being utilized. In particular, equity-based 
contracts once entered into, they cannot be changed till the maturity. Hence Islamic banks 
do not offer any equivalent of inflation linked bonds or inflation adjusted financial products. 
Their profit share ratios are made based on inflation forecasts.
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In line with Beck et al. (2006) and Evrensel (2008) inter alios, our survival-time 
analysis suggests that banking sector concentration (Herfindahl index) has a favorable ef­
fect on survival time for CBs. An increase of 1% in concentration reduces dramatically the 
failure risk of CBs which is in line with the notion that competition has an adverse effect 
in the banking sector possibly because it can undermine prudent bank behavior by encour­
aging excessive risk taking or "gambling". However, for IBs the effect of banking sector 
concentration on survival time is economically more muted and statistically insignificant. 
The effect o f concentration upon Islamic banks is not as clear; however it seems to sug­
gest that the Islamic banking system would not benefit, in terms of stability, if some M&A 
activity were to take place. Despite their lower efficiency with regards to the conventional 
banking system as well as standardization and operational risk problems there is no sta­
tistically significant evidence that a rise of concentration in the sector would be beneficial 
(Johnes et al. 2012; Hasan and Dridi 2010).
The credit risk score of sovereign states appears positively linked with bank survival 
rates generally for both CBs and IBs, as one would expect, albeit the effect is significant 
only in the Financial Ratios section, which may suggest that sovereign credit ratings are 
primarily reflective of Balance Sheet and Income Statement information.
Foreign Exchange depreciation is only significant in the Income Statement section 
with a sign suggestive that a depreciation of the home currency against the USD would in­
crease failure risk for conventional banks. The fact that FX Depreciation is only significant 
in the Income statement may be related to the short-lived hazard of currency depreciation. 
From the bank’s point of view any new investments would be adjusted quickly to take into
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account the recent developments in the currency markets; hence there may not be any sig­
nificant contribution to failure risk would last maximum one year. Islamic banks do not 
engage into complex hedging instruments (currency swaps). In fact any currency exchange 
for an Islamic bank can only take place at par value; hence any hazard arising from for­
eign exchange depreciation does not have any significant contribution to an Islamic bank’s 
failure risk.
Financial openness is positively related to failure risk. The effect is significant for 
conventional banks but more muted for Islamic banks. The finding may be reflective of 
our broad definition of failure that includes mergers and acquisitions, similar to bank con­
centration. M&A activity following the East Asian crisis in countries like Malaysia and 
Indonesia that had been particularly open to foreign investors during the years leading to 
the outbreak of the crisis is likely to be driving this result.
Finally, unexpected inflation and Foreign Exchange depreciation is not found to have 
any significant relation with banking failure.
Figures 5-7 present the baseline survivor functions of the Semi-restricted Cox PH 
with macroeconomic variables for the three parts of the accounting statement. Similarly to 
the findings of the previous paragraph, the Financial ratios model is the most informative 
due to the more gentle slope of the baseline hazard function followed by the Balance sheet 
and the Income statement. The varying explanatory power of the macroeconomic variables 
can be assessed from the flatness of the baseline survivor functions. Indeed, Real GDP 




3.5.4 Shared Frailty Cox PH Results
Tables 23-25 present the results of the shared frailty models for the three parts of the ac­
counting statement, Balance Sheet, Income Statement, and Financial Ratios, respectively. 
We report two specifications according to the cluster variables that define the intra-group 
correlations for the frailty specification. First according to bank type {Islamic banking 
dummy) (column 4) and the second according to Country (column 5). As the frailty mod­
els provide a correction for omitted variables they are reported alongside the Restricted and 
Semi-restricted models for comparison.
[Tables 23-25 here]
When the cluster variable is set to Country, the random effects are highly significant 
(LR test=39.12; p-value=0.000). The estimated coefficients appear slightly different than 
the original restricted and semi-restricted models due to the omitted variables correction. 
However these differences are minor with signs and statistical significances not changing 
qualitatively. The hidden country factors captured by the estimated random effects imply 
that there are significant differences across countries that need to be accounted for by the 
inclusion of macroeconomic variables. Most interestingly, the Islamic banking dummy re­
tains its significance (At the 5% level) while the exponentiated coefficient suggests that 
Islamic banks are 1 — e -1  058 =  65.29% less hazardous than conventional banks when 
the Balance Sheet is used. When the Income statement and the Financial Ratios are used 
there is no significant difference between the two bank types. When the Islamic banking
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dummy is the specified cluster variable, we observe that the random effect term is statisti­
cally significant (LR test=5.36; p-value=0.010). Therefore there is significant within-group 
correlation meaning that the failure patterns in one group (conventional banks) is different 
to the other (Islamic banks). Our main argument that hazard rates in IBs are different than 
CBs is also verified by the random effects model.
Table 26 and Figure 8 report the estimated log frailty when the frailty identifier is 




The least frail country is the one with the most negative estimated frailty. By contrast, 
the most frail country is the one with the highest. The interpretation of the coefficients now 
needs to be conditioned on the frailty for every country. Given that coefficient estimates 
do not change significantly from the non-frailty models we can focus on the interpreta­
tion o f the log frailties (u*) for every country which may be considered as a measure of 
"opportunity cost" in hazard terms of a bank operating in country A rather than country 
B. In other words the log-frailty estimates provide a classification of the banking environ­
ments according to how "favorable" they are. To explain "favorable" better we refer to how 
random effects are specified within the Cox model:
Vi = log (a*) <==> exp1"1 =  <%{ (3.49)
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Hence a favorable banking environment can be interpreted as a country bonus in the 
hazard function contributions of the explanatory variables. Take for example the hazard 
functions o f Jordan and Brunei for the Balance Sheet specification:
hji{t) =  h0(t) X e ~ 1,462 X e(0-783j4- 6-336GoA-°-092Go^ -0 001L>l-0.483OjE;yl-1.058/S'  ^ ^
_  ho(t) X e °'726 X e(°-783j4- 6-336Go^ -0-°92Go^ -0 ’001LA-0.483O£,A-1.058/5L^ 5J)
where A stands for Assets, GoA for Growth o f  Assets, GoE for Growth o f  Equity, LA 
for Liquid Assets, OEA for Other Earning Assets and ISL is the Islamic dummy. As the two 
functions differ only by the log frailties we realize that a bank with the same characteristics 
would have 1 +  e- 1-462+0-726 =  l  — e-o.75i _  5 2 .8 %. The estimated frailties from the three 
sections o f the accounting statement give broadly the same ranking with Egypt and Yemen 
being two exceptions.
Table 27 and Figure 9 present the estimated frailties when the frailty is defined by 
bank type. We evidence significant differences on failure risk of the two bank types under 
all three sections of the accounting statement. The results verify that Islamic banks are less 
hazardous. However, the correction for omitted variables leads to a revised estimate that 
Islamic banks have about 13.8% lower failure risk than conventional banks. The largest 
difference between the two bank types is evidenced in the Balance Sheet data (19.5%)




3.5.5 Shared Frailty Macro Cox PH
Heterogeneity can exist among groups when a variable has not been accounted for. So far 
the frailty models did not take account of the macroeconomic environment; therefore the 
differences found previously could be explained by greater financial growth or higher con­
centration. By contrast, failure to eliminate the shared frailty would mean that there is a 
latent variable or process that affects the banking sector of a country and cannot be ex­
plained by the differences in macroeconomic characteristics. In a previous section we have 
found significant evidence that both bank types are affected by the macroeconomic envi­
ronment. Here we combine into a shared frailty model bank-specific and macroeconomic 
indicators. Tables 28 - 30 present the estimation results for the Restricted (Panel A) and 
Generalized (Panels B & C)48.
[Tables 28 - 30 here]
Frailty is present when the pooled dataset is considered under the Restricted speci­
fication (Panel A of Tables 28 - 30); however when the Generalized model is utilized we 
find that conventional banks always have a statistically significant random effect. In fur­
ther analysis, the LR tests for the significance of the latent country effects or shared frailty 
(H 0 : 6 =  0), suggests that unobserved factors induce within-country clusters of correlation 
in the hazard of bank failure for CBs but not for IBs. These contrasting findings indirectly 
suggest that there is larger within-country heterogeneity among IBs which could relate to 
their modus operandi, namely, their less uniform and standardized nature in terms of fi­
48 We have opted for the restric ted  as opposed to the better, in term s o f  AIC , sem i-restricted  version due to 
the Islam ic banking dum m y whose explanation in term s o f  difference betw een the two bank types is m ore 
straightforw ard.
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nancial products and nature o f contracts. Moreover, severe distress and failure o f one bank 
can easily spread to other banks in the case of CBs —  due to their large size and leverage 
levels, and strong bank interconnectedness articulated through interbank lending in money 
markets. Thus, contagion can play the role of a latent country factor linking the failure risk 
o f CBs. When a CB is severely distressed, the state typically intervenes to minimize neg­
ative externalities and avoid possible bank runs. This creates moral hazard problems. By 
contrast, the business model of IBs makes them less interconnected thus more insulated 
meaning that if an IB is in financial distress, the effect is less likely to spread to the rest of 
the banking sector. Consequently state intervention to rescue IBs may be far less expected 
to take place.
From the shared frailty models with bank-specific and macroeconomic variables we 
can get the estimates of the individual frailty quantities for each country separately for 
conventional and Islamic banks. Results are presented in tables 31-33 and figures 10-12.
[Tables 31-33 here]
[Figures 10-12 here]
The rankings of the countries do not change significantly from the frailty model with­
out the macroeconomic variables. This gives evidence in support of some hidden charac­
teristics applicable for every country that cannot be accounted solely with the inclusion of 
macroeconomic variables. Differences in the ranking of the countries separately for CB/IB 
reveal that the latent factor does not always have the same impact on both bank types. These 
variances in the rankings provide additional evidence of the different risk profile o f the two 
bank types. For example Egypt (under the Balance sheet data) has a negative log frailty -
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yet this is not statistically significant - for Islamic banks (see Table 31); thus hazard is re­
duced. By contrast, conventional banks appear to have a positive log frailty (see Table 31); 
hence they experience a rise in hazard due to operating in this country. Hence, a conven­
tional bank in Egypt faces (e°-24-° 069 — 1) x 100 =  18.65% higher failure risk compared 
to the an Islamic bank of the same country, ceteris paribus.
3.5.6 Robustness Checks
In this section we perform some standard robustness checks for the models we fitted pre­
viously. We have supportive evidence for the proportional hazards assumption. First the 
respective tests reported after every model show no sign of violation. Secondly the mag­
nitude of the coefficients between the Restricted and the Semi-Restricted versions of the 
same model (see Tables 14, 16 and 18) shows no significant variation (Cleves et al. 2007). 
Here we present a test for the proportional hazards assumption using the Schoenfeld (1982) 
residuals for every explanatory variable in the three blocks of the accounting statement as 
well as the global test which has been reported in the tables of the previous sections. In ad­
dition we have run the proportional tests separately on eveiy stratum for the Semi-resticted 
models. Tables 34 - 36 present the test statistic and the p-values in brackets. Results show 
that the proportional hazards assumption is not violated with a minor exception in the gen­
eralized version of the Balance Sheet model. Further investigation on that showed that the 
explanatory variable Growth o f  Loans is the one disturbing the proportionality of hazards. 
To correct for this we can fit Growth o f  Loans Squared which is in-line with the literature 
arguing about an optimal Growth rate of loans above which excessive lending is consid-
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ered dangerous for the stability of the bank. Yet that term was not statistically significant 
at conventional levels hence dropped.
[Table 3 4 -3 6  here]
Figure 13 reports the Cox-Snell residuals plotted against the Nelson-Aalen cumu­
lative hazard function as a measure of the goodness of fit for the Semi-Restricted (first 
column) and Generalized models (second column for CB, third for IB).
[Figure 13 here]
The model for the conventional banks shows better fit across the different datasets 
used; an expected result due to the richer dataset for the conventional banking industry. By 
contrast, the fit on the Islamic banks is not as good particularly when balance sheet data are 
used. Financial ratios data show much better fit. The variability at the right-hand tail and 
the more jagged lines are expected due to the reduced sample effectiveness because of past 
failures.
[Figure 14 here]
Figure 14 shows the influential banks in the analysis. Influential points are detected 
using the log-likelihood displacement and LMAX values methodologies for the stratified 
samples under each data specification. The further the bank lies from the x-axis the more 
influential it is. Visual inspection of the graphs shows that there are some influential points 
(identified by their ID number). Contrary to other methodologies where influential points 
could be removed, in survival analysis these are not treated as outliers as they might be 
informative. In other words it would not be correct to remove any of the outliers that are 
failed banks. Bank IDs show that the influential points are all failed banks hence they
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should not be removed from the analysis (outliers with an ID higher than 1000 indicate 
Islamic banks).
3.5.7 A Full Variable Model
In this section we develop a set of Full Models which utilize the stepwise algorithm for 
both bank-specific and macroeconomic variables. Hence these models can have more than 
one macroeconomic variables at every time. Shared frailty is selected only for Conven­
tional banks as it was found to be insignificant for Islamic banks in a previous section. We 
report the Restricted and the Semi-Generalized set-ups. The Semi-Generalized is the least 
restrictive between the two on its assumptions for the hazard functions of the two bank 
types. Consistent with our initial approach of treating Balance Sheet, Income Statement 
and Financial Ratios individually. The optimization phase with the stepwise algorithm 
takes place in the Restricted setup with both bank-specific and macroeconomic variables 
(micro+macro model in Table 38) and then the macroeconomic variables are dropped (mi­
cro model). The tables 37-39 present our results for the Balance sheet, Income statement 
and Financial Ratios respectively.
[Tables 37-39 here]
The contributions of the explanatoiy variables remain unchanged from the previous 
analysis so we avoid any further repetition. In particular, the coefficient of the Islamic 
Banking dummy implies that, controlling for differences in bank-level accounting charac­
teristics, macroeconomic environment and latent country effects Islamic banks have about 
55% less hazardous than CBs. The main benefit from the Full models is a much improved,
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in terms o f explanatory power, model of failure risk as can be evidenced by the increased 
pseudo  — R 2. A comparison of the McFadden pseudo-f?2 of each Micro+Macro model 
reported in Tables 37-39 and the corresponding Micro model suggests that bank-level fun­
damentals not only significantly affect the probability of bank failure, but also explain a 
significant proportion of it.49 However, country-level indicators add further explanatory 
power, particularly, for IBs. The increase in the pseudo-i?2 from each Micro model to the 
corresponding Micro+Macro model ranges from 5% to 11% for CBs and from 18% to 26% 
for IBs;50 the same qualitative conclusion is reached by measuring the change in AIC, BIC 
and log-likelihood. For instance, in the context of the generalized Cox PH model for finan­
cial ratios, the improvement in the log-likelihood of the Micro+Macro model against the 
corresponding Micro model is 4% for CBs and 38% for IBs. This finding suggests that the 
macroeconomic environment (mainly Inflation) matters to IB failure risk, which is plausi­
ble given the asset-backed aspect of their business model and their greater involvement in 
real estate and the construction sector.
To conclude the empirical analysis, we gather all the Balance sheet, Income state­
ment, Financial ratio and country-level indicators retained by the stepwise variable-selection 
algorithm, as shown in Tables 37-39, and include them in a "Full-Variable" Restricted Cox 
PH model for pooled data on all banks. This model allows us to corroborate empirically the 
absence of omitted variable bias in the balance sheet, income statement and financial ratio
49 T he M cFadden pseudo-i?2 is com puted as 1 m inus the ratio o f  log-likelihoods o f  two PH Cox m odels: the 
corresponding  "full" m odel as reported in each table and the "intercept" m odel w hich is a sim plified version 
including only the baseline hazard function w ithout explanatory variables.
50 T he unreported shared-frailty Cox PH m odels for IBs produce sim ilar evidence, namely, the increase in 
the pseudo-i?2 is 24%  (balance sheet), 18% (incom e statem ent) and 25%  (financial ratios).
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models. Indeed the coefficient estimates reported in Table 40 are similar in magnitude to 
those reported earlier in Tables 37 to 39.
[Table 40 here]
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has been motivated by the lack of empirical evidence, supportive or contradict­
ing, to theoretical arguments that Islamic finance promotes economic growth and enhances 
financial stability (Haque and Mirakhor 1986). In addition, there has been evidence that 
Islamic banks have managed to weather the recent financial crisis due to their different 
banking model as well as their excess liquidity (Hasan and Dridi 2010).
We conduct a comparative analysis of Islamic banks and conventional commercial 
banks from the viewpoint of failure risk. A novel research strategy is adopted for the 
comparison based on both unconditional and conditional survival-time models. We assess 
the relative importance of various accounting indicators and macroeconomic fundamentals 
as early waning signals of bank financial distress. The firm-level covariates pertain to the 
three blocks of the accounting statement, balance sheet, income statement and financial 
ratios, whereas the system-wide indicators reflect the country business cycle and financial 
structure. The survival-time methodology adopted controls for unobserved country factors 
that induce within-country correlation clusters in default rates. A total of 421 banks, of 
which 106 are Islamic and 315 conventional, are observed during the 16-year period from 
1995 to 2010. The banks are located in 20 Middle and Far Eastern countries.
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The unconditional non-parametric estimators of survival rates suggest that Islamic 
banks are less prone to failure than commercial banks. The conditional hazard functions 
reveal that Islamic banks are about 55% less hazardous than conventional banks ceteris 
paribus. We uncover important differences in the drivers of the survival rate for the two 
banking systems. Better capitalization (inverse of leverage), as proxied by Equity/Assets, 
reduces the failure risk for conventional banks; yet it increases it for Islamic banks. The 
default risk of Islamic banks is more strongly linked to macroeconomic factors (e.g. infla­
tion) than that of commercial banks. This is attributed to the IBs having to invest in tangible 
goods (i.e. commodities, real estate) affects them to a greater degree by the macroeconomic 
environment (real GDP growth, inflation) than CBs. Specifically, IBs are more affected by 
inflation whereas CBs by real GDP growth. The reason for this is that IBs cannot protect 
themselves against rising inflation as CBs do by the use of hedging instruments. Latent 
country factors significantly increase the probability of co-default in commercial banks but 
are less important for Islamic banks.
The contrasting findings documented for the two banking systems can be attributed to 
fundamental differences in their business models. The results indirectly imply that Islamic 
banks contribute favorably to the soundness of the overall financial system. This research 
has very important implication for policy makers and regulators, and the risk management 
of individual banks.
We find that the two bank types display important differences under the three blocks 
of the accounting statement, namely the Balance Sheet, the Income Statement and the 
Financial Ratios, with Islamic banks being less fragile than the conventional ones.
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Firstly, growth of assets has a greater impact on Islamic banks while there is a signif­
icant relation between real GDP growth and growth o f assets only for Islamic banks veri­
fying their being closer to the real economy as argued by Haque and Mirakhor (1986). In 
addition, the macroeconomic environment affects the survival o f Islamic banks to a larger 
degree than it does for conventional banks. Merger and acquisition activity led many con­
ventional banks to merge their business in many countries; thus leading to higher concen­
tration o f the industry. As a result more concentration reduces the hazard for conventional 
banks; however the opposite is true, though not statistically significant, for Islamic banks.
Secondly, the equity-to-assets shows that better capitalization is desirable for conven­
tional banks but not for Islamic banks. Better capitalization (inverse of leverage), as proxied 
by Equity/Assets, reduces the failure risk for conventional banks; yet it increases it for Is­
lamic banks. The contrast may reflect the downward pressure to profitability that Islamic 
banks face from their constraints on leverage. Moreover it seems that Islamic banks have 
the necessary mechanisms in place that discipline them more effectively than conventional 
banks on the use and abuse of leverage. Such mechanisms may relate to the equity-type 
contractual agreements with depositors, the so-called investment account holders. These 
agreements induce depositors to monitor bank performance due to the uncertainty of their 
payout. On the bank’s end, such depositors imply larger withdrawal risk than in conven­
tional banks. In addition, the applicability of displaced commercial risk specifically to IBs 
suggests that leverage imposes stronger market discipline in Islamic banks (e.g. incentives 
to stronger loan screening standards and monitoring) and reduces moral hazard.
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Thirdly, we find evidence in support of the claims that Islamic banking is operating 
more using fee-based contracts as opposed to partnership contracts due to the insignif­
icance of the net interest revenue explanatory variable under the income statement data 
specification. In addition, the other operating income coefficient is more negative for the 
Islamic than the conventional banks which could mean that an increase in the covariate has 
a greater, hazard lessening, effect upon the former.
Fourthly, we find evidence that there is a significant "country effect" for conventional 
banks. The effect can be considered as a proxy for political risk or regulatory efficiency. In 
essence it is a bonus decrease in the hazard function of banks operating in country A than 
country B. The effect retains its significance even after correcting for the macroeconomic 
environment.
Additionally, increased within-country correlation for conventional banks would mean 
that they are more vulnerable to banking crises, as there is a latent process causing them to 
behave in the same way implying a higher vulnerability to contagion. By contrast, Islamic 
banks do not have significant within group correlation, meaning that it is more likely finan­
cial distress in an Islamic bank to be contained rather than spreading to the rest banking 
system. Less standardization of products and practices in Islamic banking as well as a more 
"private banking" character might be responsible for this. Such finding can have important 
policy implications as governments would intervene to bail out a failed conventional banks 
for fears of adverse economic impact on the country’s banking system. However the results 
suggest that such action is not likely to take place for Islamic banks as the effect is unlikely 
to spread to other banks.
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Tunisia, Jordan and Kuwait have the most favorable banking background whereas 
Turkey, Brunei and Indonesia have the least. For Islamic banks in particular the most 
favorable environment is found in Malaysia, Kuwait and the UAE; conversely the worst is 
found in Bangladesh, Brunei and Turkey. Finally, all results are verified no matter which 
part of the accounting statement is used; however as subtle differences exist among them, 
inspection of all is necessary and one set cannot be used to substitute another.
Main policy implication from this chapter is the fact that Islamic banks are less prone 
to failure than conventional banks. In addition they are sensitive to different variables which 
has implications for their regulation and monitoring. Moreover the presence of Islamic 















i  w b 00 OQ
W 00 W
% oo
Ov ui ^  ui w vooo-~jovc/i.CkOJto
2. a  2.^  ^  «?
0} s  co.
CO W o
S. S. DO
a  a  E.
5' 5' cloo oo g-oo oo oo
e  e . s
f t  «  f t
^  S'
CO a  
g 3
m
n  a  co 
g  g  E
co
co co o  aC-) ct cj* ft
>  g S 5*
co oo 3: ^  e n 3 f3"
I* 3 m 3'
S. co 
o- S.





Eg Z Z to ■TO_ Z 
£  <"> 
o 3
CO
n  « ^  3 o !?
9 » » 3 s; i8 =L B: O M »
f t  S  S  w «  63
5' 3' 300 oo —•
C/2 00 ftO O 1/5o o




>  a  a a  coo oo > >
c  c
> > §■ 8 Er q§!
3 S. I
c  a  cco oo oo
> > >
a  coo oo 
> >
o  o  o  o  o
O v OO OJ
~J ^  O'
O ' O ' O ' O ' CT*
to  NJ NJ OJ 4^
H-. to  ’—] VO O 'O' O' O' O' &
4*. O  OvO' O' °
cl — cr
CO CO CO co JO c eB. B. B. :<
S  £  5 ‘O.
s ' s  3
00 00 oo
w  ^  O  2  o' 8- S  £  £
00 00 00
5  oo oo
n '> G 0 O 0 ° >Tl> !£ l S !? e 'O SV c  n> n o ■o «  «  e. o pS-o  a" v
O O O o  oo g  o00 oo VO 00 00 00
«  3
W W *11 w w <■0 <■& n> <t>TD (T 13 t3














X 3  *0 Cu
3 «•














































































to  V  o  °  X









tS £  
°  to  
+H «- <0. 
to
















































OCA oda a lcBL






































OJ NS 1—  O  g  
»
oc















o o p 1—
D. 4L Ol k>o us -J o








































Table 9. Classification of conditioning variables.
Accounting Variables
I. Balance Sheet
Loans Deposits and Short term funding
Assets Equity
Other Earning Assets Liabilities
Reserves for Impaired Loans/NPL Liquid Assets
II. Income Statement
Net Interest Revenue Net Income
Other Operating Income General Admin. Expenses (Overheads)
III. Financial Ratios
Capital Quality Earnings
Equity/Assets Net Interest Margin
Equity/Net Loans Return on Average Assets (RoA)
Equity/Deposits and Short term funding Return on Average Equity (RoE)
Liabilities/Equity Cost to Income
Z-score Income Diversity
Asset Quality Liquidity
Loan Loss Reserves/Loans Net Loans/Assets
Tier 1 Ratio Liquid Assets/Deposits and Short term funding
Macroeconomic Variables
Business Cycle Financial structure
Growth of Real GDP Banking Sector Concentration
Inflation Islamic Banks Share
FX Rate Depreciation Sovereign Rating
Unexpected Inflation Financial Openness
The source for the accounting variables is Bankscope whereas the macroeconomic data 
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95% Cl □  95% Cl
—  Conventional Banks — - Islamic Banks
Survival T im e
The figure reports non-parametric Kaplan-M eier survival rate estim ates and their 95% confidence 
interval from 1 to 100 years. The survival rates are 84% (after 20 years) and 77% (after 30 years) 
for conventional commercial banks, and 91%  (20 years) and 86% (30 years) for Islamic banks.
3.7 Tables
Table 12(a). Non ] : Type / Conventional Banks
Total Net Survivor St. Upper Lower Cumulative St. Upper Lower
Time Banks Failure Lost Function Error 95% C l 95% Cl Hazard Error 95% Cl 95% C l
4 315 1 0 0.9968 0.0032 0.9777 0.9996 0.0032 0.0032 0.0004 0.0225
5 314 3 0 0.9873 0.0063 0.9665 0.9952 0.0127 0.0064 0.0048 0.0339
6 311 2 1 0.9810 0.0077 0.9581 0.9914 0.0192 0.0078 0.0086 0.0426
7 308 5 1 0.9650 0.0104 0.9377 0.9805 0.0354 0.0107 0.0196 0.0639
8 302 6 2 0.9459 0.0128 0.9143 0.9660 0.0553 0.0134 0.0344 0.0889
9 294 0 3 0.9459 0.0128 0.9143 0.9660 0.0553 0.0134 0.0344 0.0889
1 0 291 2 3 0.9394 0.0135 0.9066 0.9609 0.0621 0.0143 0.0396 0.0974
u 286 4 7 0.9262 0.0148 0.8910 0.9504 0.0761 0.0159 0.0506 0.1146
12 275 3 2 0.9161 0.0158 0.8792 0.9421 0.0870 0.0171 0.0592 0.1279
13 270 1 2 0.9127 0.0161 0.8753 0.9393 0.0907 0.0175 0.0622 0.1324
14 267 3 4 0.9025 0.0169 0.8634 0.9308 0 . 1 0 2 0 0.0186 0.0713 0.1459
15 260 1 12 0.8990 0.0172 0.8594 0.9279 0.1058 0.0190 0.0744 0.1506
16 247 6 4 0.8772 0.0190 0.8343 0.9095 0.1301 0.0215 0.0942 0.1798
17 237 I 3 0.8735 0.0192 0.8301 0.9064 0.1343 0.0219 0.0976 0.1848
18 233 2 7 0.8660 0.0198 0.8216 0.9000 0.1429 0.0227 0.1047 0.1951
19 224 3 11 0.8544 0.0206 0.8085 0.8900 0.1563 0.0240 0.1157 0 .2 1 1 1
2 0 2 1 0 3 7 0.8422 0.0215 0.7946 0.8795 0.1706 0.0256 0.1275 0.2283
2 1 2 0 0 2 1 0.8337 0 .0 2 2 1 0.7851 0.8723 0.1806 0.0263 0.1357 0.2403
2 2 197 0 3 0.8337 0 . 0 2 2 1 0.7851 0.8723 0.1806 0.0263 0.1357 0.2403
23 194 2 1 0.8251 0.0227 0.7754 0.8649 0.1909 0.0273 0.1442 0.2527
24 191 1 3 0.8208 0.0230 0.7705 0.8611 0.1961 0.0278 0.1485 0.2590
25 187 1 2 0.8164 0.0233 0.7656 0.8573 0.2015 0.0283 0.1530 0.2654
26 184 3 8 0.8031 0.0241 0.7506 0.8457 0.2178 0.0299 0.1665 0.2849
27 173 1 8 0.7985 0.0244 0.7454 0.8416 0.2236 0.0304 0.1713 0.2919
28 164 0 3 0.7985 0.0244 0.7454 0.8416 0.2236 0.0304 0.1713 0.2919
29 161 2 4 0.7886 0.0251 0.7342 0.8331 0.2360 0.0316 0.1814 0.3069
30 155 2 3 0.7784 0.0258 0.7227 0.8242 0.2489 0.0329 0.1920 0.3226
31 150 2 6 0.7680 0.0265 0.7111 0.8152 0.2622 0.0343 0.2030 0.3388
32 142 1 6 0.7626 0.0268 0.7050 0.8105 0.2693 0.0350 0.2087 0.3473
33 135 0 8 0.7626 0.0268 0.7050 0.8105 0.2693 0.0350 0.2087 0.3473
34 127 1 5 0.7566 0.0273 0.6981 0.8054 0.2771 0.0359 0.2151 0.3571
35 12 1 0 7 0.7566 0.0273 0.6981 0.8054 0,2771 0.0359 0.2151 0.3571
36 114 0 2 0.7566 0.0273 0.6981 0.8054 0.2771 0.0359 0.2151 0.3571
37 1 1 2 0 4 0.7566 0.0273 0.6981 0.8054 0.2771 0.0359 0.2151 0.3571
38 108 2 4 0.7426 0.0285 0.6816 0.7937 0.2957 0.0382 0.2296 0.3808
39 1 0 2 1 2 0.7353 0.0292 0.6730 0.7879 0.3055 0.0394 0.2372 0.3933
40 99 0 2 0.7353 0.0292 0.6730 0.7876 0.3055 0.0394 0.2372 0.3933
41 97 1 3 0.7277 0.0298 0.6641 0.7813 0.3158 0.0407 0.2452 0.4066
42 93 1 4 0.7199 0.0305 0.6549 0.7747 0.3265 0.0421 0.2536 0.4205
43 8 8 1 0 0.7117 0.0313 0.6453 0.7679 0.3379 0.0436 0.2623 0.4352
44 87 1 3 0.7035 0.0319 0.6358 0.7611 0.3494 0.0451 0.2712 0.4500
45 83 2 2 0 . 6 8 6 6 0.0333 0.6161 0.7468 0.3735 0.0482 0.2900 0.4811
46 79 2 3 0.6692 0.0347 0.5961 0.7321 0.3988 0.0514 0.3097 0.5135
47 74 0 2 0.6692 0.0347 0.5961 0.7321 0.3988 0.0514 0.3097 0.5135
48 72 1 2 0.6599 0.0354 0.5854 0.7242 0.4127 0.0533 0.3204 0.5315
49 69 0 6 0.6599 0.0354 0.5854 0.7242 0.4127 0.0533 0.3204 0.5315
50 63 0 7 0.6599 0,0354 0.5854 0.7242 0.4127 0.0533 0.3204 0.5315
52 56 0 5 0.6599 0.0354 0.5854 0.7242 0.4127 0.0533 0.3204 0.5315
53 51 0 2 0.6599 0.0354 0.5854 0.7242 0.4127 0.0533 0.3204 0.5315
54 49 0 2 0.6599 0.0354 0.5854 0.7242 0.4127 0.0533 0.3204 0.5315
55 47 0 2 0.6599 0.0354 0.5854 0.7242 0.4127 0.0533 0.3204 0.5315
56 45 0 2 0.6599 0.0354 0.5854 0.7242 0.4127 0.0533 0.3204 0.5315
57 43 0 1 0.6599 0.0354 0.5854 0.7242 0.4127 0.0533 0.3204 0.5315
58 42 0 1 0.6599 0.0354 0.5854 0.7242 0.4127 0.0533 0.3204 0.5315
59 41 1 1 0.6438 0.0381 0.5639 0.7128 0.4371 0.0586 0.3361 0.5684
60 39 0 1 0.6438 0.0381 0.5639 0.7128 0.4371 0.0586 0.3361 0.5684
61 38 0 2 0.6438 0.0381 0.5639 0.7128 0.4371 0.0586 0.3361 0.5684
62 36 0 1 0.6438 0.0381 0.5639 0.7128 0.4371 0.0586 0.3361 0.5684
63 35 0 2 0.6438 0.0381 0.5639 0.7128 0.4371 0.0586 0.3361 0.5684
64 33 2 0 0.6048 0.0446 0.5114 0.6858 0.4977 0.0726 0.3739 0.6624
65 31 0 1 0.6048 0.0446 0.5114 0.6858 0.4977 0.0726 0.3739 0.6624
67 30 0
1
1 0.6048 0.0446 0.5114 0.6858 0.4977 0.0726 0.3739 0,6624
6 8 29 1 0.5839 0.0477 0.4845 0.6707 0.5322 0.0804 0.3958 0.7155
70 27 1 0 0.5623 0.0506 0.4574 0.6546 0.5692 0.0885 0.4197 0.7720
71 26 1 3 0.5407 0.0531 0.4313 0.6378 0.6077 0.0965 0.4451 0.8295
73 2 2 1 0 0.5161 0.0561 0.4014 0.6192 0.6531 0.1067 0.4742 0.8995
74 2 1 1 0 0.4915 0.0585 0.3728 0.5997 0.7007 0.1168 0.5054 0.9715
75 2 0 1 0 0.4670 0.0606 0.3453 0.5796 0.7507 0.1271 0.5388 1.0461
79 19 0
1
2 0.4670 0.0606 0.3453 0.5796 0.7507 0.1271 0.5388 1.0461
80 17 0
1
0.4395 0.0629 0.3146 0.5574 0.8096 0.1400 0.5768 1.1362
82 16 0
1
0.4395 0.0629 0.3146 0.5574 0.8096 0.1400 0.5768 1.1362
85
89
15 1 0.4102 0.0652 0.2825 0.5335 0.8762 0.1551 0.6194 1.2396










12 0 1 0.4102 0.0652 0.2825 0.5335 0.8762 0.1551 0.6194 1.2396
1 1 0 2 0.4102 0.0652 0.2825 0.5335 0.8762 0.1551 0.6194 1.2396
9 0
1
1 0.4102 0.0652 0.2825 0.5335 0.8762 0.1551 0.6194 1.2396
g 1 0.3589 0.0745 0.2178 0.5022 1 .0 0 1 2 0.1992 0.6779 1.4787
g o 1 0.3589 0.0745 0.2178 0.5022 1 .0 0 1 2 0.1992 0.6779 1.4787
5 o 2 0.3589 0.0745 0.2178 0.5022 1 .0 0 1 2 0.1992 0.6779 1.4787
3 0
1
1 0.3589 0.0745 0.2178 0.5022 1 .0 0 1 2 0.1992 0.6779 1.4787
2 0
1
0.1795 0.1323 0.0186 0.4766 1.5012 0.5382 0.7435 3.0312
1 0 0.1795 0.1323 0.0186 
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Table 12(b). Non Parametric Analysis by Bank Type / Islamic Banks.
Total Net Survivor St. Upper Lower Cumulative St. Upper Lower
Tim e Banks Failure Lost Function Error 95% Cl 95% C l Hazard Error 95% C l 95% C l
2 106 1 3 0.9906 0.0094 0.9349 0.9987 0.0094 0.0094 0.0013 0.0670
3 1 0 2 1 3 0.9809 0.0134 0.9256 0.9952 0.0192 0.0136 0.0048 0.0769
4 98 0 11 0.9809 0.0134 0.9256 0.9952 0.0192 0.0136 0.0048 0.0769
5 87 1 4 0.9696 0.0174 0.9083 0.9901 0.0307 0.0178 0.0099 0.0957
6 82 0 6 0.9696 0.0174 0.9083 0.9901 0.0307 0.0178 0.0099 0.0957
7 76 0 3 0.9696 0.0174 0.9083 0.9901 0.0307 0.0178 0.0099 0.0957
8 73 0 4 0.9696 0.0174 0.9083 0.9901 0.0307 0.0178 0.0099 0.0957
9 69 0 3 0.9696 0.0174 0.9083 0.9901 0.0307 0.0178 0.0099 0.0957
1 0 6 6 0 2 0.9696 0.0174 0.9083 0.9901 0.0307 0.0178 0.0099 0.0957
11 64 1 1 0.9544 0.0228 0.8807 0.9830 0.0464 0.0237 0.0170 0.1262
1 2 62 0 6 0.9544 0.0228 0.8807 0.9830 0.0464 0.0237 0.0170 0.1262
13 56 0 3 0.9544 0.0228 0.8807 0.9830 0.0464 0.0237 0.0170 0.1262
14 53 0 4 0.9544 0.0228 0.8807 0.9830 0.0464 0.0237 0.0170 0.1262
15 49 0 1 0.9544 0.0228 0.8807 0.9830 0.0464 0.0237 0.0170 0.1262
16 48 1 2 0.9345 0.0297 0.8436 0.9734 0.0672 0.0316 0.0268 0.1687
17 45 0 1 0,9345 0.0297 0.8436 0.9734 0.0672 0.0316 0.0268 0.1687
19 44 1 1 0.9133 0.0358 0.8091 0.9619 0.0899 0.0389 0.0385 0.2099
2 0 42 0 1 0.9133 0.0358 0.8091 0.9619 0.0899 0.0389 0.0385 0.2099
2 1 41 0 1 0.9133 0.0358 0.8091 0.9619 0.0899 0.0389 0.0385 0.2099
23 40 0 2 0.9133 0.0358 0.8091 0.9619 0.0899 0.0389 0.0385 0.2099
24 38 0 1 0.9133 0.0358 0.8091 0.9619 0.0899 0.0389 0.0385 0.2099
25 37 1 4 0 . 8 8 8 6 0.0425 0.7700 0.9480 0.1169 0.0474 0.0529 0.2586
26 32 0 1 0 . 8 8 8 6 0.0425 0.7700 0.9480 0.1169 0.0474 0.0529 0.2586
27 31 1 3 0.8600 0.0499 0.7257 0.9315 0.1492 0.0573 0.0703 0.3167
28 27 0 3 0.8600 0.0499 0.7257 0.9315 0.1492 0.0573 0.0703 0.3167
29 24 0 3 0.8600 0.0499 0.7257 0.9315 0.1492 0.0573 0.0703 0.3167
30 2 1 0 1 0.8600 0.0499 0.7257 0.9315 0.1492 0.0573 0.0703 0.3167
31 2 0 0 2 0.8600 0.0499 0.7257 0.9315 0.1492 0.0573 0.0703 0.3167
32 18 0 4 0.8600 0.0499 0.7257 0.9315 0.1492 0.0573 0.0703 0.3167
33 14 0 2 0.8600 0.0499 0.7257 0.9315 0.1492 0.0573 0.0703 0.3167
34 1 2 0 4 0.8600 0.0499 0.7257 0.9315 0.1492 0.0573 0.0703 0.3167
36 8 0 1 0.8600 0.0499 0.7257 0.9315 0.1492 0.0573 0.0703 0.3167
47 7 0 1 0.8600 0.0499 0.7257 0.9315 0.1492 0.0573 0.0703 0.3167
56 6 0 1 0.8600 0.0499 0.7257 0.9315 0.1492 0.0573 0.0703 0.3167
70 5 0 I 0.8600 0.0499 0.7257 0.9315 0.1492 0.0573 0.0703 0.3167
79 4 0 1 0.8600 0.0499 0.7257 0.9315 0.1492 0.0573 0.0703 0.3167
83 3 0 1 0.8600 0.0499 0.7257 0.9315 0.1492 0.0573 0.0703 0.3167
96 2 0 1 0.8600 0.0499 0.7257 0.9315 0.1492 0.0573 0.0703 0.3167
99 1 0 1 0.8600 0.0499 0.7257 0.9315 0.1492 0.0573 0.0703 0.3167
Note: Survivor Function and Cumulative Hazard Function are the Kaplan-Meier and
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Table 14. Restricted / Semi-Restricted / Semi-Generalized Cox PH / Balance Sheet.
Restricted Semi-Restricted Semi-Generalized
All banks AH banks Conventional Islamic
Assets (In) 0.638 0.649 0.610 0.813
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007)
Growth of Assets -0.094 -0.091 -0.093 -0.082
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.177)
Growth of Equity -0.102 -0.115 -0.114 -0.216
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.651)
Liquid Assets -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(p-value) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.179)
Other Earning Assets (In) -0.390 -0.386 -0.350 -0.463
(p-value) (0.003) (0.002) (0.038) (0.014)
Islamic -1.207 - - -
(p-value) (0.002)
A IC 711.82 665.61 626.62 48.72
B IC 749.82 697.27 657.19 72.20
LogL -349.91 -327.81 -308.31 -19.36
Pseudo — R 2(%) 10.51 9.50 9.25 13.88
No. of banks 419 419 315 104
No. of failures 96 96 89 7
No. of obs 4155 4155 3345 810
Wald test (x2) 79.70 68.86 64.62 11.09
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.049)
PH test (%2) 7.02 4.92 8.07 1.17
(p-value) (0.319) (0.425) (0.152) (0.947)
Note: The table reports estimates of the restricted, semi-restricted and semi-generalized Cox PH 
models conditional on firm-level balance sheet information. Estimated coefficients are reported 
while p-values are in brackets. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. Wald test for the joint 
significance of all explanatory variables. Assets and Other Earning Assets are in natural logs.
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Table 15. Generalized Cox PH / Balance Sheet.
Generalized 
Conventional Islamic




Growth of Equity -0.108 -
(p-value) (0.000)
Liquid Assets -0.001 -
(p-value) (0.011)
Other Earning Assets (In) -0.410 -0.756
(p-value) (0.009) (0.028)
Assets (In) 0.640 2.305
(p-value) (0.000) (0.012)
Growth of Assets - -0.137
(p-value) (0.092)
A IC 622.65 38.83
B IC 653.22 57.57
LogL -306.32 -15.42
Pseudo — R 2(%) 9.83 31.08
No. of banks 315 100
No. of failures 89 7
No. of obs 3340 800
Wald test (x 2) 57.93 18.99
(p-value) (0.000) (0.001)
PH test (x 2) 13.92 4.96
(p-value) (0.016) (0.291)
Note: The table reports estimates of the generalized Cox PH models conditional 
on firm-level balance sheet information. Estimated coefficients are reported 
while p-values are in brackets. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. Wald test for 
o f all explanatory variables. Assets and Other Earning Assets are in natural logs.
A dash indicates that the variable was thrown out by the variable selection algorithm.
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Table 16. Restricted /  Semi-Restricted /  Semi-Generalized Cox PH /  Income Statement.
Restricted Semi-Restricted Semi-Generalized
All banks All banks Conventional Islamic
Growth of Overheads -0.087 -0.085 -0.074 -0.947
(p-value) (0.036) (0.041) (0.077) (0.002)
Net Income 0.007 0.006 0.006 -0.166
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
Net Interest Revenue -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.012
(p-value) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.373)
Other Operating Income -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.011
(p-value) (0.016) (0.035) (0.040) (0.385)
Islamic -1.025 - - -
(p-value) (0.009)
A IC 712.19 666.71 624.13 42.01
B I C 743.76 691.97 648.55 60.65
LogL -351.09 -329.35 -308.06 -17.01
P seudo — R 2{%) 4.54 3.25 3.19 23.35
No. of banks 418 418 315 103
No. of failures 91 91 84 7
No. of obs 4089 4089 3308 781
Wald test (x2) 33.40 22.15 20.35 10.37
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.035)
PH test (x2) 5.08 4.37 5.30 1.64
(p-value) (0.407) (0.358) (0.258) (0.802)
Note: The table reports estimates of the restricted, semi-restricted and semi-generalized Cox PH 
models conditional on firm-level income statement information. Estimated coeflicients are reported 
while p-values are in brackets. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. Wald test for the joint 
significance of all explanatory variables.
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Table 17. Generalized Cox PH / Income Statement.
Generalized 
Conventional Islamic
Growth of Overheads -0.074 -0.969
(p-value) (0.077) (0.002)
Net Income 0.006 -0.194
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000)
Net Interest Revenue -0.002 -
(p-value) (0.009)
Other Operating Income -0.002 -0.017
(p-value) (0.040) (0.025)
A IC 624.13 40.88
B I C 648.54 54.91
LogL -308.06 -17.44
Pseudo — R 2{%) 3.19 1.13
No. of banks 315 104
No. of failures 84 7
No. of obs 3308 793
Wald test (x2) 20.35 9.84
(p-value) (0.000) (0.020)
PH test (x2) 5.30 1.13
(p-value) (0.257) (0.769)
Note: The table reports estimates of the generalized Cox PH models 
conditional on firm-level income statement information. Estimated 
coefficients are reported while p-values are in brackets. AIC is Akaike 
Information Criterion. Wald test for the joint significance of all explanatory 
variables. A dash indicates that the variable was thrown out by the 
variable selection algorithm.
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Table 18. Restricted / Semi-Restricted / Semi-Generalized Cox PH / Financial Ratios.
Restricted Semi-Restricted Semi-Generalized
All banks All banks Conventional Islamic
Z score 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.001
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.750)
ROA -0.025 -0.026 -0.026 -0.127
(p-value) (0.055) (0.051) (0.055) (0.373)
CTI 0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.013
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.473)
Net Loans/Assets 0.015 0.015 0.018 -0.015
(p-value) (0.046) (0.042) (0.026) (0.355)
Islamic -1.021 - - -
(p-value) (0.033)
A IC 878.08 839.79 798.59 46.39
B I C 910.11 865.42 823.37 65.37
LogL -434.04 -415.89 -395.48 -19.60
P seudo — R 2(%) 3.52 2.85 3.23 2.10
No. of banks 415 415 315 100
No. of failures 87 87 82 5
No. of obs 4476 4476 3624 852
Wald test (x2) 31.65 24.37 26.37 4.52
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.341)
PH test (x2) 1.59 0.98 0.69 4.55
(p-value) (0.902) (0.912) (0.953) (0.337)
Note: The table reports estimates of the restricted, semi-restricted and semi-generalized 
Cox PH models conditional on firm-level financial ratios information. Estimated coefficients 
are reported while p-values are in brackets. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. Wald test 
for the joint significance o f all explanatory variables.
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Table 19. Generalized Cox PH / Financial Ratios.
Generalized
Conventional Islamic










Income Diversity -0.001 -0.051
(p-value) (0.097) (0.009)
Liquid Assets/Deposits 0.003 -0.011
(p-value) (0.406) (0.357)
A IC 552.48 37.51
B I C 589.07 69.87
LogL -270.24 -11.75
Pseudo  — R 2(%) 8.34 27.63
No. of banks 315 102
No. of failures 82 5
No. of obs 3624 755
Wald test (x2) 49.19 8.98
(p-value) (0.000) (0.254)
PH test (x2) 1.19 1.19
(p-value) (0.977) (0.991)
Note: The table reports estimates of the generalized Cox PH models conditional 
on firm-level income statement information. Estimated coefficients are reported 
while p-values are in brackets. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. Wald test for 
the joint significance of all explanatory variables. A dash indicates that the 
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Table 23. Frailty Cox PH Results / Balance Sheet.
Restricted Semi-Restricted Random Effects 
All Banks
Assets (1) 0.638 0.649 0.618 0.783
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Growth of Assets -9.407 -9.132 -9.498 -6.336
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
Growth of Equity -0.102 -0.115 -0.102 -0.092
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.009)
Liquid Assets -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(p-value) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
O ther Earning Assets (1) -0.390 -0.386 -0.372 -0.483
(p-value) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Islamic -1.207 - - -1.058
(p-value) (0.002) (0.020)
A IC 711.82 665.61 716.21 672.70
B I C 749.82 697.27 747.87 710.69
LogL -349.91 -327.81 -353.10 -330.35
Pseudo — R 2(%) 10.51 9.50 29.71 31.72
No. of banks 419 419 419 419
No. of failures 96 96 96 96
No. of obs 4155 4155 4155 4155
Wald test ( x2) 79.70 72.47 53.01 45.28
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PH test (x2) 7.02 4.92 4.94 4.20
(p-value) (0.319) (0.425) (0.423) (0.649)
Theta (9) - - 0.257 1.381
LR test 9 =  0 5.360 39.120
(p-value) (0.010) (0.000)
Frailty Group - - Islamic Country
Note: The table reports estimates of the restricted, semi-restricted and random effects 
Cox models conditional on firm-level balance sheet information. Estimated coefficients 
are reported while p-values are in brackets. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. Wald 
test for the joint significance of all explanatory variables. LR test is for the null that the 
latent factors are insignificant. 9 is the variance of the unspecified probability distribution 
from which the random effects are drawn.
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Table 24. Frailty Cox PH Results / Income Statement.
Restricted




Net Interest Revenue -0.002
(p-value) (0.008)




A IC  712.19
B IG  743.76
LogL  -351.09
P seudo — R 2{%) 4.54
No. of banks 418
No. of failures 91
No. of obs 4089
Wald test (*2) 36.53
(p-value) (0.000)
PH test ( x2) 5.08
(p-value) (0.407)
Theta (9)






























Note: The table reports estimates of the restricted, semi-restricted and random effects 
Cox models conditional on firm-level income statement information. Estimated coefficients 
are reported while p-values are in brackets. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. Wald 
test for the joint significance of all explanatory variables. LR test is for the null that the 
latent factors are insignificant. 0 is the variance of the unspecified probability distribution 
from which the random effects are drawn.
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Table 25. Frailty Cox PH Results / Financial Ratios.
Restricted Semi-Restricted Random Effects
All Banks
Z score 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
ROA -0.025 -0.026 -0.026 -0.017
(p-value) (0.055) (0.051) (0.141) (0.346)
CTI 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Net Loans/Assets 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.010
(p-value) (0.046) (0.042) (0.024) (0.180)
Islamic -1.021 - - -0.457
(p-value) (0.033) (0.389)
A IC 878.08 839.79 881.36 859.64
B I C 910.11 865.42 906.98 891.67
LogL -434.04 -415.89 -436.67 -424.82
Pseudo — R 2{%) 3.52 2.85 13.08 12.19
No. of banks 415 415 415 415
No. of failures 87 87 87 87
No. of obs 4476 4476 4476 4476
Wald test (X2) 51.91 50.40 38.25 28.71
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PH test (x2) 1.59 0.98 0.89 1.22
(p-value) (0.902) (0.912) (0.926) (0.943)
Theta (0) 0.144 1.101
LR test 0 =  0 1.32 21.16
(p-value) (0.125) (0.000)
Frailty Group Islamic Country
Note: The table reports estimates of the restricted, semi-restricted and random effects 
Cox models conditional on firm-level financial ratios information. Estimated coefficients 
are reported while p-values are in brackets. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. Wald 
test for the joint significance of all explanatory variables. LR test is for the null that the 
latent factors are insignificant. 0 is the variance of the unspecified probability distribution 
from which the random effects are drawn.
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All CB IB All CB IB All CB IB
Albania 0.318 0.303 0.000 0.342 0.233 0.000 0.649 0.387 0.000
Bahrain 0.961 0.663 0.394 0.480 0.480 0.133 0.684 0.431 0.012
Bangladesh -1.443 -1.788 0.007 -1.127 -1.600 0.801 -1.223 -1.700 1.205
Brunei 0.726 0.129 0.306 1.202 0.436 1.395 1.097 0.397 1.945
Egypt 0.316 0.323 -0.067 -0.345 -0.292 -0.682 0.302 0.124 -1.939
Indonesia 0.896 0.865 -0.010 1.196 1.121 -0.155 0.773 0.908 -0.111
Iran -0.862 0.000 -0.097 -1.746 0.000 -0.967 -1.409 0.000 -1.814
Jordan -1.462 -1.284 -0.120 -2.087 -1.726 -0.505 -1.477 -1.215 -0.908
Kuwait -0.695 -0.208 -0.166 -1.736 -0.944 -0.668 -1.113 -0.468 -2.869
Malaysia 0.434 0.423 -0.217 0.908 0.989 -0.664 0.350 0.936 -1.543
Mauritania -0.906 -0.661 -0.002 -0.974 -0.584 -0.778 -0.383 -0.220 -0.767
Pakistan -0.745 -0.815 -0.050 -0.459 -0.397 -0.805 -0.340 -0.495 -1.511
Palestine -0.236 -0.150 -0.004 -0.538 -0.302 -0.112 -0.279 -0.120 -0.077
Qatar -0.985 -0.695 -0.036 -1.606 -1.122 -0.240 -0.861 -0.637 -1.066
Saudi Arabia -0.740 -0.502 -0.001 -1.390 -1.179 -0.014 -1.174 -0.962 -0.527
Sudan -0.998 -0.502 -0.194 -1.566 -0.633 -1.098 -0.742 -0.355 -1.866
Tunisia -1.988 -1.871 -0.016 -1.967 -1.612 -0.388 -1.573 -1.370 -0.691
Turkey 1.055 1.060 0.224 1.252 1.185 1.013 0.605 0.654 0.622
UAE -1.128 -0.935 -0.180 -1.284 -0.992 -0.821 -0.884 -0.718 -1.347
Yemen -0.028 0.064 -0.023 -1.674 -1.116 -0.812 0.235 -0.419 -0.777
Note: The table shows the estimates of the random effects from the shared-ffailty Cox model. 
A negative (positive) coefficient suggests a decreasing (increasing) contribution of the country 
to the bank’s hazard. Vi =  log (a*).
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F ig u re  8. E stim a ted  L o g  fra ilties  fo r  c o u n tr ie s  ac c o rd in g  to  b a n k  and  d a ta  type.
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The figure plots the latent country factor estimates, ( i^ ) ,  for the shared-ffailty Cox PH model 
that conditions on accounting information indicators. The bars represent the estimated log frailties 
obtained in the balance sheet, income statement and financial ratio models. In each country we 
distinguish conventional and Islamic banks separately. V i >  0 (Vi <  0) implies that the latent 
country factor has an upward (downward) effect on bank failure risk.
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Difference (Log) -0.217 -0.131
Exponentiated Difference 0.195 0.123
Note: Exponentiated difference is the hazard ratio of the difference in 
the log frailties. Islamic banks are 9.4% — 19.5% lower failure risk than 







Figure 9. Exponentiated frailties for bank type.
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Figure 10. Exponentiated frailties for countries / Balance Sheet.
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The figure plots the latent country factor estimates, («/»), for the shared-ffailty Cox PH model 
that conditions on accounting and macroeconomic information. The bars represent the 
estim ated log frailties obtained in the balance sheet, restricted and generalised models.
Vi >  0 (ui <  0) implies that the latent country factor has an upward 
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Figure 11 .Exponentiated frailties for countries /  Income Statement.
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The figure plots the latent country factor estimates, (vi),  for the shared-ffailty Cox PH model 
that conditions on accounting and macroeconomic information. The bars represent the 
estimated log frailties obtained in the income statement, restricted and generalised models. 
Vi >  0 [yi  <  0) implies that the latent country factor has an upward 
(downward) effect on bank failure risk.
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Figure 12. Exponentiated frailties for countries /  Financial Ratios.
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The figure plots the latent country factor estimates, ( v^,  for the shared-ffailty Cox PH model 
that conditions on accounting and macroeconomic information. The bars represent the 
estimated log frailties obtained in the financial ratios, restricted and generalised models.
Vi >  0 (vi <  0) implies that the latent country factor has an upward 
(downward) effect on bank failure risk.
^
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Table 34. Proportional Hazards Assumption / Balance Sheet.
Restricted Semi-Restricted Generalised
All Banks Conventional Islamic Conventional Islamic




Growth of Equity -0.025 -0.028 -0.001 -0.079 -
(p-value) (0.857) (0.839) (0.990) (0.707)
Liquid Assets -0.060 -0.036 0.464 -0.081 -
(p-value) (0.481) (0.700) (0.454) (0.316)
Other Earning Assets (in) -0.022 -0.023 -0.417 0.001 0.054
(p-value) (0.753) (0.815) (0.262) (0.989) (0.937)
Assets (In) -0.046 -0.057 0.363 -0.068 0.375
(p-value) (0.616) (0.592) (0.491) (0.564) (0.531)
Growth of Assets 0.181 0.174 -0.133 - -0.046
(p-value) (0.033) (0.057) (0.787) (0.943)
Islamic -0.068
(p-value) (0.519)
Global Test (0.319) (0.357) (0.825) (0.016) (0.291)
Note: Table reports p  values for the Schoenfeld test o f the proportional hazards and p-values 
in brackets. The Semi-restricted model is tested individually for the two strata (Conventional 
and Islamic). Null Hypothesis is that the PH holds.
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Table 35. Proportional Hazards Assumption / Income Statement.
Restricted Semi-Restricted Generalised
AH Banks Conventional Islamic Conventional Islamic
Growth of Overheads 0.094 0.049 -0.086 -0.015 -0.249
(p-value) (0.682) (0.843) (0.870) (0.949) (0.720)
Net Income -0.040 -0.038 -0.584 -0.009 -0.483
(p-value) (0.776) (0.710) (0.297) (0.953) (0.463)
Net Interest Revenue -0.196 -0.244 0.367 -0.066 -
(p-value) (0.035) (0.068) (0.441) (0.735)
Other Operating Income -0.190 -0.164 -0.259 -0.279 -0.522
(p-value) (0.073) (0.246) (0.765) (0.151) (0.869)
Islamic -0.029
(p-value) (0.786)
Global Test (0.384) (0.258) (0.802) (0.631) (0.946)
Note: Table reports p values for the Schoenfeld test of the proportional hazards and p-values 
in brackets. The Semi-restricted model is tested individually for the two strata (Conventional 
and Islamic). Null Hypothesis is that the PH holds.
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Table 36. Proportional Hazards Assumption / Financial Ratios.
Restricted Semi-Restricted Generalised
All Banks Conventional Islamic Conventional Islamic
Z score 0.079 0.079 0.641 0.024 0.158
(p-value) (0.164) (0.572) (0.661) (0.839) (0.928)
ROA 0.074 0.080 -0.891 - -0.502
(p-value) (0.697) (0.612) (0.211) (0.437)
CTI 0.058 0.049 -0.844 -0.030 -0.343
(p-value) (0.603) (0.673) (0.111) (0.786) (0.528)
Net Loans/Assets 0.060 0.014 0.337 - -





Income Diversity 0.081 -0.163
(p-value) (0.652) (0.776)




Global Test (0.891) (0.953) (0.337) (0.977) (0.991)
Note: Table reports p  values for the Schoenfeld test o f the proportional hazards and p-values 
in brackets. The Semi-restricted model is tested individually for the two strata (Conventional 
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Table 40. Full-variable Cox PH  m odel estim ates.
Restricted Cox PH model (all banks)
M icro+M acro M icro
Coefficient p -value  C oefficient p -value
Assets 0.707 (0.000)*** 0.697 (0.000)***
Other Earning Assets -0.490 (0.000)*** -0.418 (0.003)***
Liquid Assets -0.001 (0.023)** -0.001 (0.018)**
Growth of Loans -0.768 (0.096)* -1.055 (0.039)**
Growth of Equity -0.041 (0.166) -0.087 (0.003)***
Growth of Overheads -0.009 (0.857) -0.032 (0.606)
Net Interest Revenue 0.000 (0.900) 0.001 (0.349)
Net Income 0.000 (0.828) 0.000 (0.992)
Equity/Assets 0.007 (0.541) -0.003 (0.825)
Net Interest Margin 0.010 (0.119) 0.011 (0.029)**
Cost/Income 0.002 (0.031)** 0.002 (0.206)
Liquid Assets/Deposits 0.001 (0.561) 0.002 (0.250)
Islamic Dummy -1.018 (0.004)*** -1.501 (0.003)***
Growth of Real GDP -0.078 (0.000)***
Inflation 0.016 (0.008)***
Sector Concentration -1.183 (0.035)**
Wald test (3 =  0 126.9 68.8
(0.000) (0.000)






No. of banks 413 413
No. of failures 87 87
No. of observations 4062 4062
The table reports estimates of a Cox PH model without shared frailty. The covariates are 
from all blocks of the accounting statement. Significance p-values for each coefficient are 
reported in a separate column, and for the tests in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote 
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A3. Credit Rating 
Scores.
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Table A4(a). Bank Names, Countries, Bank Types, Establishm ent Year and Duration.
No B ank Name C ountry Type
Establ Failure 
Year Year D uration
1 AB Bank Ltd Bangladesh CB 1982 n/a 13
2 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UAE CB 1985 n/a 10
3 Affin Bank Malaysia CB 1975 n/a 20
4 Agrani Bank Limited Bangladesh CB 1972 2007 23
5 Ahli Bank QSC Qatar CB 1983 n/a 12
6 Ahli United Bank (Bahrain) B.S.C. Bahrain CB 1977 2004 18
7 Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE Egypt CB 1978 n/a 17
8 Ahli United Bank BSC Bahrain CB 1977 n/a 22
9 Ahli United Bank KSC Kuwait CB 1971 n/a 24
10 Ak Uluslararasi Bankasi AS Turkey CB 1985 2004 13
11 Akbank T. A. S. Turkey CB 1948 n/a 51
12 AktifYatirim Bankasi AS Turkey CB 1999 n/a 5
13 A1 Ahli Bank of Kuwait (KSC) Kuwait CB 1967 n/a 28
14 A1 Masraf-Arab Bank for UAE CB 1976 n/a 19
Investment & Foreign Trade
15 A1 Watany Bank of Egypt Egypt CB 1980 n/a 15
16 Al-Arafah Islami Bank Ltd. Bangladesh CB 1994 n/a 1
17 Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad Malaysia CB 1982 n/a 13
18 Allied Bank Limited Pakistan CB 1942 n/a 53
19 AmBank (M) Berhad Malaysia CB 2001 n/a 1
20 Amen Bank Tunisia CB 1967 n/a 28
21 American Express Bank L td - Pakistan CB 1990 2007 13
Pakistan Branches
22 Anadolubank A.S. Turkey CB 1997 n/a 4
23 ANZ Panin Bank Indonesia CB 1990 n/a 5
24 Arab African International Bank Egypt CB 1964 n/a 31
25 Arab Bank Group Jordan CB 1930 n/a 65
26 Arab Bank Pic Jordan CB 1930 n/a 65
27 Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) Jordan CB 1990 n/a 5
28 Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt Egypt CB 1982 n/a 13
29 Arab Banking Corporation - Tunisie Tunisia CB 2000 n/a 1
30 Arab Banking Corporation BSC Bahrain CB 1980 n/a 15
31 Arab International Bank Egypt CB 1974 n/a 21
32 Arab National Bank Saudi Arabia CB 1980 n/a 15
33 Arab Tunisian Bank Tunisia CB 1982 n/a 13
34 Askari Bank Limited Pakistan CB 1992 n/a 3
35 Atlas Bank Limited Pakistan CB 1990 2010 14
Note: Duration refers to the 1st year in the period. For instance.
AB Bank is first observed in 1995; hence Duration 1995-1982
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38 Bahraini Saudi Bank (The) BSC
39 Baiduri Bank
40 Ban Hin Lee Bank Berhad - BHL Bank
41 Banca Italo Albanese/ Banka Italo 
Shqiptare-Italian-Albanian Bank
42 Bangkok Bank Berhad
43 Bangladesh Commerce Bank Ltd
44 Bangladesh Small Industries & Commerce 
Bank Ltd-BASIC Bank Ltd
45 Bank A1 Habib
46 Bank Al-Jazira
47 Bank Alfalah Limited
48 Bank Artha Graha
49 Bank Artha Graha Intemasional Tbk
50 Bank Asia Limited
51 Bank Asia Pacific - ASPAC Bank
52 Bank Audi SAE
53 BankBahari
54 Bank BIRA - Bank Indonesia Raya
55 Bank Bumi Arta
56 Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad
57 Bank Central Asia
58 Bank Central Dagang
59 Bank Chinatrust Indonesia
60 Bank Commonwealth
61 Bank Credit Lyonnais Indonesia
62 Bank Danamon Indonesia Tbk
63 Bank DBS Indonesia
64 BankDuta
65 Bank Ekonomi Rahardja
66 Bank Ekspres A.S.




70 Bank ICB Bumiputera
EstabI Failure
Country Type Year Year Duration
Tunisia CB 1968 n/a 27
Bahrain CB 2004 2009 4
Bahrain CB 1983 n/a 12
Brunei CB 1994 n/a 1




Malaysia CB 1994 n/a 1
Bangladesh CB 1987 n/a 8
Bangladesh CB 1988 n/a 7
Pakistan CB 1991 n/a 4
Saudi Arabia CB 1975 n/a 20
Pakistan CB 1992 n/a 3
Indonesia CB 1967 2006 28
Indonesia CB 1973 n/a 22
Indonesia CB 1991 n/a 8
Indonesia CB 1957 1997 38
Egypt CB 1948 n/a 47
Egypt CB 1967 1997 28
Indonesia CB 1951 n/a 44
Indonesia CB 1967 n/a 28
Malaysia CB 1965 1998 30
Indonesia CB 1957 n/a 38
Indonesia CB 1969 n/a 26
Indonesia CB 1995 n/a 1
Indonesia CB 1995 n/a 1
Indonesia CB 1989 2001 6
Indonesia CB 1956 n/a 39
Indonesia CB 1989 n/a 8
Indonesia CB 1966 n/a 29
Indonesia CB 1990 n/a 5
Turkey CB 1992 n/a 5
Indonesia CB 1973 1997 22
Indonesia CB 1989 2008 6
Indonesia CB 1989 2007 6
Indonesia CB 1990 n/a 8
Note: Duration refers to the 1st year in the period. For instance.
AB Bank is first observed in 1995; hence Duration=1995-1982
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Table A4(c). B ank Nam es, Countries, Bank Types, Establishm ent Year and D uration.
EstabI Failure
No Bank Name Country Type Year Year Duration
71 Bank Intemasional Indonesia Tbk Indonesia CB 1959 n/a 36
72 Bank Jabar PT Indonesia CB 1961 n/a 42
73 Bank Kapital T.A.S. Turkey CB 1985 2000 14
74 Bank KEB Indonesia PT Indonesia CB 1990 n/a 5
75 Bank Keppel Tat Lee Buana Indonesia CB 1990 2002 5
76 Bank Kesawan Indonesia CB 1913 n/a 82
77 Bank Lippo Tbk. Indonesia CB 1948 n/a 47
78 Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk Indonesia CB 1991 n/a 8
79 Bank Mashill Utama Indonesia CB 1989 1998 6
80 Bank Mega TBK Indonesia CB 1969 n/a 30
81 Bank Modem Indonesia CB 1989 1997 7
82 Bank Mutiara Tbk Indonesia CB 1990 n/a 5
83 Bank Nasional Indonesia CB 1980 1997 16
84 Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) - Bank BNI Indonesia CB 1946 n/a 49
85 Bank Nusa Intemasional Indonesia CB 1989 1997 6
86 Bank Nusantara Parahyangan Indonesia CB 1972 n/a 26
87 Bank OCBC NISP Tbk Indonesia CB 1905 n/a 90
88 Bank of Alexandria Egypt CB 1957 n/a 38
89 Bank o f America Malaysia Berhad Malaysia CB 1994 n/a 1
90 Bank o f Commerce & Development ’A1 Tegaryoon’ Egypt CB 1980 2002 15
91 Bank o f Jordan Pic Jordan CB 1960 n/a 35
92 Bank o f Khyber Jordan CB 1991 n/a 4
93 Bank o f Nova Scotia Berhad Malaysia CB 1973 n/a 22
94 Bank o f Palestine Pic Palestine CB 1960 n/a 35
95 Bank of Punjab Pakistan CB 1989 n/a 6
96 Bank of Sharjah UAE CB 1973 n/a 22
97 Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Malaysia) Berhad Malaysia CB 1959 n/a 36
98 Panin Bank-Bank Pan Indonesia Tbk PT Indonesia CB 1971 n/a 24
99 Bank Papan Sejahtera Indonesia CB 1980 1997 16
100 Bank Paribas - BBD Indonesia Indonesia CB 1974 2001 21
101 Bank Pembangunan Indonesia (Persero) - BAPINDO Indonesia CB 1951 1998 44
102 Bank Permata Tbk Indonesia CB 1954 n/a 41
103 Bank Prima Express Indonesia CB 1956 2000 39
104 Bank Putra Surya Perkasa Indonesia CB 1980 1997 15
105 Bank Rabobank International Indonesia Indonesia CB 1990 n/a 6
Note: Duration refers to the 1st year in the period. For instance:
AB Bank is first observed in 1995; hence Duration= 1995-1982
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Table A4(d). Bank Names, Countries, Bank Types, Establishm ent Year and Duration.
No Bank Name
106 Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk
107 Bank Rama
108 Bank Sahid Gajah Perkasa
109 Bank Sakura Swadharma
110 Bank Sinarmas
111 Bank Subentra
112 Bank Sumitomo Mitsui Indonesia
113 Bank Surya
114 Bank Tabungan Negara (Persero)
115 Bank Tiara Asia
116 Bank UFJ Indonesia
117 Bank Umum Nasional
118 Bank Umum Servitia
119 Bank Universal
120 Bank UOB Buana
121 Bank Utama (Malaysia) Berhad
122 Banka e Tiranes Sha-Tirana Bank SA
123 Banka Societe Generale Albania Sh.A
124 C Bank-Bankpozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma 
Bankasi AS
125 Banque de 1’ Habitat
126 Banque de Tunisie
127 Banque du Caire SAE
128 Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie
129 Banque Mauritanienne pour le 
Commerce International
130 Banque Misr SAE
131 Banque Nationale Agricole
132 Banque Nationale de Mauritanie
133 Banque Saudi Fransi
134 Barclays Bank - Egypt S.A.E.
135 BBKB.S.C.
136 BLOM Bank Egypt SAE
137 BNP Paribas Egypt (SAE)
138 BRAC Bank Limited
139 BSN Commercial Bank (Malaysia) Berhad
140 Burgan Bank SAK
141 Cairo Amman Bank
Establ Failure
Country Type Year Year Duration
Indonesia CB 1895 n/a 100
Indonesia CB 1967 1999 28
Indonesia CB 1990 1998 5
Indonesia CB 1989 2000 6
Indonesia CB 1989 1997 6
Indonesia CB 1989 1997 6
Indonesia CB 1989 n/a 7
Indonesia CB 1980 1997 15
Indonesia CB 1950 n/a 45
Indonesia CB 1989 1998 6
Indonesia CB 1989 2005 9
Indonesia CB 1952 1997 43
Indonesia CB 1967 1998 28
Indonesia CB 1990 2001 5
Indonesia CB 1956 n/a 39
Malaysia CB 1976 2003 19
Albania CB 1996 n/a 3
Albania CB 2003 n/a 1
Turkey CB 1999 n/a 3
Tunisia CB 1989 n/a 6
Tunisia CB 1884 n/a 111
Egypt CB 1952 n/a 43
Tunisia CB 1976 n/a 19
Mauritania CB 1974 n/a 21
Egypt CB 1920 n/a 75
Tunisia CB 1959 n/a 36
Mauritania CB 1989 n/a 6
Saudi Arabia CB 1977 n/a 18
Egypt CB 1975 n/a 20
Bahrain CB 1971 n/a 24
Egypt CB 1977 n/a 18
Egypt CB 1977 n/a 18
Bangladesh CB 2000 n/a 1
Malaysia CB 1975 2000 20
Kuwait CB 1975 n/a 20
Jordan CB 1960 n/a 35
Note: Duration refers to the 1st year in the period. For instance:
AB Bank is first observed in 1995; hence Duration= 1995-1982
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Table A4(e). Bank Nam es, Countries, Bank Types, Establishm ent Year and Duration.
No Bank Name
42 Capital Bank o f Jordan
43 CIMB Bank Berhad
44 Citibank Berhad
45 City Bank Ltd
46 Commercial Bank International P.S.C.
47 Commercial Bank o f Bahrain B.S.C.
48 Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C.
49 Commercial Bank o f Kuwait SAK (The)
50 Commercial Bank of Qatar (The) QSC
51 Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E.
52 Credit Agricole Egypt
53 Denizbank A.S.
54 Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Bhd.
55 Dhaka Bank Limited
56 Doha Bank
57 Dutch-Bangla Bank Limited
58 Eastern Bank Limited
59 Ege Giyim Sanayicileri Bankasi A.S. - EGS Bank
60 Egyptian American Bank
61 Egyptian Gulf Bank
62 Emirates Bank International PJSC
63 EON Bank Berhad
64 Eon Finance Berhad
65 Esbank Eskisehir Bankasi T.A.S.
66 Etibank AS
67 Export Import Bank o f Bangladesh Limited
68 Faysal Bank Ltd
69 Finansbank A.S.
70 First Gulf Bank
71 Fortis Bank AS
72 GSD Yatirim Bankasi AS
73 Gulf Bank KSC (The)
74 Gulf International Bank BSC
75 Habib Bank Limited
76 Hanil Tamara Bank
77 Hock Hua Bank Bhd
Establ Failure
Country Type Year Year Duration
Jordan CB 1994 n/a 1
Malaysia CB 1971 n/a 24
Malaysia CB 1959 n/a 36
Bangladesh CB 1983 n/a 12
UAE CB 1991 n/a 4
Bahrain CB 1984 2001 11
UAE CB 1969 n/a 26
Kuwait CB 1960 n/a 35
Qatar CB 1975 n/a 20
Egypt CB 1975 n/a 20
Egypt CB 1977 n/a 18
Turkey CB 1938 n/a 61
Malaysia CB 1968 n/a 27
Bangladesh CB 1985 n/a 10
Qatar CB 1979 n/a 16
Bangladesh CB 1995 n/a 1
Bangladesh CB 1992 n/a 3
Turkey CB 1994 2000 1
Egypt CB 1976 2006 19
Egypt CB 1981 n/a 14
UAE CB 1977 n/a 18
Malaysia CB 1963 n/a 32
Malaysia CB 1989 2004 6
Turkey CB 1927 1999 68
Turkey CB 1935 2000 60
Bangladesh CB 1960 n/a 39
Pakistan CB 1994 n/a 1
Turkey CB 1987 n/a 12
UAE CB 1979 n/a 16
Turkey CB 1964 n/a 35
Turkey CB 1998 n/a 1
Kuwait CB 1960 n/a 35
Bahrain CB 1975 n/a 20
Pakistan CB 1941 n/a 54
Indonesia CB 1980 2000 15
Malaysia CB 1951 2000 44
Note: Duration refers to the 1st year in the period. For instance:
AB Bank is first observed in 1995; hence Duration=1995-1982
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Table A4(f). Bank Names, Countries, Bank Types, Establishm ent Year and D uration.
EstabI Failure
No Bank Name Country Type Year Year Duration
177 Hock Hua Bank Bhd Malaysia CB 1951 2000 44
178 Hong Leong Bank Berhad Malaysia CB 1905 n/a 90
179 Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) Jordan CB 1974 n/a 21
180 HSBC Bank A.S. Turkey CB 1990 n/a 10
181 HSBC Bank Egypt S A E Egypt CB 1982 n/a 13
182 HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad Malaysia CB 1884 n/a 111
183 IBJ Indonesia Bank Indonesia CB 1980 2000 15
184 International Finance Investment and Bangladesh CB 1983 n/a 12
Commerce Bank Limited-IFIC Bank Limited 
185 Iktisat Bankasi Turk A.S. Turkey CB 1924 2000 71
186 Indonesia Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Indonesia CB 1991 2000 4
187 Indonesia Eximbank Indonesia CB 1998 n/a 1
188 Indus Bank Limited Pakistan CB 1992 n/a 3
189 ING Bank A.S. Turkey CB 1984 n/a 11
190 Interbank A.S. Turkey CB 1888 2000 107
191 International Bank Malaysia Bhd Malaysia CB 1961 2000 34
192 International Bank o f Qatar Q.S.C. Qatar CB 2000 n/a 1
193 International Bank of Yemen YSC Yemen CB 1979 n/a 16
194 Intesa Sanpaolo Bank Albania Albania CB 1998 n/a 1
195 Invest Bank P.S.C. UAE CB 1975 n/a 20
196 Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited Bangladesh CB 1983 n/a 12
197 Islamic Development Bank o f Brunei Bhd Brunei CB 1994 2006 1
198 Jamuna Bank Ltd Bangladesh CB 2000 n/a 1
199 Janata Bank Limited Bangladesh CB 1972 n/a 23
200 JayaBank International Indonesia CB 1989 1998 6
201 Jordan Ahli Bank Pic Jordan CB 1955 n/a 40
202 Jordan Commercial Bank Jordan CB 1977 n/a 18
203 Jordan Kuwait Bank Jordan CB 1976 n/a 19
204 JP Morgan Chase Bank Berhad Malaysia CB 1994 n/a 1
205 KASB Bank Limited Pakistan CB 1994 n/a 1
206 KentbankA.S. Turkey CB 1992 2001 3
207 KocbankA.S. Turkey CB 1985 2006 13
208 Korfezbank Turkey CB 1987 2001 8
209 Malayan Banking Berhad - Maybank Malaysia CB 1960 n/a 35
210 Mashreqbank UAE CB 1967 n/a 28
211 MCB Bank Limited Pakistan CB 1947 n/a 48
212 Mercantile Bank Limited Bangladesh CB 1998 n/a 1
Note: Duration refers to the 1st year in the period. For instance:
AB Bank is first observed in 1995; hence Duration=1995-1982
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Table A4(g). Bank Nam es, Countries, Bank Types, Establishm ent Year and Duration.
No Bank Name
213 MIBank-MISR International Bank SAE
214 Misr America International Bank
215 Misr Exterior Bank S.A.E.
216 Mohandes Bank
217 Mutual Trust Bank
218 MybankLtd
219 National Bank for Development
220 National Bank Limited
221 National Bank o f Abu Dhabi
222 National Bank o f Bahrain
223 National Bank of Dubai Public Joint 
Stock Company
224 National Bank o f Egypt
225 National Bank o f Fujairah
226 National Bank of Kuwait S. A.K.
227 National Bank of Pakistan
228 RAKBANK-National Bank o f Ras 
Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)
229 National Bank o f Umm Al-Qaiwain
230 National Bank o f Yemen
231 National Commercial Bank (The)
232 National Credit and Commerce Bank Ltd.
233 Nile Bank (The)
234 North Africa International Bank - NAIB
235 OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Berhad
236 Omdurman National Bank
237 One Bank Limited
238 Oriental Bank Berhad
239 Ottoman Bank-Osmanli Bankasi A.S.
240 Overseas Union Bank (Malaysia) Berhad
241 Pacific Bank Berhad
242 Pamukbank T.A.S.
243 PhileoAllied Bank (Malaysia) Berhad
244 PICIC Commercial Bank Limited
245 Piraeus Bank Egypt SAE
246 Premier Bank Ltd (The)
247 Prime Bank Limited
248 PT Bank Bukopin
Establ Failure
Country Type Year Year Duration
Egypt CB 1978 2006 17
Egypt CB 1977 2004 18
Egypt CB 1970 2001 25
Egypt CB 1979 2005 16
Bangladesh CB 1999 n/a 1
Pakistan CB 1962 n/a 33
Egypt CB 1980 n/a 15
Bangladesh CB 1983 n/a 12
UAE CB 1968 n/a 27
Bahrain CB 1957 n/a 38
UAE CB 1963 2009 32
Egypt CB 1898 n/a 97
UAE CB 1982 n/a 13
Kuwait CB 1952 n/a 43
Pakistan CB 1949 n/a 46
UAE CB 1976 n/a 19
UAE CB 1982 n/a 13
Yemen CB 1970 n/a 25
Saudi Arabia CB 1938 n/a 57
Bangladesh CB 1993 n/a 2
Egypt CB 1960 2002 36
Tunisia CB 1984 n/a 11
Malaysia CB 1994 n/a 1
Sudan CB 1993 n/a 2
Pakistan CB 1998 n/a 1
Malaysia CB 1931 2000 64
Turkey CB 1863 2001 132
Malaysia CB 1994 2001 1
Malaysia CB 1919 2000 76
Turkey CB 1955 2001 40
Malaysia CB 1994 2000 1
Pakistan CB 1994 2007 1
Egypt CB 1978 n/a 18
Bangladesh CB 1998 n/a 1
Bangladesh CB 1994 n/a 1
Indonesia CB 1970 n/a 25
Note: Duration refers to the 1st year in the period. For instance:
AB Bank is first observed in 1995; hence Duration= 1995-1982
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Table A4(h). Bank Names, Countries, Bank Types, Establishm ent Year and Duration.
No Bank Name
249 PT Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk
250 PT Bank Mayapada Intemasional TBK
251 PT Bank Mizuho Indonesia
252 PT Bank OCBC Indonesia
253 PT Bank Resona Perdania
254 PT Bank Swadesi Tbk
255 PT Bank UOB Indonesia
256 Pubali Bank Limited
257 Public Bank Berhad
258 Qatar Development Bank Q.S.C.C.
259 Qatar National Bank
260 RHB Bank Berhad
261 RiyadBank
262 Royal Bank of Scotland Berhad (The)
263 Royal Bank o f Scotland Ltd (The)
264 Rupali Bank Limited
265 Sabah Bank Berhad
266 Samba Financial Group
267 Saudi British Bank (The)
268 Saudi Hollandi Bank
269 Saudi Investment Bank (The)
270 Sekerbank T.A.S.
271 Silkbank Limited
272 Societe Arabe Internationale de Banque
273 Societe Tunisienne de Banque
274 Sonali Bank Limited
275 Soneri Bank Limited
276 Southeast Bank Limited
277 Southern Bank Berhad
278 Standard Bank Limited
279 Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad
280 Suez Canal Bank
281 T-Bank-Turkland Bank AS
282 T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S.
283 Tamara Bank
284 Tarisbank - Milli Aydin Bankasi
Establ Failure
Country Type Year Year Duration
Indonesia CB 1955 n/a 40
Indonesia CB 1990 n/a 5
Indonesia CB 1989 n/a 6
Indonesia CB 1996 n/a 1
Indonesia CB 1953 n/a 42
Indonesia CB 1989 n/a 6
Indonesia CB 1989 2010 6
Bangladesh CB 1959 n/a 36
Malaysia CB 1965 n/a 30
Qatar CB 1996 n/a 1
Qatar CB 1964 n/a 31
Malaysia CB 1965 n/a 30
Saudi Arabia CB 1957 n/a 38
Malaysia CB 1905 n/a 91
Pakistan CB 1991 n/a 4
Bangladesh CB 1972 n/a 23
Malaysia CB 1979 n/a 16
Saudi Arabia CB 1980 n/a 15
Saudi Arabia CB 1978 n/a 17
Saudi Arabia CB 1976 n/a 19
Saudi Arabia CB 1976 n/a 19
Turkey CB 1953 n/a 42
Pakistan CB 1995 n/a 1
Egypt CB 1976 n/a 19
Tunisia CB 1957 n/a 38
Bangladesh CB 1972 n/a 23
Pakistan CB 1991 n/a 4
Bangladesh CB 1994 n/a 1
Malaysia CB 1963 2006 32
Bangladesh CB 1998 n/a 1
Malaysia CB 1875 n/a 120
Egypt CB 1978 n/a 17
Turkey CB 1985 n/a 14
Turkey CB 1863 n/a 132
Indonesia CB 1977 1998 18
Turkey CB 1913 1999 82
Note: Duration refers to the 1st year in the period. For instance:
AB Bank is first observed in 1995; hence Duration=I995-1982
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Table A4(i). Bank Nam es, Countries, Bank Types, Establishm ent Year and Duration.
No Bank Name
285 Tekstil Bankasi A.S.-Tekstilbank
286 Tokai Lippo Bank
287 Toprakbank
288 Turk Ekonomi Bankasi A.S.
289 Turkiye Emlak Bankasi A.S.
290 Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S.
291 Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S.
292 Turkiye Imar Bankasi
293 Turkiye is Bankasi A.S. - ISBANK
294 Turkiye Tutunculer Bankasi Yasarbank A.S.
295 Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi TAO
296 Union Bancaire pour le Commerce et 
I’lndustrie SA UBCI
297 Union Bank Limited
298 Union Internationale de Banques
299 Union National Bank
300 Union National Bank - Egypt SAE
301 United Arab Bank PJSC
302 United Bank Ltd.
303 United Bank of Egypt
304 United Commercial Bank Ltd
305 United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd.
306 United Saudi Bank
307 Uttara Bank Limited
308 Wah Tat Bank Berhad
309 Watani Bank for Trade & Investment
310 Workers’ National Bank
311 Yapi Ve Kredi Bankasi A.S.
312 Yemen Commercial Bank
313 Yemen Kuwait Bank for Trade and Investment
314 Yurt Ticaret ve Kredi Bankasi A.S.-Yurtbank
315 Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited
316 A’ayan leasing and investment co
317 ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.)
318 Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co.
319 Affin Islamic Bank Berhad
320 Agricultural Bank of Iran-Bank Keshavarzi
Establ Failure
Country Type Year Year Durat
Turkey CB 1986 n/a 13
Indonesia CB 1989 2001 6
Turkey CB 1992 2001 3
Turkey CB 1927 n/a 72
Turkey CB 1988 2001 9
Turkey CB 1946 n/a 53
Turkey CB 1938 n/a 61
Turkey CB 1928 2003 67
Turkey CB 1924 n/a 77
Turkey CB 1924 1991 71
Turkey CB 1954 n/a 43
Turkey CB 1961 n/a 34
Turkey CB 1991 1996 4
Tunisia CB 1963 n/a 32
UAE CB 1983 n/a 13
Egypt CB 1981 n/a 14
UAE CB 1975 n/a 20
Pakistan CB 1959 n/a 36
Egypt CB 1981 2003 15
Bangladesh CB 1983 n/a 12
Malaysia CB 1993 n/a 2
Saudi Arabia CB 1983 n/a 12
Bangladesh CB 1965 n/a 30
Malaysia CB 1929 2000 66
Yemen CB 1997 2004 1
Sudan CB 1987 n/a 13
Turkey CB 1944 n/a 55
Yemen CB 1993 n/a 2
Yemen CB 1979 n/a 16
Turkey CB 1993 1999 2
Pakistan CB 1961 n/a 35
Kuwait IB 1999 n/a 3
Bahrain IB 1985 n/a 20
UAE IB 1997 n/a 1
Malaysia IB 2005 n/a 1
Iran IB 1908 n/a 88
Note: Duration refers to the 1st year in the period. For instance:
AB Bank is first observed in 1995; hence D uration=l 995-1982
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Table A4(j). Bank Names, Countries, Bank Types, Establishm ent Year and Duration.
No Bank Name
321 AjmanBank
322 A1 Amin Bank
323 A1 Baraka Bank Egypt SAE
324 A1 Baraka Bank Sudan
325 A1 Hilal Bank PJSC
326 A1 Rajhi Bank-Al Rajhi Banking & 
Investment Corporation
327 A1 Rajhi Banking & Investment 
Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad
328 A1 Salam Bank
329 Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C.
330 Albaraka Bank Tunisia
331 Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C.
332 Albaraka Islamic Bank BSC
333 Albaraka Islamic Bank BSC (EC) - 
Pakistan Branches
334 Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi AS- 
Albaraka Turk Participation Bank
335 AlinmaBank
336 Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad
337 Amlslamic Bank Berhad
338 Amlak Finance PJSC
339 Arab Islamic Bank
340 Arcapita Bank B.S.C.
341 Aref Investment Group
342 Asian Finance Bank Berhad
343 Bank Asya-Asya Katilim Bankasi AS
345 Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C.
346 BAMIS-Banque A1 Wava Mauritanienne 
Islamique
347 Bank AlBilad
348 Bank Islam Brunei Darussalam Berhad
349 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
350 Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad
351 Bank o f Khartoum
352 Bank Syariah Mandiri
353 Banklslami Pakistan Limited
354 Boubyan Bank KSC
355 Capivest
356 CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad
Establ Failure
Country Type Year Year Duration
UAE IB 2007 n/a 1
Bahrain IB 1987 2007 13
Egypt IB 1980 n/a 15
Sudan IB 1984 n/a 17
UAE IB 2007 n/a 1
Saudi Arabia IB 1988 n/a 7
Malaysia IB 2005 n/a 1
Sudan IB 2005 n/a 1
Sudan IB 2005 n/a 1
Tunisia IB 1983 n/a 11
Bahrain IB 2002 n/a 1
Bahrain IB 1984 n/a 10
Pakistan IB 2002 n/a 1
Turkey IB 1984 n/a 17
Saudi Arabia IB 2007 n/a 1
Malaysia IB 1994 n/a 14
Malaysia IB 1976 n/a 30
UAE IB 2000 n/a 4
Palestine IB 1995 n/a 8
Bahrain IB 1996 n/a 1
Kuwait IB 1975 n/a 31
Malaysia IB 2005 n/a 1
Turkey IB 1996 n/a 5
Bahrain IB 1979 n/a 16
Mauritania IB 1985 n/a 13
Saudi Arabia IB 2004 n/a 1
Brunei IB 2005 n/a 1
Malaysia IB 1983 n/a 12
Malaysia IB 1998 n/a 1
Sudan IB 1913 n/a 84
Indonesia IB 1999 n/a 1
Pakistan IB 2003 n/a 1
Kuwait IB 2004 n/a 1
Bahrain IB 2003 n/a 2
Malaysia IB 2003 n/a 2
Note: Duration refers to the 1st year in the period. For instance: 
AB Bank is first observed in 1995; hence Duration=l995-1982
3.8 Appendix 247
Table A4(k). Bank Names, Countries, Bank Types, Establishm ent Year and Duration.
Establ Failure
No Bank Name Country Type Year Year Durat
357 Citi Islamic Investment Bank Bahrain IB 1996 n/a 9
358 Dubai Bank UAE IB 2001 n/a 1
359 Dubai Islamic Bank pic UAE IB 1975 n/a 20
360 Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC UAE IB 1976 n/a 19
361 EONCAP Islamic Bank Berhad Malaysia IB 2005 n/a 1
362 Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) Sudan IB 1978 n/a 27
363 Faisal Islamic Bank o f Egypt Egypt IB 1977 n/a 18
364 First Finance Company (Q.S.C.) Qatar IB 2004 n/a 1
365 First Habib Modaraba Pakistan IB 1985 n/a 18
366 First Investment Company K.S.C.C. Kuwait IB 1997 n/a 6
367 First National Bank Modaraba Pakistan IB 2003 n/a 2
368 Global Banking Corporation BSC Bahrain IB 2006 n/a 1
369 Gulf Finance House BSC Bahrain IB 1999 n/a 1
370 Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad Malaysia IB 2005 n/a 1
371 Ihlas Finans Kurumu A.S. Turkey IB 1994 2001 1
372 IIB-Intemational Investment Bank B.S.C. Bahrain IB 2003 n/a 2
373 International Investor Company, K.S.C. (The) Kuwait IB 1992 n/a 3
374 Investment Dar Co (The) Kuwait IB 1994 n/a 7
375 Investors Bank BSC Bahrain IB 1997 n/a 6
376 Islamic Bank o f Brunei bhd. Brunei IB 1980 2006 17
377 Islamic Bank o f Yemen for Finance & Investment Yemen IB 1995 n/a 3
378 Islamic Co-operative Development Bank Sudan IB 1982 n/a 14
379 Islamic International Arab Bank Jordan IB 1997 n/a 1
380 Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahrain) Bahrain IB 1997 2000 1
381 Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan IB 1978 n/a 17
382 Khaleeji Commercial Bank Bahrain IB 2003 n/a 1
383 Kuwait Turkish Participation Bank Inc- Turkey IB 1989 n/a 10
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S.
384 Kuwait Finance House Bahrain IB 1977 n/a 25
385 Kuwait Finance House Kuwait IB 1977 n/a 18
386 Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad Malaysia IB 2005 n/a 1
387 Kuwait International Bank Kuwait IB 1973 n/a 22
388 Masraf A1 Rayan (Q.S.C.) Qatar IB 2005 n/a 1
389 Maybank Islamic Berhad Malaysia IB 2007 n/a 1
390 Meezan Bank Limited Pakistan IB 1997 n/a 3
391 Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar IB 1990 n/a 5
392 Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ Qatar IB 1982 n/a 13
Note: Duration refers to the 1st year in the period. For instance:
AB Bank is first observed in 1995; hence Duration= 1995-1982
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Table A4(l). Bank Names, Countries, Bank Types, Establishm ent Year and Duration.
No Bank Name
393 RHB Islamic Bank Berhad
394 Saba Islamic Bank
395 Seera Investment Bank BSC
396 Shahjalal Islami Bank Ltd
397 Shamil Bank o f Bahrain B.S.C.
398 Shamil Bank o f Yemen & Bahrain
399 Sharjah Islamic Bank
400 Standard Chartered Modaraba
401 Sudanese Islamic Bank
402 Tadamon Islamic Bank
403 Tadhamon International Islamic Bank
404 Tamweel PJSC
405 Islamic Development Bank of Brunei Bhd
406 United bank o f Albania
407 The oriental bank
408 Bank Maskan
409 Bank Mellat
410 Bank Melli Iran
411 Bank o f Industry and Mine
412 BankPasargad
413 Bank Refah
414 Bank Saderat Iran
415 Bank Sepah
416 BankTejarat
417 EN Bank-Eghtesad Novin Bank PJSC





Country Type Year Year Duration
Malaysia IB 2004 n/a 1
Yemen IB 1997 n/a 5
Bahrain IB 2006 n/a 1
Bangladesh IB 2000 n/a 1
Bahrain IB 1982 2010 13
Yemen IB 2001 n/a 1
UAE IB 1975 n/a 20
Pakistan IB 1987 n/a 18
Sudan IB 1977 n/a 23
Sudan IB 1981 n/a 14
Yemen IB 1995 n/a 1
UAE IB 1975 n/a 28
Brunei IB 1994 n/a 1
Albania IB 2000 2004 1
Bangladesh IB 1987 2004 8
Iran IB 1938 n/a 59
Iran IB 1980 n/a 15
Iran IB 1928 n/a 69
Iran IB 1979 n/a 19
Iran IB 2004 n/a 1
Iran IB 1960 n/a 37
Iran IB 1952 n/a 43
Iran IB 1925 n/a 70
Iran IB 1979 n/a 16
Iran IB 2000 n/a 1
Iran IB 1991 n/a 5
Iran IB 1979 n/a 20
Iran IB 2000 n/a 1
Iran IB 1999 n/a 1
Note: Duration refers to the 1st year in the period. For instance: 
AB Bank is first observed in 1995; hence Duration= 1995-1982
Chapter 4 
Financial Markets Synchronization and 
Contagion
A bstract
In this chapter we examine the synchronization of the 2007 financial crisis upon 
the stock markets of 55 countries over the 2001-2011 period. The GCC are compared 
against other country groups, consisting of developed and developing countries, in terms 
of duration and intensity of the crisis. We adopt a DCC-GARCH framework with Markov- 
Switching (MS) models. The DCC framework enables us to investigate for financial conta­
gion evidence in the largest sample of countries so far. The contribution of the MS model 
is an endogenous identification of the country-specific crisis transition dates, which relaxes 
the assumption that all countries were affected at the same time. Our main findings can be 
summarized as follows. We find variation in the crisis transition dates and intensity scores 
of the examined countries. Our results are supportive of financial contagion for both devel­
oped and developing countries due to the 2007 financial crisis. The developed markets are 
hit sooner and more fiercely than the developing markets. Industrialized economies weath­
ered the crisis better. Two case studies of EU-27 and the GCC are provided. The EU-27 
shows evidence of varying integration with the New Members being affected at a signifi­
cant lag. The GCC financial sector shows significant evidence of financial contagion. Yet 
it shows minimal synchronization with global financial markets as evidenced by one of the 
lowest crisis intensity measures. The timely and efficient policy response of the GCC cou-
249
4.1 Introduction 250
pled with the better capitalized and more liquid banking system has insulated the region 
from the adverse effects o f the global turmoil.
4.1 Introduction
The co-movement of financial markets widely affects investors’ decisions, policy implica­
tions and economic growth. Early studies have documented the benefits of international 
diversification in terms of risk reduction due to the low correlations that exist among eq­
uity markets (Grubel 1968; Levy and Sarnat 1970; Grubel and Fadner 1971). However, as 
financial integration increases globally across time the links among financial markets be­
come stronger. Economic shocks can now be transmitted more easily across markets giving 
rise to financial contagion (Ordonez 2006). Increased correlations during volatile periods 
are documented in Lin, Engle and Ito (1994) among others, with the study of correlations 
being the most widely used method of assessing the degree of financial market synchro­
nization. Financial contagion studies are of special interest as recent financial crises such 
as, the Mexico peso crisis in 1994, the East-Asian crisis in 1997, the Russian default in 
1998, the dot.com bubble in 2001 and the 2007 financial crisis have shown that diversifica­
tion benefits follow a downward trend across time.
Developing markets have attracted investors’ attention as they are less correlated 
to the global financial markets. Yet during financial crises, the monetary dependence of 
developing markets upon developed, due to the developing countries receiving of invest­
ments, goods and services from developed countries, would erode any diversification ben­
efits as developing countries are affected by financial contagion as well. The decoupling
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hypothesis relates to such investor benefits arising from low correlations between devel­
oping and developed financial markets. Evidence documented in Bekaert (1995), Dooley 
and Hutchinson (2009), Christoffersen et al. (2010) and Syllignakis and Kouretas (2011) 
among others show decreasing support for the decoupling hypothesis in recent years.
In this chapter we study the synchronization of the 2007 financial crisis by comparing 
and contrasting developed and developing countries. Special emphasis is given on the 
GCC, one of the most homogenous51 groups of countries forming an economic association, 
and the EU (IMF 2010). The contributions of the chapter are as follows:
Adopting a DCC-GARCH and Markov-Switching model framework enables us to 
identify which countries were affected earlier or later. Other studies so far have settled 
for an exogenous date assuming that all countries are affected simultaneously. Dynamic 
Conditional Correlation (DCC) models have been used in the analysis of co-movements 
and contagion (Cho and Parhizgari 2008; Yiu et al, 2010; Naoui et al. 2010). The main 
advantages of DCC-GARCH models are their ability to capture the time varying nature of 
volatilities and correlations while being computationally feasible even for a large number 
o f assets. We have adopted a correlation approach to test for contagion effects as this would 
allow us to study how synchronized the markets are; whereas other approaches (e.g. probit) 
would not be suitable. Markov-Switching Regime models, introduced by Hamilton (1994), 
provide an appealing framework to accommodate crisis events and non-linearities. Stock 
markets entering a different regime (affecting volatilities, correlations and business cycles) 
during crises can be due to their sharing similar economic conditions. Additionally, correct
51 H om ogenous in term s o f  com m on history, language, culture, resources and econom ical activity m ainly 
focused in carbonhydrates. In addition, the GCC have pegged currencies to the US dollar.
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identification o f the current regime has policy and financial applications (e.g. Quantitative 
Easing, Portfolio Management). We find that the financial crisis is experienced by all 
countries in our sample within a time frame of about 18 months.
Secondly, as simple statistical verification of financial contagion cannot encompass 
the full extent of the financial crisis upon a country we introduce measures of duration 
and intensity. A general finding is that developing countries, although they show support­
ive evidence of financial contagion, experience it later and not as severely as developed 
countries.
A third contribution is the differentiation of financial contagion into regional and 
global. We identify country groups (e.g. Core EU) that show evidence of regional conta­
gion as the countries therein become more aligned between themselves. By contrast other 
country groups (e.g. GCC) exhibit global contagion as their members show increased cor­
relations with countries outside of their country group too. The finding provides supportive 
evidence o f a two-speed EU integration process which is consistent with the core-periphery 
framework (Camacho et al. 2008). We also find that industrialized countries weathered the 
crisis better than those with prominent financial sectors.
Similarities and differences between the GCC and the EU in light of the financial 
crisis are noteworthy. The GCC are a very uniform group, even when compared to the 
Core EU. However the GCC are affected by the crisis at a year lag compared to the Core 
EU. Moreover the crisis intensity is much lower than the Core EU and can be compared to 
that of the most recently accepted member states. In addition the GCC are among the least 
affected countries and they managed to maintain positive GDP growth amidst the crisis
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mainly due to two reasons; the revenue diversification projects to reduce the countries’ 
dependence on oil revenue and the financially strong banking sector relative to developing 
and some developed economies (i.e. New Members of the EU). The banking system has 
benefited by the presence of Islamic banks whose ideals on risk-sharing, linkages to real 
assets and shunning of conventional debt instruments offers a safer approach compared to 
what transpired in the US and Europe.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: In section 2 we provide a liter­
ature review on financial contagion studies. Section 3 introduces the adopted methodology 
while section 4 presents the data. Results are presented and discussed in section 5 while 
section 6 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
In this section we provide a literature review around the concepts of integration, contagion 
the studies that have analyzed these concepts and the methodologies used therein. The 
section is divided in four sub-sections. The first two subsections provide background infor­
mation on the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (GCC). 
Subsection three focuses presents the definitions of contagion, the differences from inte­
gration and the implications of the decoupling hypothesis for developing economies in the 
recent years. The last subsection reviews the econometric methodologies that have been 
used in the context and their key findings.
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4.2.1 The European Union
Since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the EU has moved forward by implementing mea­
sures to foster economic growth and increase integration among all participating countries. 
Common legislation and common policies are only a few of the measures that have been 
implemented. In the 21st century the EU has expanded in two stages to include several new 
members and there are plans to expand even further. Paramount to the integration process 
was the adoption of the Euro, the common currency by many of the EU-27 countries with 
more planning to join later. The European Union (EU) sets as a priority the integration 
and efficient functioning of the financial system in Europe52. Financial integration is es­
sential to ensure the effectiveness of any monetary policy in the EU and specifically in the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) or Eurozone. Financial stability is also enhanced by 
the promotion of a Single Market, of which financial integration is essential (ECB 2011). 
Integration leads to highly efficient financial systems that increase opportunities for port­
folio diversification, rate of return and enhances risk-sharing. By contrast, integration does 
not necessarily increase stability. Indeed, high interconnectedness of financial markets al­
lows for cross-border transmission of shocks thus spreading the crisis to other sectors or 
countries leading to contagion.
In the years leading up to the financial crisis, the capital markets in EU were in­
creasing and becoming more uniform in terms of market size. During 2000 -  2005 capital 
markets in EU grew by 9% as opposed to 6% for the US while at the same time finan­
cial integration indicators (i.e. bond yields, CDS spreads, cross-border holding of equities,
52 F inancial integration is a priority for the Eurosystem . See m ission statem ent at: www.ecb.europa.eu
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spread of the overnight EONIA lending rates across countries) suggested that integration is 
increasing. Therefore, the "experiment" is deemed as successful and the expansion of the 
EU is the next step. In two expansion phases in 2004 and 2007 the number of EU members 
leaps from 15 to 27. New members share common elements but have also significant dif­
ferences among themselves. The level of financial integration varies across countries and 
is higher the closer the market is to the single monetary policy (ECB 2010). Cyprus has 
2 times higher GDP per capita than Poland while the stock markets of the former mem­
bers of the Soviet Union have very small market capitalization relative to the rest of the 
EU. Despite the differences many of the New Members opted for a further step of inte­
gration by joining the EMU as well. The fact that all these developments took place in a 
favorable economic climate helped to masquerade the build-up o f vulnerabilities and omis­
sions53. The drawbacks of integration were also given less attention due to the lack of past 
evidence relating high calibre economies to costly crises (Ferguson et al. 2007).
The financial crisis, especially after the Lehman Brothers collapse, affected EU fi­
nancial markets to different degrees causing a reversal of the integration tendency in the 
money markets to retrench within national markets. The tendency was exacerbated for the 
members of the EMU that having lost the independence of their monetary policy they came 
across worsening fiscal balances, lack of competitiveness and soaring public debt. As a
53 For exam ple, different m arkets (capital, retail, labor m arkets) w ere integrating at different speeds. The 
Eurozone also has the inherent flaw o f  the Inconsistent Trinity under w hich a country can only have tw o o f  the 
fo llow ing three at the sam e time: a) fixed exchange rate; b) free capital m ovem ent; c) independent m onetary 
policy. The Eurozone definitely has the two first and the third is arguable. A  country cannot print m oney but 
given the convergence o f  the capital m arkets it could borrow  m oney (bond m arkets or securitization products) 
at m uch low er interest rates than its fundam entals would suggest. In the case o f  Greece, the extra m oney in 
the econom y was diverted to consum ption rather than productive purposes that could strengthen the coun try ’s 
econom y and increase its com petitiveness.
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result, money markets started pricing differently the perceived risks (a mixture o f credit, 
sovereign, political and liquidity risk) in different parts o f the EMU and EU leading to di­
vergence in bond yields and CDS spreads. Actions taken by the EU (ECB accepting bonds 
of lower credit rating as collateral) to avoid bankruptcy of Greece and potential contagion 
effects in the EU are of dubious results.
4.2.2 The Gulf Cooperation Council
The superior economic performance of the GCC relative to other developing economies 
as well as the increased integration they have achieved compared to other Middle East­
ern countries is remarkable (UNDP 2002). The GCC states show significant homogeneity 
among them on various geopolitical, macroeconomic and institutional aspects (IMF 2005). 
At first the six countries54 share the same language and history. In terms o f monetary con­
vergence, all GCC states have generally low inflation rates compared to other developing 
countries (IMF 2005). In addition, they all maintain long-standing fixed exchange rates 
to the US dollar with Kuwait being the only exception after switching to an undisclosed 
basket of currencies in May 2007. The remarkable exchange rate stability given the liber­
alized financial sector has led to co-movements in the interest rates and similar sovereign 
creditworthiness (ECB 2005).
Certainly, the dependence of the countries on energy related exports reduces the like­
lihood of asymmetric shocks as the countries’ dynamics and trade patterns are generally in 
phase. The GCC has about 42% and 23% of the world’s oil and gas reserves. Flowever as
54 B ahrain, Kuwait, Om an, Qatar, Saudi A rabia and the UAE
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they are not equally spread among the country members, the necessity of the countries to 
diversify their sources of revenue varies (see table 1).
[Table 1 here]
Bahrain’s reserves are depleted and the government has invested in promoting the 
Kingdom’s financial services and banking industry, particularly Islamic finance. In the 
UAE additional revenue sources are tourism, real estate and transport. Bahrain and the 
UAE have the lowest dependency on hydrocarbons. By contrast, Saudi Arabia, with about 
25% of the world’s oil reserves remains geared towards oil related products. Kuwait and 
Qatar have taken significant steps to diversify into finance and manufacturing respectively. 
Oman still needs to catch-up with the attempts of revenue diversification.
The GCC is considered an open economy with about 50% of the exports going to 
Asia, mainly Japan, China and South Korea. In the meantime 2/3 of the imports come 
from the EU and Asia. Notably there is very limited trade taking place among the GCC 
members, a result attributed to the similar economic conditions (ECB 2005).
The financial system is mainly bank-based yet profitable, well-capitalised and re­
silient particularly when compared to neighboring countries (Johnes et a l 2012; ECB 
2005). However capital markets are classified as small and illiquid according to MSCI, 
a major provider of financial services55. Development o f the financial system is taking 
place with computerised trading infrastructure being introduced and restrictions to invest­
ment ceilings for foreign investors being lifted. Bond markets have also been developed 
both for standard bonds and Islamic type bonds (sukuk) where the GCC is competes with
55 h ttp ://w w w .m sci.com /products/indices/country_and_regional/fm /
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Malaysia, another financial centre for Islamic finance products. Nevertheless, secondary 
bond markets are still in infancy.
During the period leading to the financial crisis the stock markets in the region grew 
almost seven times reaching more than a trillion USD in 2007. Despite the growth in 
the sector, the GCC still remains relatively isolated from global financial markets yet it 
appears integrated regionally. It would be expected that countries which are in the process 
o f adopting a common currency would show evidence of financial integration. In that sense 
co-movements would be observed in their financial indicators and in the financial context, 
correlation between the stock markets of the region would have been reasonably high. This 
has been verified by many studies addressing the issue from various perspectives. Assaf 
(2003) verifies this by finding evidence of interdependence in the GCC markets over the 
1997 — 2000 period. Co-integration among subsets of the GCC is verified by Hassan (2003) 
and Al-Khazali et al. (2006). Yet, a study including all six GCC countries fails to find 
strong evidence of co-movement in all of the markets. It is plausible that some countries 
are still lagging behind in terms of financial integration which is suggestive of possible 
risk diversification benefits arising from investments in the region (Marasdeh and Shrestha 
2010). In a related context Sipson and Evans (2004) find that the main drivers of the GCC 
are Saudi Arabia and Kuwait whereas a comparison between the GCC and MENA region, 
Alkulaib et al. (2009) find that the GCC appear as more homogenous and more integrated. 
Despite the evidence in favour of the regional integration, there are also studies verifying 
the seclusion of the GCC from the global markets. In particular, Abraham et al. (2001) find 
very low correlations between Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and the USA. Around the
4.2 Literature Review 259
same notion is the study o f Muhammad (2007) that finds no connection between GCC and 
European stock markets.
4.2.3 Financial Integration and Contagion
Financial integration is a process of convergence in financial markets, consumption and 
saving patterns and institutional differences. The process would ensure that identical assets 
have the same returns, an application of the law of one price, irrespective of geographical 
location (Pungulescu 2009). Worldwide integration due to globalization is evident by the 
higher sensitivity of country returns to EU-wide and US shocks (Baele et al. 2004). The in­
tegration is magnified through the expansion of the EU as well as the monetary convergence 
with the adoption of a single currency. As a result business cycles appear to be in phase 
and previously isolated financial markets align themselves to global markets (Adjaoute and 
Danthine 2004). The EU is the most frequently studies market with studies addressing the 
integration between New Member states and the rest of Europe (Westermann 2004; Moore 
2007) or how the adoption of the common currency has affected the integration process 
(Hardouvelis et al. 2006; Bekaert ^  a/. 2010). Integration analyses for groups of countries 
(like the CEE) or specific countries from the EU-27 are given among others by Moore and 
Wang (2007), Voronkova (2004) and Syriopoulos (2007). The common denominator in all 
the case studies is that the newly acquired developing markets have become more synchro­
nized with the rest of EU, a fact that could have negative consequences in times of crises 
as all countries would respond to the same economic shocks aggravating the effect of the 
crisis.
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Different definitions of contagion exist according to the methodology adopted and 
the framework used to identify and measure it. For example, contagion can be defined as 
a rise in the probability of a country experiencing a crisis given that a crisis has occurred 
in another country, this being a definition that usually relates to exchange rates (Eichgreen 
et al. 1999). Alternatively, contagion definitions can relate to the volatility spillovers 
among financial markets that arise because of increased uncertainty during turbulent times. 
The spillovers from one market to another no longer reflect economic fundamentals; thus 
they allow for a more intensified inter-relation than expected (Rodriguez 2007; Boyer et 
al. 1997). A third definition, perhaps the most widely used, is provided by Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) who suggest that following an economic shock in one country, an increase 
in cross-market linkages is observed. This ‘so called shift-contagion’ manifests itself as a 
significant increase in the correlation between market returns (Forbes and Rigobon 2002). 
Contagion definitions are by no means complete and Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) provide 
five definitions that have been documented in the literature. Moreover, definitions on conta­
gion are evolving and tend to be reflective of recent developments in econometrics. Hence, 
the increase in the intensity of jumps in a market which is then transmitted to another mar­
ket (cross-excitation) is documented in Ait-Sahalia et al. (2010).
Contagion starts from a financial crisis to which many countries become aligned to. 
The reasons for alignement can relate to economic fundamentals, financial linkages or be 
o f behavioral nature. Crises that are based on economic fundamentals comprise changes 
in interest rates, commodity prices and trade flows. Such shocks could cause financial 
market co-movements and reversal of capital flows from developed to developing countries
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or even between countries o f the same development level (Calvo et a l  1996). In addition, 
the bad economic fundamentals of a countiy can be put in the spotlight and investors start 
worrying about countries exhibiting similar characteristics increasing the likelihood of the 
crisis spreading to another country (Masson 1999). Thus, for example, when the cause 
o f the recent economic crisis in Greece was traced to the country’s chronic fiscal problems 
concerning its budget deficit and national debt, there was a fear that contagion effects would 
be felt in other countries with similar characteristics such as Italy and Portugal and both of 
these countries experienced significant increases in their borrowing costs. Trade flows is 
also an important factor that can turn a crisis into contagion by affecting the level of exports 
o f a country and thus reducing its revenues (Gelos and Sahay 2001). Reduced demand 
for the goods and services in a country is likely to hamper the economic fundamentals. 
Contagion via trade flows is more likely to be relevant for developing economies where 
the financial markets are not fully developed. Empirical evidence in support of this claim 
include Krzak (1998) who finds that after the Russian default crisis, the CEE countries 
were most affected via trade routes. In addition, Forbes (2004) finds that 46 countries with 
exposure to Russia and East Asia during the respective crises were primarily affected via 
trade linkages.
Behavioral reasons responsible for contagion comprise investors recalling past bad 
experiences and subsequently shifts in their confidence on the markets as well as ad­
justments on their expectations (Mullainathan 2002). Investor perceptions about market 
prospects can then cause a crisis to be transmitted to another country on the basis of herd­
ing behavior (Calvo and Mendoza 1998). Under this scenario, asymmetric information
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between different types of investors; for example, hedge funds, institutional investors and 
noise traders, correlates the behavior between the least and most informed, thereby desta­
bilizing the system further (Calvo 1998; Dehove 2003).
As contagion is mainly a financial market phenomenon, countries with active and 
liquid markets as well as cross-border trading activity, in terms o f international portfolio 
holdings and cross-market hedges, are more prone to it (Calvo, 1998). Bond and stock 
markets become more and more responsive to common factors increasing systemic risk in 
the economy. Increased integration with banks being common lenders to several countries 
and recent developments in financial products such as securitization products (e.g. credit 
default swaps) create new transmission channels allowing the crisis to spread from the tur­
bulent markets to unaffected ones (Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000). Bilateral bank holdings 
and cross-holdings of equity and bonds have grown by about 40%, 62% and 97% respec­
tively within the EMU since the latters establishment (Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2010; Lane 
2006). A study of Brezigar-Masten et al. (2010) verifies that investment in asset-backed 
securities prior to the 2007 financial crisis in the US was aided by increasing financial inte­
gration and cross-border investments. In addition, investors readjusting their expectations 
can lead to portfolio rebalancing and the withdrawal from positions, or markets, that are 
considered too risky (Kodres and Pritsker 2002). This starts a liquidation procedure which 
can be intensified by margin calls or regulatory requirements that need to be met (Sbracia 
and Zaghini 2003). Banks’ adjustments of capitalization and leverage ratios especially in a 
climate o f falling stock market prices can have an escalating effect upon contagion as liq­
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uidity is restricted and the effects propagated to financially sound sectors of the economy 
(Davis 2008).
Baele (2005) examined the relationship between integration and vulnerability o f stock 
markets to shocks over the period from 1980 to 2001 in the EU and his results showed ev­
idence of increased integration over the time period under investigation and also revealed 
an increase in the intensity of contagion across time.
In contrast, developing markets in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) along with 
those in Portugal, Greece and Ireland were found to be less affected by previous crises - the 
East Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian collapse of 1998, the Brazilian devaluation of 1999 
and the dot.com bubble of 2000 - than were the rest of Europe, a fact that was attributed to 
their lower degree of integration with the EU-15 (Serwa and Bohl 2005). In a similar vein, 
Gelos and Sahay (2001) reported that the developing CEE markets were less affected by the 
1994 Mexican and 1997 East Asian crises than developed markets. The study o f Carrieri, 
Errunza and Hogan (2007) finds that developing markets have not shown any evidence of 
contagion during the financial crises of the 1997-2000 period.
However as these developing markets progress in their economic and financial inte­
gration within the EU, an increasing alignment of their financial markets with the EU-15 
is observed (Kocenda et a l  2008). In this light, Syriopoulos (2004) documents that CEE 
markets show stronger linkages with the developed EU than amongst themselves. After 
the accession of the CEE countries in the EU, cross-country linkages increase even further 
(Christiansen and Ranaldo 2008). The increased interconnectedness of developing and de­
veloped markets will give rise to contagion effects when a crisis hits the economy and de­
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veloped markets may not be as insulated as they were supposed to be (Grubel 1968; Levy 
and Samat 1970; Grubel and Fadner 1970). Indeed, Eiling and Gerard (2011) conclude 
that contagion effects have been verified in developing markets during the recent financial 
crises. In a more recent study, Hesse and Frank (2009) find that developing markets have 
not been as insulated during the East Asian and Russian crises from the developed markets 
as during previous crises. They support their arguments by identifying rising correlations 
between developing and developed markets, a finding verified also by Walti (2010).
For developed markets, evidence is more clear-cut as many studies find evidence in 
support o f contagion (Longin and Solnik 1995; Bekaert et al. 2010).
4.2.4 The Econometrics of Contagion
Empirical research in the field of financial contagion suffers from problems related to small 
country samples as most studies are confined to the US, EU and the East Asian economies 
(De Bandt and Hartmann 2000). In addition, defining the crisis periods in an arbitrary 
way as well as the different definitions of contagion can undermine the validity of the 
results (Dungey and Tambakis 2003). Modelling of contagion has followed a diversity of 
econometric approaches including, but not limited to, binary outcome models, correlation 
analysis of asset returns, multivariate GARCH modelling and extreme value theory.
One of the first approaches in modelling contagion is the estimation of the probability 
of a country being in crisis, given that another country is already in crisis, while control­
ling for certain fundamentals such as competitiveness dilferentials (Forbes 2004). Eichen- 
green et al. (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) offer contagion applications within this
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framework. Thus, for example, within the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), 
speculative attacks are likely to propagate to other countries within the mechanism once a 
country has been the subject of speculative pressures (Eichengreen et al. 1996). Probit and 
Logit models have been used by Carramazza et al. (2000) and Van Rijkeghem and Weder
(2001). They study the impact of various macroeconomic factors upon their contribution to 
the likelihood of a developing country to experience a crisis with their focus being on the 
period encompassing the Mexican, East Asian and Russian crises.
An alternative econometric approach is given within a correlation analysis frame­
work. Tests for "shift contagion" typically boil down to some sort of statistical test for the 
significance of any observed change between a stable period and a crisis one. Goetzmann 
and Rouwenhorst (2001) find evidence of rising integration since 1850 especially towards 
the end of the 2Qth century. Bekaert and Harvey (2003) conclude that integration is ris­
ing between 1960 - 1990 for equity markets. Yet Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue that 
gradually rising correlations are sign of integration in financial markets and should not be 
confused with contagion which is a by-product of financial crises. Two studies relating 
correlation analysis with contagion identification are those of King and Wadhwani (1990) 
and Lee and Kwang (1993) who tested for contagion across major stock markets follow­
ing the 1987 US crash. They found evidence of this as inter-country correlations rose, on 
average, by 69%. Of course, this methodology is not confined to stock market contagion 
and it has, for example, been used to uncover contagion between stock and bond markets 
in the wake of the 1994 Mexican crisis (Calvo et al. 1996). Similarly, Baig and Goldfajn 
(1998) found contagion both between stock and bond markets as well as exchange and in­
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terest rates after the 1997 East Asian crisis. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) have criticized this 
rather simple method of correlation analysis as it does not account for the volatility in the 
financial markets. They construct a correlation coefficient robust to time-varying volatility 
levels but its application fails to verify any previous evidence of contagion. One drawback 
o f their measure, as noted by Cho and Parhizgari (2008) is that it treats correlation as time 
invariant.
O f particular interest are the applications of multivariate GARCH modelling to con­
tagion. The seminal paper of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) only revealed evidence of interde­
pendence among stock markets and not contagion. However, their conclusion can, in part, 
be explained by their failure to capture the time varying nature of the correlation among 
stock markets Cho and Parhizgari (2008). Prior to the introduction of DCC-GARCH mod­
els by Engle (2002), these were either assumed to be constant or their estimation would 
suffer from the dimensionality curse, as witnessed by VEC and BEKK models. As a con­
sequence most work has been restricted to a limited number of countries. For instance, 
Hamao et al. (1990) test for contagion between Japan, the UK and the US in the wake of 
the 1987 US crash while Edwards and Susmel (2003) focused on how the Mexican deval­
uation of 1994 manifested itself on the bond markets of Argentina and Chile. Due to the 
difficulties imposed by these models in modelling correlations, many studies were sufficed 
to test for volatility spillovers and draw conclusions based on these results. Hence, Kanas 
(1998) and Christiansen (2007) are able to verify significant volatility spillovers among the 
largest European stock markets and from the US to European bond markets respectively.
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DCC-GARCH models were introduced separately by Engle (2002) and Tse and Tsui 
(2002) with the two approaches differing only in the way the conditional correlation matrix 
is parameterized. Extensions of DCC-GARCH models can be divided in two categories. 
First there is the model employed to identify the asymmetric effects on volatility, with the 
univariate GARCH being superseded by EGARCH, PARCH and TARCH models. The 
second relates to the estimator itself with the corrected DCC-GARCH model proposed 
by Aielli (2009) providing an alternative, asymptotically unbiased, estimator. Note though 
that the bias of the DCC-GARCH estimator is negligible in samples with less than 89 assets 
(Caporin and McAleer 2010).
Most o f the research on financial contagion using multivariate GARCH models has 
focused on exchange rates (Khalid and Rajaguru 2005), bond markets (Coudert and Gex 
2010)or stock markets (Bertero and Mayer 1989; King and Wadhwani 1990). Chiang et al. 
(2007) investigated nine East Asian exchanges from 1990 to 2003 using a DCC-GARCH 
framework and found evidence of contagion after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, as did 
Cho and Parhizgari (2008) using a larger sample of 14 countries. Likewise, Yiu et al 
(2010) and Naoui et al. (2010) found evidence of contagion between the US and East 
Asia for the East Asian, dot.com and financial crises between 1993 and 2010 and during 
the 2005 to 2010 financial crisis respectively using similar approach. Naoui et al. (2010) 
documents evidence supporting high interdependence between developed and developing 
financial markets. During the 2007 financial crisis any international diversification bene­
fits have disappeared according to Dooley and Hutchinson (2009) while Frank and Hesse
(2009) generalise this finding to other financial crises as well. For the CEE region, Chmiel-
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wska (2010) provides supportive evidence of contagion for the stock and bond markets over 
the period from 2008 to 2010. Syllignakis and Kouretas (2011) verify contagion effects by 
means of a DCC-GARCH approach for the developing CEE markets over the 1997-2009 
period, which encompasses the East Asian, Russian and the 2007 financial crisis. Sim­
ilarly, Hwang et al. (2010) find supportive evidence o f contagion for the developed EU 
stock markets.
One o f the major compromises in most of the past studies relates to the identification 
o f the crisis start date and the implicit assumption that all examined countries experience it 
at the same time. For example, when dating the onset o f the recent financial crisis several 
studies have used the August 1st 2007 which corresponds to the burst o f the US housing 
bubble or other cut-off dates such as the collapse o f Lehman Brothers at September 15th 
2008 (Hwang et al. 2010). Markov regime switching models introduced by Hamilton 
(1994) offer an endogenous determination o f the transition date between regimes w hilst, 
at the same time, accounting for non-linearities, in the shock transmission process. This 
approach has been documented by, inter alia, Baele (2005), Pelletier (2006) and Billio 
et al. (2005). Baele (2005) highlights the advantages o f Markov-switching models in 
identifying regime changes as opposed to standard GARCH proceedures. The first of these 
authors examined the volatility spillovers from the US to 13 European stock markets over 
the period 1980-2001 and found that volatility transmission was intensified during the crisis 
regime. Similarly, Billio et al. (2005) who focuses on contagion effects between the US and 
European stock markets during the 1997 East Asian crisis and finds non-linear linkages.
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Addressing the non-linearities in a contagion framework generated a heterogeneous 
literature. While several studies have adopted extreme value theory approaches (for ex­
ample, Longin 1996; Longin and Solnik 2001), others have addressed the issue by using 
non-linear estimates of correlations (copulas) in tranquil and turmoil times. Longin and 
Solnik (2001) adopt an extreme value approach and find that correlation between stock 
markets increases during bear market periods while this is not the case during bull markets.
Copulas offer several advantages over the traditional measures of correlation (e.g. 
Pearson correlation coefficient) as they account for tail asymmetries and dependencies as 
well as not being restricted on a linear dimension of correlation. Financial contagion is 
an asymmetric phenomenon as it is more of a concern during downturns o f the economy 
(Ang and Chen 2002). Indeed, Butler and Joaquin (2002) offer an application of correla­
tion analysis during different market conditions (i.e. bull, bear and stable markets). The 
first application of copulas in the context of financial contagion comes from Patton (2006), 
who studies contagion in currency markets using copula techniques allowing for Markov- 
switching regimes. Bartam et al. (2007), Jondeau and Rockinger (2006) and Rodriguez 
(2007) find contagion evidence, in terms of correlation increases, in European markets us­
ing different copula methods. In these lines, Serban et al. (2007) compared the dependence 
structure of financial time series and their implications in portfolio management. In partic­
ular, they compared a standard BEKK formulation, which assumes linear correlations, to 
a modified DCC-GARCH model which allows for non-linear correlations. They find that 
the latter model outperformed the former one which highlights the benefits of addressing 
non-linearities for portfolio management. Non-linearities in the transmission of economic
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shocks have also been addressed using a VAR framework by Favero and Giavvazi (2002) 
for Germany and the rest o f Europe whilst Baig and Goldfajn (1999) have utilised the 
methodology for developing East Asian countries.
Although copulas have benefits over linear correlation measures, their incorpora­
tion within a GARCH framework leads to estimation problems (Solnik and Roulet 2000). 
Hence the econometric literature regarding financial contagion is split mainly in these two 
strands; the correlation/copula applications and the multivariate GARCH approaches. De­
spite the variety of techniques used to address the issue, the consistency o f the finding, in 
support o f contagion after most of the recent economic crises, is remarkable.
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Multivariate Models
The Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model introduced by Engle 
(1982) has been used extensively in modeling volatility of financial time series. The atten­
tion it received by the econometric community soon lead to extensions like the well-known 
generalized variation the GARCH of Bollerslev (1986) which enhances the conditional 
variance equation of the ARCH so that it is a function of its own past values as well. The 
integrated GARCH (IGARCH) of Engle et al. (1987) eliminates the constant term and 
forces the estimated coefficients to sum up to one. The IGARCH is applicable in value 
at risk (VaR) estimation of the RiskMetrics program. The models so far did not differ­
entiate the impact of good or bad news upon the modeling procedure. As negative news
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tend to have greater impact, the threshold GARCH (TARCH) (Zakoian 1994; Glosten etal.
1993) and exponential GARCH (EGARCH) Nelson (1991) were two models introduced 
to capture that effect.
An immediate extension of modeling volatilities of the returns is the modeling of 
co-movements of financial assets with practical applications in portfolio management, risk 
management and asset allocation. As a consequence, the univariate GARCH family of 
models had to be extended to a multivariate setup so that covariance and correlation be­
tween assets are modeled. Multivariate GARCH (MGARCH) models are also applied in 
studies of contagion, volatility transmission and spillover effects (Tse and Tsui 2002; Bae 
e ta l  2003).
The evolution of MGARCH models faced difficulties as there were many issues to 
be addressed. At first a multivariate model should be able to capture the full dynamics 
o f a number of assets that is the time evolution of volatilities and correlations. Moreover, 
it needs to produce estimates of coefficients that are easy to interpret and estimate. At the 
same time, as the number of assets can get large the model needs to be parsimonious enough 
so that estimation for all the parameters can be done. As all the models are estimated using 
maximum likelihood, there can be the case (depending on the model) that the covariance 
matrix needs to be inverted for every step of the optimization routine. Finally, covariances 
need to be positive definite by definition, which is not easy in large systems. The time 
evolution of MGARCH models reveals that not all of the above mentioned prerequisites 
were ever fully satisfied. In fact, all of the MGARCH models offer a trade-off between 
them.
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The VEC-GARCH model of Bollerslev et al. (1988) was the first step from the uni­
variate to the multivariate universe. Every conditional covariance56 is written as a function 
o f all lagged covariances. Let us define a vector o f returns rt that is conditionally het- 
eroscedastic, hence:
rt =  H 1t / \  ( 4 . 1 )
where r t : N  x 1 matrix of returns; H t =  [hijt] : N  x N  matrix o f conditional 
covariances; rjt : a vector of the error process. Then the VEC-GARCH is written as:
q  p
vech(H t) -  c +  Ajvech{rt-.jr{_j) +  ^  BjvechCHt-j)  (4.2)
j =i j=i
where vech(-) : stacks the lower triangular part of the matrix; c : the vector o f con­
stants; A j, B j : parameter matrices.
The VEC model that the authors introduced allows for dynamic correlations but the 
number o f parameters to be estimated equals which is large unless N  is very small. Assume 
we estimate a VEC with only two assets and the easiest structure on the lags with p = q = 
1. This will yield a total of 21 parameters to be estimated. For a slightly larger portfolio of 
8 assets and the same structure a total of 2,628 parameters need to be estimated while for 
an even larger portfolio of 20 assets and p = q =  2 a total of 176, 610 parameters need to 
be estimated! Of course in reality a company’s portfolio could be in excess o f 100 assets 
making obvious the shortcomings of the VEC model.
56 This includes variances as the variance is the covariance of a number with itself.
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Due to the number of parameters to be estimated the diagonal VEC (DVEC) was 
proposed (Bollerslev et al. 1988) which simplifies the VEC by imposing a restriction that 
the A  and B  matrices are diagonal. As a result the number of parameters to be estimated 
drops to (p+q + 1) x N ( N  + 1)/2 which gives 9, 108 and 1,050 parameters to be estimated 
for the same portfolios. However, the DVEC does not allow for dynamic covariances a 
rather strong assumption. Assuming correlation remains constant over time is a major 
drawback in finance applications. The FTSE 100 is a market capitalization w eighted equity 
index o f the 102 most prominent companies listed in the UK stock exchange accounting for 
84.35% of the market capitalization. Constant correlation w ould imply that Vodafone and 
BP, two of the constituents, maintain a constant correlation coefficient with FTSE 100 over 
the 27 years of the index’s existence. This can be verified by a rolling correlation coefficient 
using a moving window of 365 observations (i.e., 1 year). The correlation changes greatly 
over time.
[Figure 2 here]
Another drawback of the VEC model is that the covariance matrix needed to be in­
verted at every observation as part of the likelihood function optimization process. In 
addition the positive definiteness of the matrices has to be ensured though no general solu­
tion exists for this problem (Silvennoinen and Terasvirta, 2010). To deal with these prob­
lems, Engle and Kroner (1995) propose the Baba-Engle-Kraft-Kroner (BEKK) model. The 
BEKK structure ensures by construction that conditional covariance matrices are positive
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definite. This is done by decomposing the constant term into a product o f two lower- 
triangular matrices. The model is given by:
<? K p K
H( = CC' + E  + E E B« (4-3)
j=1 fc=l j=l fc= 1
where A, B , C : N  x N  parameter matrices. The BEKK succeeds in doing what it 
was designed for, i.e. to guarantee positive definiteness of the covariance matrix. It is not 
a model without drawbacks though. The first problem with the BEKK is the interpretation 
of the estimates as the parameters in A and B do not translate into lagged volatilities or 
shocks. In addition, it still requires a lot of parameters to be estimated. In fact it requires 
(p +  q ) K N 2 +  N ( N  +  l ) /2  parameters to be estimated, which would be 11,164 and 
1,810 for portfolios of 2,8 and 20 assets, and several matrix inversions which render it 
inferior to the DVEC in terms of computational speed. Therefore two other versions of 
the BEKK have appeared in the literature, the diagonal BEKK and the scalar BEKK, each 
one imposing more restrictions. Without going into details, the diagonal BEKK imposes 
that A and B are diagonal matrices meaning that the estimated covariance parameters are 
products of the parameters of the variance equations. In addition, the scalar BEKK restricts 
the diagonal BEKK even further by assuming that A and B are multiplied by two scalars 
rather than a diagonal matrix. Experience of the BEKK models has shown that many 
estimated parameters are insignificant leading to additional difficulties in modeling (Tsay 
2010 ).
The conditional covariance matrix H t can be expressed as a function of conditional 
standard deviations and correlations:
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H t=  D tPD , (4.4)
where D t — diag{h\{.2, ..., h 1^ 2} and P  =  [p^]. All elements of the P  matrix located 
on the diagonal (i =  j ) are equal to 1 whereas the off-diagonal items equal:
Returns {rit} are modelled as a G A R C H (p ,q )  type process with the conditional 
variance being:
Bollerslev (1990) proposed the Constant Conditional Correlation GARCH model 
which assumes that correlations between the assets are time invariant (CCC-GARCH). The 
model ensures that the correlation matrix is positive-definite in most situations (Nelson and 
Cao 1992). In addition the model greatly reduces the number of parameters to be estimated, 
requiring only 1,28 and 190 for portfolios with 2,8 and 20 assets. The CCC-GARCH 
was extended to the DCC-GARCH when the correlation matrix is allowed to depend on 
time. Hence the conditional standard deviations (D) are obtained from a typical univariate 
GARCH(p,q) are now used to form the conditional covariance matrix (H):
(4.5)
(4.6)
H t=  D tP tD t (4.7)
where covariances (H) are expressed as products of standard deviations (D) and 
correlations (P ), both of which are conditional on time. The extension to the constant con-
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ditional correlation (CCC) GARCH models, the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) 
allows for a correlation specification which is implemented in two stages. In the first stage 
univariate GARCH models are fitted to the financial series (returns) and the standardized 
residuals are obtained. These residuals are used in a second stage for the parameter estima­
tion of the correlation. The conditional covariance matrix (H*) is generalized by allowing
the conditional correlation matrix (P t) to be time dependent. The conditional correla­
tion matrix needs to be positive definite at every observation which makes the DCC more 
complicated than the CCC GARCH. Two parameterizations of the conditional correlation 
matrix (P t) exist, one by Tse and Tsui (2002) and another by Engle (2002). Tse and Tsui
(2002) propose the specification for the correlation matrix (P t) :
P* =  (1 — a — b) S +  aS t- i  +  bit* t- i  (4.8)
where S is constant positive-definite parameter matrix with ones on the diagonal; a 
and b are non-negative scalar parameters satisfying the condition a +  b <  1 and St_i is a 
sample correlation matrix of the past m  standardized residuals et- \ ,  • ••, h - m  which can be 
specified by the user. The higher the value of m  the higher the contribution of history to 
the current value of the conditional correlation.
For the modelling of correlations (P t) Engle (2002) starts from a dynamic matrix 
process:
Qt =  (1 — cl — b) S +  +  bQt-i (4.9)
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where a and b are scalar parameters so that a ^ 0, b ^ 0 and a +  b <  1, S is 
the unconditional correlation matrix composed o f the standardized residuals et and Q is 
positive definite. A rescaling of Q ensures that the correlation matrix is valid (Silvennoinen 
and Terasvirta 2010):
p t = (i© Q t)“1/2Qt( ie Q t)-I/2 (4.10)
The major benefit of DCC-GARCH models is that they allow modeling o f the corre­
lation, which is assumed to be time variant, in a parsimonious and easy to interpret way. 
The small number of parameters that need to be estimated N ( N  — l ) /2  +  2 makes the 
model a good choice even when the number of assets is large. It requires two more pa­
rameters to be estimated for every portfolio compared to the CCC-GARCH; however the 
procedure itself is much more time consuming as the correlation matrix needs to be in­
verted at every iteration. By contrast, the simplifying assumption that a and b are scalars 
imposes the restrictive assumption that correlation dynamics share the same structure. To 
avoid this limitation several specifications have been proposed.
Billio and Carporin (2006) impose a BEKK structure on the conditional correlations 
of the DCC-GARCH formulating the Quadratic Flexible DCC-GARCH (GFDCC). The Qt 
matrix is defined as:
Qt =  C 'S C  +  A'st-i^t-i-A- +  (4.11)
where the matrices A, B , C are symmetric; S is the unconditional correlation ma­
trix composed of the standardized residuals £t .Stationarity conditions require C 'S C  to be
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positive definite. The number of parameters to be estimated is 3N ( N  +  1)/2  which is un­
feasible with increasing asset size and as a remedy the authors suggest grouping o f assets 
according to industry, sector other criteria.
Asymmetric effects were introduced firstly in the DCC - GARCH model by Tsay
(2010) who allows the only the estimation of the first stage to be subject to leverage effects 
and then impose a similar correlation equation as in Tse and Tsui (2002). The volatility 
equation, similar to an EGARCH model is given below:
Cappiello et al. (2006) introduce asymmetries in an asymmetric generalized context 
(AG-DCC-GARCH). They specify Qt as:
where A ,B , G are N  x N  parameter matrices; e~ = I{£t<o} O £t, where I  is the 
indicator function and S, S~ the unconditional covariance matrixes o f et and et respec­
tively. However these models have more parameters to be estimated than the simple DCC- 
GARCH which restricts their applicability with large datasets unless restrictions are im­
posed.
Aielli (2009) proves that the DCC-GARCH estimator is asymptotically biased but the 
bias is negligible for small number of parameters. For large numbers of assets the DCC has 
been shown to perform accurately even though in theory the estimator is inconsistent. The
(4.12)
Q t =  (S — A 'S A  -  B 'S B  -  G 'S “ G) +  A V i e ^ A  +  B 'Q ^ B  +  G 'e"  l£~_XG
(4.13)
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consistent alternative of Aielli, the cDCC performs equally well even for large datasets. 
Caporin and McAleer (2010) compare, among others, the DCC and cDCC up to 89 assets 
and do not find any significant differences between them.
So far the DCC-GARCH is a way of modeling correlation relying only on past 
returns. However there have been developments for models that allow the correlation 
to be controlled by an exogenous variable, observable or latent. The Smooth Transi­
tion Conditional Correlation (STCC-GARCH) (Silvennoinen and Terasvirta 2005) and the 
Double Smooth Transition Conditional Correlation (DSTCC-GARCH) (Silvennoinen and 
Terasvirta 2007) allow the correlation to shift between two extreme states subject to a user 
selected variable. Pelletier (2006) introduced the Regime Switching Dynamic Correla­
tion (RSDC-GARCH) model which can be classified somewhere between the normal DCC 
type models and the Smooth Transition ones. For large number of assets, unlike the smooth 
transition cases, the model can be estimated in two steps. The first step involves the estima­
tion of the parameters o f the univariate or multivariate GARCH equations. In the second 
step with the use o f the EM algorithm of Dempster et a l  (1977) to estimate the switching 




Markov-Switching (Hamilton 1994) models (MSMs) are part o f the greater family o f non­
linear models which also includes SETAR (Tong 2005) and LSTAR models (Terasvirta
1994) among others57.
Markov-Switching models condition the behavior of a financial time series on the 
state of the economy (i.e. crisis or non-crisis) while estimating the respective transition 
probabilities. The resulting model is linear within each regime but the aggregated model is 
non-linear. In contrast, SETAR/LSTAR models are non-linear throughout. However, these 
types of models require a user input relating to the sensitivity o f the transition process 
whereas the MSMs rely on the data itself to identify the timing o f the shift.
A two-regime switching model58 is given by:
where et~N[0, a 2} and st is a variable that follows a Markov-chain and determines 
the regimes of the economy as follows:
Vt — pQ + P V y - l  + (4.14)
Vt — PVy—l + £t (4.15)
/i0|st =  0 : non  — crisis  
p 0\st = 1 : crisis
5 7  For a  m ore in-depth discussion o f  these m odels the reader is d irected to Tsay, (2010).
58 A  M arkov-Sw itching m odel can have m ore than 2 regim es and different m odels w ithin each regim e. M ore 
indepth analysis o f  such m odels can be found in Terasvirta and G onzalez (2008) and H am ilton (1994).
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The St variable is the probability o f the economy switching to the crisis regime (j)  in 
time t +  1 given that currently, at time t, is in a non-crisis regime i. Mathematically:
Pj\i = P[st+1 =  j \ s t = i] : i, j  = 0,1 (4.17)
Due to the fact that the estimates are probabilities they need to sum to 1. In other 
words, the economy can either be in crisis or non-crisis regime at any point in time. Math­
ematically:
l
£ %  =  1 (4 .18)
i=0
Then the full transition matrix can be given as:
/  st =  0 st =  1 \
P  = st+i =  0 P0|o Pop (4.19)
\ s t+ i =  1 Pi|0 Pi|i /
Estimation of Markov-Switching models is done via maximum likelihood approach
after the likelihood function has been filtered and smoothed (Hamilton 1994; Kim 1994).
The algorithm used is the Lawrence and Tits (2001) which is found to be more efficient 
than the standard EM algorithm of Dempster et al. (1977) (Doomik and Hendry 2006).
4.3.3 Duration and Intensity Measures
After a unique crisis transition date has been identified for each country, we calculate the 
duration of the financial crisis as the number of days spent in the high volatility regime 
after this time. Our crisis intensity measure is then computed as the ratio of duration to the 
total number of days after the crisis transition date till the end of our sample (27/09/2011).
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The subscript i is used to denote the different countries while Tc is the crisis transition date 
for each country. Naturally, the intensity measure can only take values between 0 and 1.
I n te n s e  =  (4.20)
1 otai JJaySi 1 otal Days
A high value of this intensity measure indicates that a country takes a relatively long 
time to revert back to the non-crisis regime. This reflects a market where the impact of the 
financial crisis has long lasting effects. In contrast, countries with a low intensity measure 
see their markets recovering more quickly after the shock. O f course, the delimitation 
between high and low in this setting is arbitrary, although our measure does allow us to 
gauge the relative intensities of the impact of the financial crisis for our sample countries.
4.3.4 Country Correlation Analysis
As discussed in the previous section, shift contagion is defined as significantly higher bi- 
variate correlations for the financial markets of the sample of countries for the period after 
the crisis compared to the period before (Forbes and Rigobon 2002). In our study the cut­
off point is unique for every country as the crisis transition dates are estimated from the 
data. We define the crisis period when at least one of the two countries has passed its crisis 
transition date.
We proceed with our correlation analysis by introducing two new measures; the av­
erage intra-group correlation (alGC) and the average inter-country correlation (alCC). For 
the alGC, each country group is considered in isolation. Taking the case of Denmark for 
example, which is part of the Scandinavian group, the average of two correlations, involv­
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ing the other two counties in the group, Sweden and Finland, will be reported. In contrast, 
the alCC analysis considers the correlation of a country vis-a-vis every other country in the 
sample which involves the average of 55 correlation measures for each country under inves­
tigation. This classification allows us to examine separately the effect of contagion within 
country groups (i.e. regional contagion) as well as allowing us to examine its incidence on 
a global scale.
As discussed above, one of the downsides of increased integration is the contagion ef­
fects that appear once a crisis hits the economy. When markets are segmented then barriers 
such as capital flows and cross-country investment restrictions prevent, or delay, the spread 
of a financial crisis to other countries. In contrast, in integrated markets, contagion effects 
ensure that individual financial markets will be affected shortly after a financial crisis has 
occurred.
In essence, a higher degree of integration between the financial markets of country X 
and the rest of the world would mean that more intensified links between the countries in 
the form of, for example, higher trade volumes and more cross-country investments allow 
shocks to be transmitted more easily. Moreover, in the wake of a shock, new transmission 
channels are created between countries that did not previously have close ties. Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (2000) term this phenomenon “true” contagion while Karolyi (2003) calls 
it “irrational” contagion. In other words, the stock market in a particular country would 
respond to global news causing the alCC measure to be higher than the alGC.
In contrast, lower levels of integration would restrict any contagion to small groups 
o f countries sharing similar characteristics such as their level of development, proximity or
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trade. Hence the alGC measure would be higher than the alCC as news in the countries 
comprising the group is more relevant.
4.4 Data
We use daily data of stock market indices for 55 countries denominated in US $ for the
period 01/01/2001 — 27/09/2011, giving a sample of 2,800 observations. All data are
taken from Datastream and details on the indices employed are presented in Table 3(a)-
(b). We measure industrialization by the percentage value added to GDP by industry and
manufacturing activities using the average percentage for the period 2000 -  2009 and as
a robustness check we include only the 2009 value. Industrialization data are from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
[Tables 3(a)-(b) here]
To facilitate discussion we classify the 55 countries into groups. In Europe we 
identify two main groups, the Old Europe59 and the Recently Acceded Member States 
(RAMS) in view of the fact that there have been arguments in the literature about transition 
economies being less affected by past financial crisis (Gelos and Sahay 2001).
Old Europe is subsequently decomposed into the Core EU (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the UK), the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden) and the PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain). The mo­
tivation for these groups is partially based on the recent discussion about the lack of com­
petitiveness, fiscal deficit and public debt problems of the southern economies, particularly
59 T he Old Europe coincides w ith the E U -15
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Greece, Italy and Portugal. The Scandinavian countries can be viewed as different to the 
Core EU due to the higher priority these countries attribute to social welfare, the fact that 
Denmark and Sweden opted not to join the Eurozone and the important trade linkages be­
tween them (ECB 2010). In addition, the stock markets of the three Scandinavian countries 
are part of the NASDAQ OMX exchange company since 1998 for Sweden and since 2003 
for Finland and Denmark comprising the NASDAQ OMX Nordic.
The Recently Accepted Member States (RAMS) consists of three sub-groups, the 
Baltics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), the RAMS I group (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovenia) and the RAMS II group (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Romania and Slo­
vakia). We take the three Baltic countries together (i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) 
because of their proximity, common history and common ownership of their stock markets 
by the NASDAQ OMX group. The exchanges in the three countries comprise the NAS­
DAQ OMX Baltic. The other two sub-groups are defined according to the starting date 
of their negotiation talks with the EU which is 1997 and 1999 for RAMS I and RAMS II 
respectively.
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa constitute the BRICS, a group of newly 
industrialized, fast-developing countries with sufficient political power to affect regional 
and global affairs. The first time the term BRIC makes its appearance was in a diplomatic 
meeting in May 2008 in Yekaterinburg, Russia. South Africa joined in August 2010 and 
became an official member in December of the same year. Since then the acronym was 
expanded to BRICS to accommodate the inclusion of South Africa.
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The Gulf Cooperation Council or GCC has been introduced in a previous section. 
Here we highlight that the GCC is considered as an economic and political union with ob­
jectives in various sectors such as education (establishment of research centres), economic 
(stimuli for private sector investments, common currency) and military (common military 
presence). Consequently in economic terms it can be viewed as similar to the BRICS but 
the GCC has a more complete form of integration among its members. The UAE are not 
included in the analysis due to data limitations.
The selection of countries for Africa and Asia is restricted by data availability as 
stock markets are not existent in many countries. A total of 14 countries is included in this 
category. We make a distinction between developed and developing countries based on the 
combination of two criteria; the United Nations (UN) Human Development Index (HDI) 
and the IMF. Hence a country is considered as developed if it is included in at least one 
of the two lists. The Africa and Asia Developed countries comprises Hong Kong, Japan, 
South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. By contrast the Africa and Asia Developing countries 
category includes Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Tunisia.
Finally there is a special worldwide group which includes two stock market indices 
which are used as a proxy for the global economy; these are the S&P 500 and the Euronext 
100. The S&P 500 comprises 500 large capitalization and highly liquid common stocks 
traded in either of the two stock market exchanges in the USA, the New York Stock Ex­
change (NYSE) and the NASDAQ. The Euronext 100 comprises the 100 largest and most 
liquid stocks from European stock markets (mainly France, Germany, Portugal, Belgium
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and the Netherlands). These two indices are considered as representative market bench­
marks for the worldwide economy. In addition we include two popular measures of market 
sentiment, the VIX and the VSTOXX indices. The indices are measures of the implied 
volatility of S&P 500 and Euronext index options respectively. They reflect the market’s 
expectations over the next 30 days based on the option prices.
4.4.1 Macroeconomic Background
Table 4(a)-(d) summarizes key macroeconomic indicators for the countries under exam­
ination. Specifically the table reports country population in 2010 and GDP in constant
2000 USD as measures for size of the economy. Real GDP growth rates averaged over
2001 — 2010 rates specifically for 2009 and 2010 to show the extent of the recession fol­
lowing the financial crisis. GDP per capita in purchasing power parity terms is a proxy 
for the level of prosperity in a country. Unemployment and inflation rates are standard 
macroeconomic indicators. Market capitalization of listed firms as a percentage of GDP 
in 2010 is a measure of the development of a country’s financial markets. Industrialization 
measures the percentage value added to the country’s GDP by industry and manufacturing 
activities. The values reported are averages over the 2001 -  2009 period60.
[Tables 4(a)-(d) here]
A similar level of prosperity is evidenced in the Old Europe by the similar values 
o f GDP per capita at about 33 thousand USD perhaps with the exception of Luxembourg 
which is in excess of 71 thousand USD. In 2010 all countries in the Core EU group had
60 Values for 2010 were not available for all countries; hence we used 2001-2009 instead.
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recovered from the recession that followed the financial crisis by recording positive, yet 
small, GDP growth rates. However the members of the Scandinavian group of countries 
record higher GDP growth on average with Sweden having the highest growth in EU in 
2010 at 5.54%. Market capitalization is similar between the Scandinavian and the Core EU 
groups at about 84% of GDP. In the Core EU group, Luxembourg and the UK have the 
highest relative stock market capitalization with approximately 183% and 138% of GDP 
respectively. By contrast, Austria is the least capitalized among the Core EU at about 18% 
of GDP.
The financial problems in the economies of the five European countries comprising 
the PUGS group emerged during the financial crisis and subsequently gave rise to the Euro 
crisis. With the exception of Spain, which has a market capitalization to GDP ratio of 
83%, the other four countries exhibit much lower market capitalization figures (35% on 
average), the lowest being Italy at 15.51%, than the Core EU and the Scandinavian groups. 
This is surprising given that the PUGS are part of the Eurozone which is supposed to be 
promoting convergence among the countries. In that sense the market capitalization of 
Sweden and Denmark, both of which are not part of the Eurozone, is much closer to the 
average capitalization of the Core EU group. In terms of GDP growth Greece, Ireland 
and Spain in 2010 are still in a contracting phase with figures being -4.47% , -1.04%  and 
—0.14% respectively. There has been an imposition of austerity measures to all of the 
PUGS which aim to the countries regaining their competitiveness. As a by-product of the 
measures rising unemployment has reached 18% in Spain and the living standards have
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deteriorated with an average GDP per capita at about 27 thousand USD, 18% lower than 
the Core EU.
In the RAMS stock markets were only re-established in the early 1990s after the 
collapse o f the Soviet Union. Therefore they are still relatively underdeveloped when com­
pared to mature markets in the rest of Europe (Claessens et al. 2003). The Polish stock 
exchange is the most capitalized at about 40% of GDP while the Slovakian market is still 
a very swallow one with its stock market values at only 4% of GDP. These countries have 
recovered from the crisis, with the exception of Latvia where the economy is still con­
tracting, albeit at a low rate of 0.34%. Poland, on the other hand, is enjoying significant 
growth of almost 4 per cent. The other two RAMS, Cyprus and Malta, have above average 
stock market capitalizations of 24.81% and 19.94% respectively yet both are experiencing 
contracting economies. Average GDP per capita in this region is about 18 thousand USD, 
about 45% and 33% lower than that of the Core EU and the PUGS respectively. Yet there 
is great variability among the countries in the RAMS category; hence on one end there is 
Cyprus at GDP per capita of about 25 thousand USD whereas on the bottom end there is 
Romania with barely 11 thousand USD. Unemployment is much higher compared to the 
Core EU. The reason for this is the large fall of GDP in 2009 as the three Baltic countries 
fell into deep recession due to the financial crisis61.
The newly industrialized countries of the BRICS are all deemed to be at a similar 
stage of economic development. Currently they account for more than 25% of the world’s 
land area and about 40% of the population. According to the IMF, the BRICS will ac­
61 Estonia -13.9%, Latvia -18.0% and Lithuania -14.7%.
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count for 61% of the global growth by 2015. South Africa joined in 2011 when the BRIC 
countries formed a political organization (SouthAfrica.info 2011). However, at a popula­
tion under 50 million and a GDP under 190 billion USD it is considerably smaller economy 
than the other four; hence its participation at the BRICS is often disregarded for economic 
analysis (Reuters 2011). The crisis has helped the BRICS group of countries to grow even 
faster and take a bigger share of GDP sooner (Reuters 2008). In 2010, their average GDP 
growth was at 7.8% while China was growing at 10.3% and South Africa was experienc­
ing a modest growth of 2.8%. Stock markets are highly developed in these countries with 
market capitalization levels in excess of 67%. Living standards as proxied by the GDP 
per capita are highest in Brazil and lowest in China at an average GDP of about 10 and 3 
thousand USD respectively.
The total population of the GCC is estimated at around 40 million while their com­
bined GDP is around 450 billion USD. The GCC countries show significant variations in 
terms of population, aggregate output and GDP per capita. Saudi Arabia is the largest by 
population (26 million) and GDP (249 billion USD) whereas the highest GDP per capita is 
in Qatar at about 73 thousand USD. Stock market capitalization is in excess of 80% for all 
countries but Oman (37%). The countries did not experience any recession as their GDP 
growth retained its positive sign throughout the crisis. Oil dependent and largest econ­
omy Saudi Arabia has a GDP growth rate of 3.76% in 2010 whereas Qatari economy was 
expanding at 8.64%62.
62 The UAE was the only exception with a contraction in the economy by 0.70% in 2010 mainly an effect 
o f the Dubai crisis.
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The rest of the countries in the analysis represent a less uniform group. Japan and 
South Korea are the only ones part of the OECD. Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, 
in addition to Japan and South Korea, are considered as developed countries according 
to the IMF and the Human Development Index methodology (Human Development Report 
2011). Indeed these countries included in the Africa and Asia Developed Countries identify 
themselves out of the rest as they have an average GDP per capita which is considerably 
higher than the rest of the group at about 38 thousand USD compared to about 7 thousand 
USD for the Africa and Asia Developing Countries. Stock market capitalization ranges 
between 24.12% and 172.64% for both the Developed and the Developing countries without 
any major differences between the groups. Only exception is Hong Kong where market 
capitalization is in excess of 1,000%, a fact attributed to the state being a major capitalist 
service economy characterized by low taxation and free trade. In the index of Economic 
Freedom it’s ranked first for fifteen years in a row and also described as the closest the 
world can get to laissez-faire capitalism (The Economist 2010).
4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5(a)-(d) summarizes the descriptive statistics of the daily returns of the examined 
stock markets while table 6 shows the average return, volatility and VaR for the country 
groups. Stock market returns have the properties suggested by relevant literature, that is 
leptokurticity, negative skewness and non-normality. Furthermore, annualized volatility 
and Value at Risk (VaR) are suggestive of the turbulence in the EU stock markets during 
the examined period. Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the returns and
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has been annualized using the square root of time rule assuming 252 trading days for every 
market. Value at Risk estimates the worst possible outcome in the following day at a 
specified confidence level (here 95%) given the available evolution o f prices. For instance, 
a VaR estimate of —9.33% shows that the worst possible outcome for the next period, at 
the 95% significance level, is a —9.33% drop. The Jarque-Bera (JB) test verifies that the 
distribution of returns is not normal, while the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) tests 
suggest that the weak form of market efficiency, a sign of developed financial markets, 
does not hold for many of the stock markets under investigation. Though there are many 
approaches as to how one can test for EMH, we report two of the most commonly used 
ones. The first is the Lo and MacKinlay (1988) variance ratio test. The null hypothesis 
is that the returns (rt) follow a random walk; hence the ratio of the variance of rt — rt_n 
to 1 /n  the variance of rt — rt~i would be close to one (Lock 2007). Rejection of the null 
hypothesis would imply that the EMH does not hold. The second test is the Runs test which 
was firstly used by Fama (1965). This test, which is also called Wald-Wolfowitz test, is a 
non-parametric test on the sequence of observations. The tests calculate how many “runs” 
of consecutive values above or below the mean appear in the data. Too few runs indicate a 
tendency for high and low values to cluster; an indication opposed to the EMH. By contrast, 
many runs ensure that high and low values alternate. The null hypothesis for the Runs test is 
that o f randomness; hence a rejection implies that the EMH does not hold in the particular 
country.
When both the EMH tests agree that the EMH does not hold (rejection of the null 
in both cases), we conclude that the weak form of the efficiency market hypothesis does
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not hold for the stock market in question. In particular, the EMH holds for 9 out of the 
15 countries consisting the Old Europe group (Scandinavian, Core EU and PIIGS), a ratio 
o f 60%. For the 12 Recently Accepted Member States (RAMS I, II and Baltics) the EMH 
holds for 4 out o f the 12 countries, a ratio of 33%. The 2 out of 5 countries in the BRICS 
verify the EMH, a ratio of 40% while only one member of the GCC shows evidence in 
favour o f the EMH. In the Asia and Africa Developed group all countries show support 
for the EMH whereas in the Asia and Africa Developing group the EMH holds only for 
Taiwan.
[Tables 5(a) - (d) here]
[Table 6 here]
The Core EU countries group has an average daily return of —0.002% , with the 
highest and lowest returns being observed in Germany (0.043% ) and the Netherlands 
( —0.029% ) respectively. Furthermore, average annualized volatility shows that Germany 
is the most stable market (8.95% ) while the Netherlands are the second most volatile 
(25.65% ). Value at Risk calculations reveal that the German is the safest with a a VaR 
estimate of -4 .2 9 % , while the Luxembourgish is the most risky with a corresponding fig­
ure o f -1 6 .4 6 % . The Luxembourgish stock market is also the most volatile (30.76% ).The 
apparent riskiness of the stock market in the Grand Duchy is confirmed by the fact that, at 
the outbreak of the financial crisis between August and October 2008, the Luxembourg in­
dex lost about 85% of its value, this was the steepest drop of all European countries63. The 
EMH holds for Austria, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
63 This can be attributed to Luxembourg being a major international financial centre with many money 
market funds (including hedge funds) domiciled there, due to the favourable tax and legal environment.
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The Scandinavian group of countries recorded an average daily return o f —0.009%, 
with the lowest returns being observed in Finland (—0.028%) which was also the most 
volatile (28.87%) and the most risky according to the VaR estimate of —11.27%. As a 
group the Scandinavian countries performed slightly worse than the Core EU. However this 
is probably driven by Finland which has been hit hard as the region entered into recession. 
Finland’s economy shrank by 8.2% in 2009 as demand for the country’s mainly industrial 
goods fell rapidly. The EMH holds for all three members.
On the south, the PUGS have experienced the lowest average daily returns in the 
region o f —0.025% with Greece recording the most negative (—0.0517%) and Portugal the 
least negative (—0.003%). Volatility was highest in Greece (25.77%) and lowest in Portugal 
(17.27%). Value at Risk figures show that Ireland has been the most risky at —23.70%, with 
Greece being very close however at —23.65%. At the other end, Portugal has been the safest 
relatively at a VaR estimate of -7 .33% .The EMH holds for Spain and Italy.
While the previous three groups were recording negative returns, the Recently ac­
cepted member states were offering a lucrative investment environment. More specifi­
cally returns in the Baltics were at an average level of 0.043% coupled with relatively low 
volatility of about 21.29%. The VaR, at -12.97% , is similar to that of Scandinavian or 
PUGS group. Estonia has been the most profitable financial market offering the highest re­
turn among the three (0.049%) and the safest in the region with volatility at 19.21% and 
VaR of -6.48% , comparable to that of more financially developed markets such as the 
UK. Reasons for this favorable investment climate in Estonia relate to the modem market- 
based structure of the country’s economy with adopted reforms to enhance productivity in
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the electronics and telecommunication sectors, two of the strongest pillars o f the Estonian 
economy (CIA World Factbook). The country also benefits from an export boom and in­
creased foreign investment after the adoption of the Euro on January 2011. The EMH does 
not hold for any country in this group.
RAMS I and RAMS II also show positive average daily returns 0.023% and 0.016% 
respectively while the volatility levels were comparable to that of the Old Europe at 21.79% 
and 24.29% respectively. The highest returns were recorded in Romania (0.074%) while 
the most volatile market has been Cyprus (34.76%). The high uncertainty in Cyprus, re­
flected in the high volatility, relates to the exposure of Cyprus to Greek debt. In 2010 
the exposure to Greek households and businesses of the three largest Cypriot commercial 
banks was about 53% of their assets (FinancialMirror.com 2011). As a consequence, mea­
sures imposed on the Greek economy (i.e. a reduction in the face value of Greek govern­
ment bonds by more than 50%) severely affect Cyprus’s economy. Moreover, the country’s 
economy has been downgraded several times in the recent months by credit rating agen­
cies. For all these reasons the investment prospects in the country were bleak. The EMH 
holds in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia.
The average daily return for the BRICS (0.046%) confirms that these fast-developing 
countries offer large returns to the investors willing to take the necessary risks. The risks 
in the BRICS at a volatility level of 27.59% and with a VaR of -15.90%  are considerable 
higher than other groups of developing countries such as the RAMS. Brazil, China and 
South Africa show supportive evidence for the EMH.
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The GCC countries have an average daily return o f 0.037, which ranks them below 
the Baltics in terms of performance. The GCC are less volatile however than the Baltics. 
Indeed with a volatility o f 19.76% they are on average one of the safest investment options 
from the country groups in this analysis. The Value at Risk figures -10.569%  also verity 
this point. The EMH only holds for Bahrain.
Finally the Asia and Africa Developed and Developing groups have average returns, 
0.012% and 0.042% respectively, which verify the notion that investments in developing 
countries have higher returns. By contrast, volatility levels are 26.65% and 18.88% for 
the groups respectively. In this case it is striking the result that higher returns are not 
necessarily accompanied by higher risk. The finding is plausibly related to the fact that the 
financial crisis was more contained within the developed world. The Value at Risk figures 
of —10.91 and —12.78% respectively are similar in magnitude.
4.4.3 Graphical Analysis
Figures 3(a)-(k) show the evolution of the price indices of the examined stock markets. The 
graphs are sorted according to the groups defined earlier. The Worldwide graphs in 3(g) 
define the pattern that is apparent in this time period; that is the burst of the dot-com bubble 
in the early 21s* century where the stock markets were falling till the second half of 2002 
and the boom that lead to the financial crisis in 2007, which is currently ongoing for many 
countries while others have recovered. The pattern is primarily distinguishable in the Old 
Europe countries. Most markets have been affected severely by both crises. Two exceptions 
are Austria and Germany. The burst of the dot-com bubble is barely noticeable in the
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former, a fact plausibly attributed to the lower magnitude of this crisis compared to the 2007 
financial crisis as well as the relative importance of the financial markets in the country 
which is reflected in the much lower stock market capitalization than the Core EU average. 
Germany on the other hand shows an upward trend for the full period under examination 
with the 2007 financial crisis being only of minor importance around 2010. The reason is 
the strength of the German economy, its export capacity and its sound financials. Germany 
is affected as the financial crisis turned into a Euro crisis where the fiscal problems of the 
PUGS were brought to surface and the subsequent bail-out plans organized involved great 
loan contributions from Germany. The Euro crisis is evident in graph 3(c) where most 
notably Greece’s stock market is in free-fall after 2010 while Italy shows a similar picture.
[Figures 3(a)-(k) here]
The Recently Accepted Member States experienced the 2007 financial crisis and are 
still recovering from it. Some, like Estonia, with greater success and others, like Bulgaria 
or Cyprus, with more problems. Another pattern is identified here with the Baltics and the 
RAMS I groups of countries showing a better performance after the crisis as opposed to 
the RAMS II group. A plausible reason for this can be traced to the accession date of these 
countries to the EU as well as the differences in their economies. The 3 years difference 
in the accession dates has had an important effect as the countries that joined first could 
tap the resources offered by EU to develop their economies, build infrastructure and make 
the necessary reforms to enhance competitiveness. Hence when the crisis hit they were at 
a better position compared to the RAMS II group. In addition, the latter group includes
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Bulgaria and Romania, two of the weakest economies in Europe with average GDP per 
capita o f about 1/3 of the Core EU’s.
The BRICS, figure 3(h) verify the fact that they are strong economies developing fast 
as four out of five countries have already reverted back to the levels of the pre-crisis period 
with China being the only exception. In addition the upward sloping trend leading to the 
crisis is much steeper than other economies, reflective of the countries’ high growth and 
significant investment opportunities.
The GCC, figure 3(i) are also affected by the financial crisis of 2007 as evident by 
the sharp fall in their stock market indices. In addition, the Saudi Arabian stock exchange 
experienced a crash in late 2005 following a slow-down in oil production, an effect which 
was spread to the neighboring economies, particularly the Qatari.
The last two groups, Asia and Africa Developed and Developing, graphs 3(j) and 3(k) 
respectively seem to have overcome the crisis. In specific, from the developed countries 
three out of five have reverted to their pre-crisis levels the only exceptions being Hong 
Kong and Japan. Five out of the nine developing countries have even surpassed the price 
levels on the eve of the crisis and they show great financial strength. These are Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Tunisia.
4.5 R esults
Table 7(a)-(f) presents the estimation results for the 55 countries using the DCC-AR(l)- 
GARCH(1,1) model. The AR(1) term is fitted to account for autocorrelation in the log­
arithmic returns. Tables report the estimated coefficients and the p-values are given in
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brackets. We have conducted robustness checks for the mean and the variance equations 
by specifying alternative structures. In particular, following the Box - Jenkings approach, 
we implemented an automatic ARIMA selection algorithm which cycles among various or­
ders o f ARMA(p,q) structure with respect to minimize the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC). The results confirmed the sole inclusion of an AR(1) term in the majority of times. 
In some cases the algorithm would settle for a less parsimonious model, with a minor im­
provement in the BIC over the AR(1) specification. Hence for consistency, we have used 
an AR(1) specification for the mean equation in all the countries. For the variance equation 
we have opted for the widely used GARCH(1,1) although different variants were tried (i.e. 
EGARCH) but without any improvement in terms of goodness-of-fit.
[Tables 7(a)-(f) here]
The Markov-Switching Model has been fitted to the volatility series in each of the 55 
countries and the results are presented in figures 4(a)-(l). The main findings are as follows. 
First, the figures clearly show the high-volatility, turbulent, periods in the beginning of the 
sample that corresponds to the dot.com bubble. This is followed by a low-volatility and 
tranquil period. After 2007 the markets revert to a high-volatility regime as they react to 
the onset of the financial crisis and this regime change is depicted by the solid black lines in 
the figure. Some markets have experienced additional crises like the Saudi Arabian crash 
and the impact on neighboring markets is depicted.
[Figures 4(a)-(l) here]
Figure 5 shows the transition dates for all of the sample countries. It is interesting to 
note the great deviations in the transition dates for the countries which span in a time frame
4.5 Results 300
of about 21 months. It is apparent from the graph that some countries like Luxembourg 
are affected early while others like Brazil are amongst the last to be affected. Earlier work 
typically relying on monthly and weekly data has failed to find any significant lead/lag re­
lationship among equity markets in the wake of a crisis (Granger and Morgensten 1970; 
Agmon 1972; Branch 1974). Initially Roll (1988) and then Lau and Mclnish (1996) are 
the first studies that investigate the lead/lag structure in equity markets following the fi­
nancial crisis of 1987 in the US. They conclude that as integration in the financial markets 
progresses, any lead/lag relationship following a crisis in equity markets around the world 
would tend to diminish (Lau and Mclnish 1996).
[Figure 5 here]
Table 8(a)-(c) shows, in the second column, the estimated crisis transition date for 
the countries in the sample as identified by the Markov-Switching model. The Lead/Lag 
measure, reported in column 3 shows the deviation in days between the estimated crisis 
transition date and the “guideline” crisis transition date that has been most commonly used 
as a guideline in other research; i.e. 1/8/2007 (Hwang et al. 2010). A negative sign 
indicates that the crisis transition date for the country under consideration was before the 
"guideline date" whereas a positive sign shows that the country entered the crisis regime 
after it. Columns 4 and 5 report the number of days after the crisis transition date that each 
country spent in the low-volatility (non-crisis) regime and the high volatility (crisis) regime 
respectively. Column 6 reports the crisis intensity measure which is has been introduced 





Our results show that the groups of developed countries (Scandinavian, Core EU, PI- 
IGS, Asia & Africa Developed) are hit earlier by the 2007 financial crisis than the groups 
of developing countries (RAMS, Baltics, BRICS, GCC, Asia & Africa Developing). We 
observe that the deviation between the crisis transition dates of United States and the de­
veloped European countries has been reduced in the recent financial crisis. Hon and Young 
find that the lead/lag relationship between US-Europe has decreased from previous crises 
and after the 9/11 crisis it was estimated to be around 3-6 months (Hon et al. 2004). In 
addition, the intensity of the crisis has been stronger for developed countries than the de­
veloping ones. Specifically the average delay for the developed group is about 0.5 months 
whereas for the developing group is 8.5 months compared to the "guideline date". The 
intensity values are 55.88% for the developed and 50.68% for the developing countries. 
However, within the subgroups there are important differences.
The Core EU is the first to be affected, alongside the Worldwide group, showing a 
minimal lead of about 5 days evidence that the stock markets in these countries were among 
the first to be affected. The group has the second highest crisis intensity score suggesting 
that these countries were among the most affected. Focusing on individual countries now, 
the most interesting finding is that Luxembourg was affected about 5 months earlier than 
the rest of the Core EU, rendering it the first country to enter the crisis regime globally. 
Additionally, Luxembourg had the highest crisis intensity score at 78.4% within the group. 
One rationalization of this is the dependence of the Luxembourgish economy on financial
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services and, in particular, various types of funds, including hedge funds and the rela­
tively lax regulation. Legal requirements applicable to hedge-funds were reduced further 
by the inception of a specialized investment fund (SIF) law in February 2007 specifically 
for “well-informed investors” (KPMG 2011). This law is less restrictive compared to usual 
regulatory laws for hedge funds as it allows them to be launched and then seek the approval 
of the regulator. In addition, SIF law places no quantitative or qualitative restrictions on 
how much the hedge fund can borrow (for comparison, the second less restrictive class of 
hedge funds only allows till 400% leverage of fund’s net assets for market neutral strate­
gies) (Luxembourg for Finance 2009). By contrast Germany, the largest economy in the 
EU was affected at an approximate lag of 3 months while the crisis intensity was the lowest 
in the group at 41.9%.
Examining the geographical periphery of the Core EU, that is the PUGS and the Scan­
dinavian countries, we find that these two country groups were affected at a lag of about 
9 days from the "guideline date". There is not significant variability in the crisis transition 
dates between the countries included in the two groups besides the case of Greece. Greece, 
entered the crisis regime at a lag of about 5 months after the guideline date. Although the 
troubled economies of the Eurozone do not show any distinctive behavior relative to the 
Core EU as far as their crisis transition dates are concerned, there are differences in their 
crisis intensity scores. As expected, Greece was the most affected, exhibiting an intensity 
value of 97.9% as the country was in the epicenter of the Euro crisis that followed. Ireland 
and Spain, two other troubled economies that have been facing similar problems, albeit to 
a lesser extent, also have high crisis intensity values of 78.7% and 69.0% respectively. The
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mean intensity for the four PIIGS economies, even when Greece is excluded, is higher than 
the respective measure of Core EU, albeit by only three percentage points. By contrast, the 
Scandinavian countries showed an average intensity o f 52.8% as opposed to the figure of 
70.7% of the PIIGS.
The RAMS I group entered the crisis mode with at a lag of 2 months relative to 
the "guideline date". However, there is considerable variation among the members of this 
group as the Czech Republic shows a lag of approximately 5 months. The delay evidenced 
for the Czech Republic may be related to the relative higher significance of the industry 
in the country as opposed to financial services. By contrast, Slovenia is affected about 7 
months prior to the "guideline date" while . Yet this is likely to be caused by the transitory 
period for the Slovenian economy which in the beginning of 2007 entered the EMU being 
the first o f the Recently Accepted Member States. Intensity which is at 53.35% shows that 
the crisis has been less felt in these developing economies as it is lower than the Core EU.
The RAMS II group shows a lag of 5.5 months compared to the "guideline date" and 
is also affected significantly (at the 10%) later than the RAMS I group. In terms of crisis 
intensity, the RAMS II group is at 57.35%. However, Cyprus with an intensity score of 
85.3% is an outlier due to the very large exposure to Greek debt. In consequence, austerity 
measures imposed on the Greek economy severely affect Cyprus’s economy. Hence the 
latter has been downgraded several times in the recent months by credit rating agencies. 
The average intensity for the RAMS II group, excluding Cyprus, is 50.4%, a figure which 
is lower than that for the RAMS I group. The reason for this may be related to the fact that 
the countries of the RAMS II group started negotiations with the EU with a delay of 2 years
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relative to the RAMS I group giving evidence of lower integration o f these economies with 
the rest o f the EU.
The Baltics show a lag of 13 months and an intensity score o f 52.48%. Within the 
group, Estonia experienced the crisis about two months sooner than its neighbors Latvia 
and Lithuania. The relatively high intensity score for Latvia (71.18%) can be attributed to 
the Latvian crisis that the country experienced.
The BRICS are affected at an 11 month lag while the average crisis intensity is at 
47.24%. Compared to the Core EU and the RAMS I group, the crisis intensity o f the BRICS 
is about 13 and 7 percentage points lower respectively. It is plausible that the industrialized 
economies of the countries within the BRICS group has helped them to weather the crisis. 
China is affected much sooner than the rest of the BRICS. Specifically it enters the crisis 
regime about three months before the "guideline date" or about a year before the rest of the 
BRICS. Till the onset of the crisis China was experiencing a prolonged boom period (see 
figure 3h). As the boom period continues, investors become increasingly worried that it 
will come to an end. The self-fulfilling prophecy states that crises occur because of agents 
expect them (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). In Februaiy 2007 the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis revised its forecast on US GDP growth down to 2.2% from 3.5%. Although major 
European and US stock markets rebounded to that announcement positively, the situation in 
Asia was more bleak. On the 27th of February 2007 the Chinese stock market experienced 
its biggest drop (about 9% in a single day) for over a decade with a major impact on stock 
markets worldwide. The drop in the Chinese stock market made investors worried about 
potential losses on a global scale. It is then that the housing bubble in the US, the subprime
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lending operations and the possibility of the USA entering into recession that enlarge the 
negative investment climate leading to the climax of the financial crisis (The Economist 
2007).
The GCC experienced the financial crisis with the second longest lag, after only the 
Baltics, o f 12.5 months. The high homogeneity of the GCC countries is evidenced by 
the low variability in the crisis transition dates. The low variability, at about 22 days, is 
comparable to that of the Baltics (31 days) and the Scandinavian (9 days) countries. At 
the other end, the BRICS show higher variability in their crisis transition dates of about 
7 months. The intensity of the crisis in the GCC was at 51.8%, about 9 and 2 percentage 
points lower than the Core EU and the RAMS I group. Amongst the countries in the GCC 
group, Bahrain has significantly higher crisis intensity (67.3%) than the rest (47.9%). The 
Bahraini financial market is the most developed in the region offering exquisite financial 
products such as Islamic finance. Even though market capitalization of the Bahraini stock 
exchange is similar to that of Kuwait and Qatar, Bahrain has been more affected by the 
financial crisis as its economy was not relying on energy revenue which would have reduced 
the impact of the crisis.
The last two groups, Asia & Africa Developed and Asia & Africa Developing provide 
interesting reading. The distinction between developed and developing countries provides 
evidence that the former experienced the financial crisis earlier than the latter, the difference 
is also verified statistically at the 1% significance level. Four out of five countries in the 
Asia & Africa Developed group show a minimal deviation from the guideline date of only 
2 days. This finding is in line with previous groups that consist of developed economies
4.5 Results 306
(Scandinavian, Core EU, PIIGS) also showing small deviations from the "guideline date". 
In terms o f crisis intensity, the country group has an average score of 52.0% which is about 
five percentage points higher than the BRICS and eight percentage points lower than the 
Core EU. Hong Kong has been the hardest hit by the financial crisis showing an intensity 
of 64.5% a result attributed to the very prominent financial sector. The country had been 
severely affected during the 1997 East Asian financial crisis (Lim et al. 2008). In this 
group, Japan is a unique case for two reasons. First it is the only developed market in 
the sample that becomes affected by the financial crisis at such a big lag (5.5 months) and 
secondly it has the lowest intensity score (32.9%) among all developed economies.
The deregulation of the Japanese financial system in the 70s allowed companies and 
individual savers to access the capital markets. As a consequence the country’s banking 
sector was facing increased competition which led to decreasing profit margins. The banks 
in an attempt to boost their competitiveness resorted to aggressive lending to real estate. 
The high economic growth and the rising asset prices concealed problems in collateralized 
loans where the value of the collateral was driven by an asset bubble. In addition, the pecu­
liarities o f the Japanese banking system where banks and corporations are bonded through 
a relationship system involving cross-holdings of shares and representation in the board 
of directors lead to lax monitoring of lending practises and further expansion in credit as 
banks’ capital expanded (The New York Times 2008). During the 1980s the Nikkei stock 
market index and real estate prices more than quadrupled. High economic growth and steep 
rise in asset prices often lead to asset bubbles which are in turn followed by financial crises 
when the hype can no longer be sustained (Reinhard and Rogoff 2009). The downturn hap­
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pened during the 90s and it took Japan a decade to recover, what has been known as "the 
lost decade" (Hayashi and Prescott 2003). When the subprime loans were gaining momen­
tum in the US leading to the 2007 house bubble, Japan did not have great exposure to it 
because of its recent history. In some sense, Japan has been the most segmented developed 
market during the last two major financial crises, the dot.com bubble and the 2007 finan­
cial crisis (Dekker et al. 2001). Japan was hit later when the financial crisis impacted the 
real economy and its export-driven manufacturing sector started facing difficulties as other 
countries were entering a recession. Yet Japan has one of the lowest crisis intensity scores 
of about 32.9% which is attributed to the significant savings amounting to more than 14 
trillion USD. The trade surplus that Japan has been enjoying for decades ensured it had ad­
equate money to finance its short term deficits during the peak of the financial crisis. Due 
to the financial crisis in 2007 the Japanese financial companies were in a much better sit­
uation as they wrote off about 8 billion USD compared to a global estimate of around 1 
trillion USD (IMF 2009).
The Asia & Africa Developing group experiences the crisis at an average lag of al­
most 9 months, which ranks it after than the RAMS II group (8 months) and before than 
the GCC (12.5 months) in terms of the average lag. In terms of crisis intensity, this country 
group has the lowest value of 41.9%. Many countries in this group have not as developed 
financial markets compared to the global financial centres and some of the countries have 
strong industry and manufacturing sectors like Indonesia and Thailand; hence lower in­
tensity scores are expected. Some economies, like the Philippines, have been integrated 
regionally and, to a smaller extent, internationally before the 1997 East Asian crisis (Yang
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et al. 2003). However the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand were the hardest hit by the 
1997 East Asian crisis (Lim et al. 2008). The Philippines have still not recovered fully 
and they appear to be fairly isolated markets, as shown by the particularly low crisis inten­
sity score of 25.8%, the lowest in our entire sample. The isolation from financial markets 
of the Philippines is consistent with Dekker et al. (2001) among others. A notable excep­
tion is Malaysia which shows a minimal lead of 2 days between the crisis transition date 
and the guideline date, a remarkably different result compared to the rest of its group. The 
reason is plausibly related to the prominent financial sector of Malaysia, evidenced by the 
high market capitalization ratio of about 172%.
As a further step to our analysis we investigate the relationship between industrializa­
tion and crisis intensity by means of a linear regression. More industrialized countries both 
developed like Germany and Japan as well as developing such as the Czech Republic and 
Saudi Arabia have suffered less from the financial crisis. By contrast, countries with promi­
nent financial sectors such as Luxembourg, Bahrain and Hong-Kong recorded higher crisis 
intensity levels. Table 10 reports the results fo the regression of crisis intensity upon the 
country’s industrialization. The negative and statistically significant coefficient of the ex­





Tables 11 and 12, in the second and third column, show the average Intra Group Corre­
lation (alGC) and average Inter Country Correlation (alCC) before and after the crisis re­
spectively. In columns 4-5 the median and mean changes of the two correlation indicators 
are reported for the respective country groups. Columns 6-7 report the standard deviation 
of the correlation changes in every country group together with a t-test for the statistical 
significance of the change between the pre and post crisis periods. Results show that the 
correlations between the countries in the sample increased, to different degrees, after the 
financial crisis yet not all of them are statistically significant to be classified as contagion 
according to the the definition of Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
The alGC indicator is a measure of regional integration. Results64 show that the 
Old Europe is the most integrated region (59.2%) followed by the Baltics (26.8%) and the 
RAMS I (36.5%) group. The low correlation (4.7%) among the countries comprising the 
RAMS II group is evidence of the little integration compared to other developing country 
groups such as the RAMS I group at 36.5% or the BRICS at 26.1%. The GCC coun­
tries show very little financial integration (6.1%). The result is at odds with the level of 
homogeneity in these countries, it is nevertheless expected given the low development of 
financial markets in the region. After the financial crisis the correlations between stock 
markets in the examined country groups increased as evidenced by the positive median and 
mean changes65. The statistical significance of the change in correlations verifies regional
64 We report correlations before the crisis but the results do not change qualitatively if we focus on the 
after-crisis correlations instead.
65 The mean change for the RAMS II group is negative. However for this group the change is not statistically
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contagion effects. These are significant for the Scandinavian, Core EU, Baltic and RAMS 
I group in Europe. In addition, the BRICS and the GCC groups also show strong evidence 
of regional contagion as the change is significant at the 1% and 5% respectively.
The alCC is a more generalized measure of integration among financial markets. 
Correlation levels are lower than the respective alGC measure. This is anticipated as the 
alCC measure is the average correlation of all country pairs. The fact that GCC show the 
lowest correlation prior to the financial crisis at 6.0%, much lower than the BRICS (24.0%) 
or the Old Europe (33.3%) provides supportive evidence that the GCC countries are isolated 
from the global financial markets. Developed markets (31.7%) are more integrated than 
developing markets (16.9%). The financial crisis leads to rises in the alCC measures for all 
the groups. Contagion is observed for the majority of them. Specifically, we find contagion 
at the 1% significance level for the Scandinavian, Core EU, PIIGS and BRICS groups, 
while the RAMS I and GCC show evidence at the 5% significance level. Finally, the 
Baltics and the two Asia & Africa groups show evidence in favor o f contagion at the 10% 
significance level.
[Tables 11 - 12  here]
The alGC measure tracks the increase in correlation within the group members whereas 
the alCC measures the change in the correlations against all other countries. Hence the 
comparative analysis of the alGC and alCC measures identifies whether regional or global 
contagion has been more significant in every country group. Evidence o f regional conta­
gion would verify the claims of financial markets retrenching back into national borders
significant.
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after the crisis (ECB 2010). The direct implication of this result is to identify the alignment 
patterns of stock markets during the financial crisis. For example, the constituent members 
of the PIIGS witnessed an increase in the average inter-group correlation (alGC) o f 3.4% 
and an increase in the average inter-country correlation (alCC) o f 4.3%. As the alCC is 
higher than the alGC it indicates that after the crisis the stock markets in the PIIGS group 
reacted more strongly to information from stock markets in the other country groups. In 
other words for this country group the global has been more important than regional con­
tagion. Hence they have been aligned more to stock markets outside of their group (i.e. 
Core EU). A similar finding also holds for the Scandinavian group of countries where the 
values are 2.6% and 3.8% for alGC and alCC respectively. From the New Member states, 
the RAMS I group shows similar characteristics with 6.3% and 6.7% values for alGC and 
alCC respectively.
By contrast, the opposite is observed for the Core EU, where the alGC (4.8%) mea­
sure is lower than the alCC (4.0%) indicating that the crisis has aligned more the financial 
markets o f the countries included in the group. In other words, these stock markets would 
react more strongly to news and information related to countries inside the group. The same 
is true for the Baltic and the RAMS II groups with alGC measures of 7.0% and 10.3% while 
the alCC measures are 5.1% and 3.0% respectively.
The findings suggest that there is varying degree of integration in the EU-27 which 
leads to contagion effects of varying duration and intensity for the country members, the 
Scandinavian, the PIIGS and the RAMS I groups are aligning themselves to the stock 
markets outside of their respective group. The increased emphasis that is placed on the
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financial markets outside of the respective group is plausibly attributed to the fact that as 
the financial crisis unravels the financial markets affected first are part of the Core EU and 
Worldwide groups. Most of the countries contained in there are well established financial 
centres, like New York, London and Luxembourg. The Core EU is considered an economic 
barometer for the EU and any developments would be of vital importance to countries in 
the PIIGS or the RAMS I groups as they would have direct implications on their economies. 
For the PIIGS the implications could be related to their weathering o f their fiscal problems 
while for RAMS I they may be more in-line with the availability of financial support that 
the EU gives for infrastructure developments in the peripheral states.
By contrast to the PIIGS, Scandinavian and RAMS I groups, the Baltics and the 
RAMS II appear secluded, similar to the Core EU, but the reasons are different. In the 
Core EU the notion of the seclusion was attributed to the financial development of the 
countries and them being earlier affected by the crisis. For the Baltics and the RAMS 
II it is plausibly associated with the lower degree of integration that these countries have 
acquired with the rest of the EU. This is verified statistically and economically. The lower 
integration of the two aforementioned groups is evidenced by the lower correlation they 
have amongst themselves (alGC) and among other financial markets (alCC) compared to 
other EU groups.
Specifically the correlation indicators for the Baltics and the RAMS II groups with 
respect to the Core EU before the crisis are 22 and 44 percent lower for the alGC indicator 
and 13 and 20 percent lower for the alCC indicator respectively. Economically, the RAMS 
II members are the last ones to enter the accession talks with the EU and among the last
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ones to officially join in early 2007. Therefore the bonds with the EU are expected to be 
at a much lower level compared to countries which have been members for a longer period 
and this is likely to be reflected in the financial sector as well. The Baltics on the other 
hand, despite the fact that they are closer to RAMS I group in terms of accession dates, 
they show a segmentation from the rest of the EU but this could be related to the low stock 
market development in the region where market capitalization averages about 10%, the 
lowest in EU-27. From the three countries only Estonia is part of the Eurozone but is the 
smallest economy in terms of contribution to the Eurozone’s output. Hence these countries 
are economically smaller and show important dissimilarities to other EU members. A 
consequence of these differences is that the Latvian financial crisis was contained within 
the country without the rest of the EU-27 experiencing any externalities as is the case with 
Greece, which is however part of the Eurozone too.
The remaining groups can be classified into two broad categories according to which 
of the two indicators is higher. The BRICS and the Asia & Africa Developing groups 
have 8.3% and 4.8% alGC respectively while the alCC measure is 7.2% and 4.2% re­
spectively. The findings for these two groups verify that the financial crisis has increased 
the correlations among the country members of every specific group suggesting that stock 
markets were reacting primarily to group specific developments and news. The BRICS are 
among the fastest growing economies with stock markets accounting for a significant part 
of the economy with an average market capitalization of 118%, higher than that o f Core 
EU’s. They were among the least affected from the financial crisis, a fact attributed to their 
strong productive sector. The countries in the Asia & Africa Developing group show sim-
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ilar results to other groups of developing countries like the Baltics or the BRICS. Hence a 
seclusion from the global financial markets, by means of lower alignment o f reactions is 
evidenced here as well.
The GCC and the Asia & Africa Developed groups have alGC of 10.9% and 0.0% 
while the alCC is at 37.5% and 1.7%. The fact that alGC is lower than alCC classifies these 
two groups in the same category as the PUGS and the RAMS I group in terms of alignment 
of their stock markets to the global economic environment. The results show that stock 
markets in the Asia & Africa Developed group were reacting to developments taking place 
in the global financial centres in Europe and the USA. This is also verified by the high 
crisis intensity value for the particular group, which at 59.3% ranks third after the PUGS at 
69.0% and the Core EU at 65.8%. By contrast, the GCC have the lowest correlations not 
only amongst themselves (6.1%) but also with international financial markets (6.0%). The 
only other group of countries that comes relatively close to this level of seclusion in terms 
o f financial market co-movements is the RAMS II group with 4.7% and 11.9% respectively.
4.5.2 Contagion Channels in EU
In the financial contagion literature the view in support of the decoupling hypothesis has 
been fading in the recent years (Mollah and Hartman 2012). Evidence has shown that 
developing countries are affected by financial crises; hence these countries are victims of 
financial contagion.
Identification of contagion channels has focused upon foreign bank ownership, cross- 
border exposures and the reliance upon a few "common lenders". The "common lender" has
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received much attention as evidence has highlighted its relevance in contagion studies since 
the Mexican crisis (Van Rijkeghem and Weder 1999). In particular, developing countries 
rely heavily on foreign funds to stimulate economic activity.
Focusing in Europe, it has been documented that most of the New Member states 
(RAMS I, II and Baltics) are highly dependent on a handful of Western European banking 
groups either via the local banking sector or via the private sector. Moreover, the exposure 
of Western European banking groups to the banking sector of the New Members is both 
concentrated and substantial. Austria, Belgium, Germany and Italy are the most exposed 
countries to the New Members of the European Union.
In the banking sector, before the financial crisis the asset share of foreign banks in 
seven66 out of twelve countries was in excess of 80% of the total assets. The seven largest 
institutions in the area had a combined exposure of more than 370 billion euros their relative 
presence in the region is different. Some of these institutions, classified as regional banks, 
had focused their activities in their home countries and the New Member economies67. In 
addition to these regional banks, large European68 or even international banking groups 
have been actively engaging in the New Member countries. In relative, but not necessarily 
in absolute, terms they have small presence in the region. This could result in vulnerability 
of the host country transmitted from the home country through the banking system. By 
contrast, regional banks are likely to transmit contagion both ways (Arvai et al. 2009).
66 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia.
67 Erste, Raiffeisen and OTP Bank.
68 Unicredit, KBC, Societe Generate and Intesa SanPaolo
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The majority of the New Member countries have experienced a huge credit expan­
sion to the private sector by about 30-50% in real terms during the years leading to the 
crisis (Arvai et a l 2009). Although this growth has had structural and positive develop­
ment implications, the less positive implications for financial stability had been stressed 
out (Cottarelli et al. 2003). The prominent banking system compared to capital markets in 
the region further aggravated the over-investment and excessive external borrowing prac­
tices. In the PIIGS the practices of current account deficits being re-financed with external 
borrowing, which has been cheaper since the countries have joined the Euro, have created 
moral hazard issues. This behavior relied on the implicit guarantee that cross-border liabil­
ities either via government intervention or via international bail-out programs (Sbracia and 
Zaghini 2001). Government intervention, particularly within the Euro, has been unable to 
take action as reassessment of country risk led to increased borrowing costs. Furthermore, 
the refinancing difficulties of a single country can cause a revision of beliefs about similar 
problems in other countries; hence aggravating potentially existing fundamental problems 
(Missio and Watzka 2011).
This dependence on foreign funding and the financial links between banking institu­
tions create a mechanism that would transfer a shock from a country to another leading to 
contagion. A trigger event could start in the host country if, for instance, a reassessment 
o f the credit risk entailed were to happen. Concerns on the fragility of the host country’s 
economy may lead to increased pressure to curtail lending and liquidity in the host coun­
try to safeguard operations in the home country. Or vice versa the trigger event may be 
in the home country due to changes in market conditions, possibly related to regulatory
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compliance where deleveraging across markets takes place leading to liquidity and lending 
curtailing in host countries (Arvai et a l  2009).
Linking the above with some country specific results in terms o f lead/lag crisis rela­
tion and intensity we find that the Baltic group of countries is the more segmented. This is 
also evidenced elsewhere and can be attributed to two facts; first the concentrated exposure 
(about 60% of their bank-to-bank claims) of Baltics to Sweden and second the minimal 
economic dependence of the RAMS I and II groups on Sweden. As a result any potential 
contagion between Sweden and the Baltics is likely to be contained therein feeding to the 
segmentation of the Baltics.
By contrast, Czech, Poland and to a lower extent Hungary that have more diversified 
sources of funds are affected earlier and at a lower intensity than Romania and Slovakia 
whose exposures are more concentrated to a single lender (Arvai et al. 2009).
Even developed countries that have large exposure to New Member states have recorded 
a higher crisis intensity measure compared to the other group members. For instance Aus­
tria and Belgium, part of the Core EU group, have exposure of about 70% and 25% of 
their GDP to New Member countries respectively. This has affected their crisis intensity 
measures which are among the highest in their group at 74.8% and 73.8% respectively. 
Sweden has also recorded higher crisis intensity measure of 60.8% compared to the other 
two Scandinavian countries due to its large exposure in the Baltics.
Yet these two approaches; the decoupling hypothesis and the bank transmission chan­
nels fail to receive definite support in our study. We find significant differences between 
the dispersion of the crisis transition dates for developed and developing countries within
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the EU. The developed countries experience contagion within 3 months, showing much 
lower deviation in their crisis transition dates compared to the developing countries that are 
affected by contagion effects at a lag of 3-13 months. Under the decoupling hypothesis, 
developing countries would not have been affected at all. By contrast, given the extent of 
foreign bank penetration and the "common lender" argument one would expect that conta­
gion hit these countries sooner.
4.5.3 The impact of the crisis on the GCC
The GCC are less affected by the initial impact of the financial crisis. As global financial 
conditions worsen the global productive sector takes its toll on the oil prices which drop 
sharply. Oil related revenues decline and fiscal positions are adversely affected. Liquidity 
shortages in the global financial markets impact the GCC as investor confidence is shaken 
and capital inflows are reduced. The global deleveraging and reversal of capital flows 
back to developed markets has a negative impact on GCC banks’ reserves while short-term 
interest rates rise sharply (IMF 2010).
Contagion impact and revenue diversification in the GCC
Plunging stock markets lead to a decrease in market capitalization by 41% or about 
400$ billion in money terms (IMF 2010). Bahrain is the most affected in the region due 
to the more prominent inter-linkages of its wholesale banking sector to the global financial 
markets. The contracting real estate sector has a severe effect on the UAE economy. The 
announcement of "DP World" seeking a standstill on debt repayment for two of its sub­
sidiaries ("Nakheel" and "Limitless") puts more pressure in the country’s equity markets
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with volatilities of Abu Dhabi and Dubai stock exchanges reaching record-high levels in 
the region since the end o f 2008. "Nakheel" and "Limitless" had been engaging in property 
development before the financial crisis hit the Emirate yet the falling demand for residen­
tial and commercial property led them into financial distress. The deteriorating investor 
sentiment and uncertainty are manifested in higher CDS spreads for sovereign and private 
equities.
However the effect of the Dubai crisis is isolated within the UAE with other GCC 
countries only marginally affected (IMF 2010). This can plausibly be linked to the low 
regional integration of equity markets as well as the significant part that oil revenue consti­
tutes in most of the countries. This allows them to intervene and bail-out troubled business 
entities as happened with the oil-rich Abu-Dhabi in the case of "Nakheel" and "Limitless".
Credit to the private sector falls as banks in response to stricter regulatory constraints 
reduce lending. Initial public offerings (IPO) amounting for about 11.7$ billion in the 
first half of 2008, they are cut down completely during the second half. Bond issuance 
by corporations drops by 40%, a decrease of about 16.5$ billions in money terms, in the 
same period. Islamic bond issuance falls by 73%, reaching 4.3$ billion as concerns on 
contract enforceability receive more attention during these bleak economic conditions. The 
tightening in the credit markets takes its toll on investment projects of 2.5$ trillions in total 
worth across the GCC, 23% of which were put on hold mainly in the UAE.
Corporate profitability declines from 2008 onwards but rises up again after mid-2009 
(Global Investment House 2012). Non-oil GDP growth remains positive at 2.8% in 2009. 
On the contrary, oil related GDP faces a contraction of 3.8% around the same time frame as
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US and Europe, major importers from the GCC, fall deeper into recession. Diversification 
o f revenue income into non-energy related sources is paying off for the GCC which is 
recording a positive average growth of about 1%.
GCC’s reaction to financial contagion
With the first appearance of financial contagion effects, regulatory response has been 
timely and efficient with a variety of measures taken by local governments as reported in 
table 13. Coordination in the GCC response has been better compared to the US or Europe 
and was well received by the financial markets (IMF 2010).
[Table 13 here]
Central banks and governments inject liquidity into the system through purchase- 
repurchase agreements (repos) and via long-term deposits. Monetary easing in the form of 
lowering interest rates and relaxing reserve requirements of bank institutions with the cen­
tral bank is adopted by all countries except Qatar. Measures to boost investor confidence 
are also taken by the GCC that have been enjoying fiscal surpluses during the years lead­
ing to the crisis. First, deposit insurance schemes are put in place in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE (IMF 201 la). Second, government managed sovereign wealth funds (SWF) 
support domestic assets and banks by directing their investments into these sectors, a prac­
tice followed in Kuwait, Oman and Qatar (IMF 2012a,b). Third, troubled corporations 
receive direct subsidies in Kuwait and the UAE (IMF 2012a,d). The affluent and timely 
government support, backed by the surpluses of the energy sector, helps the GCC to main­
tain their investment grade credit rating scores (Fitch). To stimulate demand in the GCC
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and the wider region, Saudi Arabia initiates a 400$ billion investment plan. GCC countries 
maintain pre-crisis levels of consumption while the positive spillovers of these supportive 
policies are felt in other economies of the MENA region (IMF 2010).
Besides the actions at the macro level (governments, regulatory bodies) there have 
been significant steps at the micro level that help to alleviate any financial contagion prob­
lems. The strong supervision and regulation of the banking sector as well as the appropriate 
risk management practices have played a crucial role (IMF 2012c). Banks in the GCC have 
shown great hindsight as even before the second-half of 2008, when GCC was affected by 
financial contagion, they had been increasing their loan loss provisions at the expense of 
lower profitability. The GCC banking system has been found capable of withstanding sig­
nificant credit and market events before any recapitalization need arises (IMF 2012c). As 
a result of the policy actions at the micro and macro level, the impact of a few failures is 
largely contained without any adverse effects in the GCC economy.
Financial institutions under distress are mainly in the more financially developed 
countries of Bahrain, UAE and Kuwait. In Bahrain, two wholesale banks ("International 
Banking Corporation" and "Awal Bank") file for bankruptcy in the first half 2009. In 
Kuwait one commercial bank is recapitalized a process financed by 1/3 from the Kuwaiti 
government and by 2/3 from the shareholders. In addition, "Global Investment House" 
and "Investment Dar", two of the largest investment companies in the country, face diffi­
culties in bond repayments of 3$ billion and 100$ million respectively. Both companies 
reach restructuring agreements without any further impact on the Kuwaiti economy (IMF 
2012a). In the UAE the government acquires two real estate finance companies ("Amlak
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Finance” and "Tamweel") that faced financial difficulties following the collapse in the real 
estate market. Spillovers to other financial or non-financial institutions are minimal (IMF 
2012d). Islamic banks are affected later than conventional banks, only by mid-2009. How­
ever their profitability, although it declines, still remains positive and comparable to that of 
conventional banks.
Challenges for the GCC
As the financial crisis affected the GCC some problems are brought to surface. How­
ever the economic prosperity of the GCC states helped to keep the magnitude o f these 
problems low.
The first problem the crisis highlights is the dependence on foreign funding that stim­
ulated economic growth. The low regional integration of GCC stock markets, the insignif­
icance of institutional investors, the lack of developed secondary debt markets in conjunc­
tion to the buy and hold strategy, particularly reinforced by Islamic banks and high net 
worth individuals, and family owned businesses (these account for 90% of the corporate 
sector) need to be addressed to further stimulate endogenously generated growth (IMF 
2011b, 2010).
Secondly, the violation of regulatory requirements with respect to loan-to-deposit 
ratios reveals potential problems in the enforceability of regulatory decrees. At the same 
time it reveals moral hazard issues. Particularly for firms in which the government has 
some direct or indirect stake, there is the perception that an implicit bail-out guarantee is in 
place.
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Thirdly, the Dubai crisis case reveals maturity mismatching and investment concen­
tration problems (IMF 2012d). Real estate requires a relatively longer investment horizon 
yet most o f the credit that was made available by foreign sources had been on a short term 
basis. The authorities need to diversify away from hydrocarbon revenues but this must not 
entail too much focus on a single economic sector.
4.6 Conclusions
The chapter examines the synchronization of the 2007 global financial crisis in the GCC 
and a wide selection of 47 developed and developing countries. Special focus is given in 
the GCC in comparison to the developed and developing countries of the EU.
We adopt a DCC-GARCH framework that allows us to estimate the conditional 
volatilities and correlations of the respective stock markets. The unique crisis transition 
date for each country is identified by a Markov-Switching model. The novelty of the 
methodology is that it enables the identification of countries that were affected earlier or 
later. Financial contagion, defined as in Forbes and Rigobon (2002), is verified statistically 
for all country groups except the RAMS II group, comprising Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, 
Romania and Slovenia.
Yet the verification of contagion cannot capture the actual impact of the financial 
crisis upon a country; hence measures of duration and intensity are employed. A gen­
eral finding is that although developed and developing countries show evidence of financial 
contagion, developing countries do so later and not as severely. More specifically, in du­
ration terms the Core EU group is the first to be affected while the GCC is the last with
4.6 Conclusions 324
an approximate lag of 1 year. An extreme case is Luxembourg, the first country to be af­
fected in March 2007, about 5 months earlier than the commonly assumed crisis starting 
point in August 2007. The group with the highest intensity is the PUGS whereas for the 
GCC the same indicator is amongst the lowest indicating that financial contagion has not 
hit as severely the region. Extreme cases include Greece at the high end, an expected find­
ing as the country has been the epicenter of the Euro crisis, and the Philippines at the low 
end. An exception within the GCC is Bahrain with an intensity score much higher than the 
other countries of the group due to the Kingdom’s higher interlinkages with global financial 
markets and its prominent banking sector.
A drawback of studies with a small number of countries is that they cannot differen­
tiate between global and regional contagion effects. Our large sample and decomposition 
measures reveal two cases; the first case consists of country groups where the countries 
therein become more aligned among themselves during the crisis showing evidence of re­
gional contagion or segmentation (e.g. Core EU, Baltics). In the second case the countries 
in the respective country groups become more aligned to global markets such as the PUGS 
and the GCC. The fact that these two groups show evidence of global contagion is plausi­
bly attributed to the bail-out deals and austerity measures decided at the EU level for the 
former group. In the GCC case it is related to their dependence upon the outside world in 
terms of foreign investments flowing in, the expansion of the real estate sector-w hich  has 
been driven by the high demand for property by outsiders, as well as the falling demand for 
oil as the world was sliding into recession.
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Any similarities in the crisis experience between the GCC and the EU have to be 
traced between the GCC and the RAMS II group as this is the one closest in terms of 
duration, intensity of the crisis and the fact that both groups experience global contagion. 
The RAMS II country group includes countries that were the last to join the EU. Hence 
the finding in support of global contagion is reflective of potential developments at the EU 
level that would affect their integration course, funding and future prospects within the 
Union. As a group, the GCC is more uniform even when compared to the Core EU. Yet the 
GCC show a response to the financial crisis similar to a group (RAMS II) that is far less 
integrated with the rest of the EU. Therefore the GCC seem to have the best o f two worlds, 
the benefits of integration without the evils of contagion.
We also find that industrialized countries have weathered the crisis better than those 
where the financial sector has been more prominent. The countries with a prominent finan­
cial sector (e.g. Luxembourg, Malaysia, and Hong Kong) have been affected earlier and 
more intensely with Bahrain and Japan being two special cases. The fact that Bahrain is af­
fected after 1 year is plausibly attributed to the high presence of Islamic banks, investments 
into infrastructure projects and the prohibition of debt contracts. Among the developed 
countries, Japan is the last to be affected. This is due to its past experiences at a similar do­
mestic crisis that has made it particularly skeptical about dangerous debt contracts (the lost 
decade).
The GCC have managed to maintain a positive GDP growth amidst the crisis, a sign 
that the revenue diversification projects have paid off. In addition, the timely and efficient
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response of regulators as well as the financial strength o f conventional and Islamic banking 
sectors has helped to alleviate the negative effects of the financial crisis in the region.
4.7 Table Appendix
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Table 1. Hydrocarbon Reserves.
Countries Oil Gas





Saudi Arabia 264.1 267.3
UAE 97.8 227.1
GCC Total 496.3 1494.2
Source: BP Statistical Review o f World Energy, 2009








y-axis: Number of Parameters; x-axis: Number of Assets. VEC Model (p=q=l)
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Table 3(a). Stock Market Indices per country, symbols and sources.
Countries Index Symbol Source
Group: Scandinavian
Denmark OMXC 20 DKKFXIN Stockholmsborsen
Finland OMXH HEXINDX Stockholmsborsen
Sweden OMXC 30 SWEDOMX Stockholmsborsen
Group: Core EU
Austria ATX ATXINDX Wiener Boerse
Belgium BEL 20 BGBEL20 BEL
France CAC 40 FRCAC40 Euronext Paris
Germany DAX 30 DAXINDX Deutsche Borse
Luxembourg SE General LUXGENI Luxembourg Stock Exchange
Netherlands AEX AMSTEOE Euronext Amsterdam
UK FTSE All Share FTALLSH United Kingdom
Group: PIIGS
Portugal PSI General POPSIGN Euronext Lisbon
Italy FTSE MIB FTSEMIB FTSE
Ireland SE Overall ISEQUIT Irish Stock Exchange
Greece ATHEX Composite GRAGENL Athens Stock Exchange
Spain IBEX 35 IBEX35 Spanish Exchanges
Group: Baltics
Estonia OMX Tallin ESTALSE Stockholmsborsen
Latvia OMX Riga RIGSEIN Stockholmsborsen








Warsaw General Index 
DS Market
CZPXIDX Prague Stock Exchange 
BUXINDX Budapest Stock Exchange 
POLWIGI Warsaw Stock Exchange
TOTXRSJ Datastream
Group: RAMS II
Bulgaria SE SOFIX BSSOFIX
Cyprus FTSE Cyprus SE 20 FTSEC20
Malta SE MSE MALTAIX
Romania BET RMBETRL
Slovakia SAX 16 SXSAX16
Bulgaria Stock Exchange 
FTSE
Borza ta’ Malta 
BET Indices
Bratislava Stock Exchange
Note: All data downloaded from Datastream
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Table 3(b). Stock Market Indices per country, symbols and sources.
Countries Index
Group: Worldwide

























BRBOVES Sao Paolo Stock Exchange
RSRTSIN Red Star Financial
IBOMBSE BSE Ltd










Muscat Securities Mkt 
Qatar Exchange Index
IFGDBHL S&P
KWKICGN Kuwait Investment Company 
OMANMSM Muscat Securities Market 
QTRMRKT Qatar Stock Exchange
TDWTASI Saudi Arabian Stock Exchange








Korea SE Composite 
Straits Times 
SE Weighted
HNGKNGI Hang Seng Bank 
JAPDOWA Nikkei 
KORCOMP Korea Stock Exchange 
SNGPORI Singapore Stock Exchange 
TAIWGHT Taiwan Stock Exchange
Group: Asia & Africa Developing
Egypt Hermes Financial EGHFINC Egypt Stock Exchange
Indonesia IDX Composite JAKCOMP Jakarta Stock Exchange
Jordan Amman SE AMMANFM Amman Stock Exchange
Lebanon BLOM LBBLOMI Beirut Stock Exchange
Malaysia KLCI FBMKLCI FTSE
Morocco MASI MASIIDX Morocco Stock Exchange
Philippines PSEI PSECOMP Philippine Stock Exchange
Thailand S.E.T. BNGKSET Thailand Stock Exchange
Tunisia Tunindex TUTUNIN Tunis Stock Exchange
N o te : A ll d a ta  d o w n lo ad ed  from  D atastream
Note: All data 
are 
2010, except when 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for Country Groups.
Country Groups Mean Volatility VaR 95°/
(%) (Annualised)
Scandinavian -0.0089 25.35 -11.27
CoreEU -0.0022 22.26 -16.46
PIIGS -0.0246 23.08 -10.62
Baltics 0.0426 21.29 -12.97
RAMS I 0.0226 21.79 -12.49
RAMS II 0.0158 24.29 -16.69
Worldwide
US & Euronext -0.0120 22.22 -8.99
Vix & VStoxx 0.0146 94.31 -31.41
BRICS 0.0460 27.59 -15,90
GCC 0.0365 19.76 -10.59
Asia & Africa Developed 0.0115 23.65 -10.91
Asia & Africa Developing 0.0424 18.88 -12.78
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Figure 
3(k). Price 
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Table 7(d). DCC Garch Models Estimation (Country Group: Worldwide).
Worldwide
S&P 500 Euronext 100
Mean Equation
Vix VStoxx
V 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.015) (0.003) (0.442) (0.710)




Ul 0.013 0.018 1.955 1.977
(0.012) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
a 0.080 0.112 0.088 0.082
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
P 0.912 0.883 0.861 0.856
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LogLikelihood 8,800 8,516 4,011 4,202
Obs 2,799 2,799 2,799 2,799
Note: Table reports estimated coefficients and p-values are given in brackets



























































J 4 4 " S O $ O O
'*-4 N ) 3 OO 3 l ~ 3
VO 3 3 3 O 3 —

























© 3 oU5 —
o o
b 3 o











-4 9 O 3; 0 O $ 0 O
00 3 VO 3 0 3 b vo b b\ b
3 3 4 4 w 3 0 0




00 95 O $ O $ 0 csC8 p pX/> 3 00 3 © 3 0 3 b 3 b




v T t4 >S
p 9 O 9 O $ O $ O 0
3 VO 3 b 3 O 3 b 3 b
3 3 3 3 4 O 3 3 0
14 v2 t4 vS 00 sO\ O vb 00 v 2 0
4 9 O <9 0 19 O 0 $ 0
to 3 00 3 b 3 b 3 t4 3 b4 o 3 4L 4 00 Oi 3 3 0
3 ^ 3 VO ^ 4 4L. A j L/> 'S? OJ
p 3J O © $ O O $ 0
O 00 3 ■_ 3 b 3 — 3 b3> 3 14 •fe. 3 3 3 3 0
(4 U \ ■S O s 2 u> 3


















































































3  O  
3  O  
3  O
. 3  “
0 5
>



















VO 4 i .
vO NJ
-o  o  
v o  O l 
v o  - o
- J  v o  
v o  UJ
v o  4k
~0 00 vO — 
vO ov
■CO
©  ©  p  ©  p  ©
b  vo b  o  b  o© to CO Os © —P  OO p  -O ©j 4k
CO O  p  O
©  1— ©  ©
CO O  CO OO
Co Ul k) .fk
p  p  ©  ©  p  ©
©  so ©  ©  ©  ©
CO >— CO - J  CO tO
C l  > 1  , C  - J  .Ov W
CO —  CO o
CO ©  Cs —




p  o  
©  o
© o p ©
© 9> *=> ^  i :  Oo o  
p  Ov v p  O
p  ©  p  p
Kj O  CO O
Co Iv) C  O
Uj UJ CO —
•b. ©  CO
-^ 1 I—  COt-/* C/1 ‘•Ok,




















00 p © "p ©
*— © v© © © ©© © t o © ov
© © © p © p
JO  0 0
Vl
v o  U Jvo VO
o°
k j  ’- J  
V© ©  © Ul
j o  o o  
"Cl u> 
v o  40- 
v© O
■o -o © © 
©  Ov
r o  ©
'•O  U J 
8  2
p  ©  p
CO I—  ©
CO ©  vop  -O
©  — 





p  ©  
Co ©
0 0  „Ov —















© S' ©> © "S © 3© 3 Ui © Uj ©
© © CO © " S © "jS
© o o © t o 4k. © ©
© 4k © 4k t o © UJ ©
p J o vO p 4k © ©




Co o o  
CO ©  
p  U l
— © to (so u> p
p o p ©





CO —  
CO OS p  -pk












£  £&  &) 
5‘ o
2  < © £L
3 €  
8 B-
o cro
- J  UJ 
©  ©  ©  4k.
©  p  ©  p  ©
0 0  CO —  Co —
©  ©  4k  ©> ©
0 0  p  ©  ts j  —
p o p  
b> L- o
CO U l '—,





ro ~  
©  « 
»  s
p  ©  p  ©  p  ©
©  00 ©  ©  ©  —
©  t o  CO ©  O i O '
P  tO  p  4k  4k. —
p  o  p  o  p  o
©  bo ©  1— ©  ©©  »- ©  4k ©> ©p  00 P  >1 A  O
p  ©  p  ©
©  ©  ©  ©©  Ui ©  o©1 ©  P  —
p o p ©  






















2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20 1 0 2011
Etenmark(Volatilily) 
Rctjme 1 _
Notes: Identification o f  the crisis and non-crisis regimes according to Markov-S witching models 
on the DCC-GARCH Volatility series. The solid black line represents the crisis transition date. 







































































































16/01/2008; Ireland: 27/07/2007; Spain: 02/08/2007
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Notes: Identification o f  the crisis and non-crisis regimes according to M arkov-Switching models 
on the DCC-GARCH Volatility series. The solid black line represents the crisis transition date. 
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F ig u re  5. C risis  T ran s itio n  D ates.
Transition Dates
<S> HK EGP ❖
KOR,SING,TAW,MAL <>




#  PL^ *
LUX




EST & ♦  KUW
ROM,UK,BEL,VSTOXX ♦ ♦  FRA hi^ N ♦IND JOR ♦  ♦  OMN
♦  lit,mor





SAF ♦  ♦  
QAT
♦  LAT,PHI




THAI ❖ ♦  ♦  BAH 
RUS
10/10/2006 18/01/2007 28/04/2007 06/08/2007 14/11/2007 22/02/2008 01/06/2008 09/09/2008 18/12/2008
Notes: Crisis transition dates identified for the countries in the sample. SLVN=Slovenia; LUX=Luxembourg; POR=Portugal 
I=Italy; NL=Netherlands; DEN=Denmark; PL=Poland; IRL=Ireland; AUS=Austria; SW E=Sweden; ROM =Romania 
UK=United Kingdom; BEL=Belgium; Fra=France; SPA=Spain; CZE=Czech Republic; FIN=Finland; BUL=Bulgaria 
HUN=Hungary; GER=Germany; CYP=Cyprus; GRE=Greece; MAL=M alta; EST=Estonia; SLVK=Slovakia; LIT=Lithuania 
LAT=Latvia; US=United States; ENXT=Euronext 100; BRA=Brazil; RUS=Russia; IND=India; CHN=China 
SAF=South Africa; HK=Hong Kong; JPN=Japan; KOR=South Korea; SING=Singapore; TAW=Taiwan; EGP= Egypt 
IND=Indonesia; JOR=Jordan; LEB=Lebanon; MAL=M alaysia; M OR=M orocco; PHIL=Philippines; THAI=Thailand 
TUN=Tunisia; VIX and VSTOXX Volatility Indices
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Table 8(a). Crisis Transition Dates, Duration and Intensity.
Country Crisis Transition Lead/Lag Days not in Days in Crisis
Date Crisis Regime Crisis Regime Intensity
Group: Scandinavian
Denmark 10/08/2007 9 506 572 53.06%
Finland 13/08/2007 12 597 479 44.52%
Sweden 27/07/2007 -5 426 662 60.85%
Group: Core EU
Austria 27/07/2007 -5 274 814 74.82%
Belgium 26/07/2007 -6 285 804 73.83%
France 09/08/2007 8 626 453 41.98%
Germany 06/11/2007 97 590 426 41.93%
Luxembourg 01/03/2007 -153 258 936 78.39%
Netherlands 10/08/2007 9 501 480 48.93%
UK 26/07/2007 -6 372 717 65.84%
Group: PUGS
Portugal 10/08/2007 9 465 613 56.86%
Italy 10/08/2007 9 526 552 51.21%
Ireland 27/07/2007 -5 232 856 78.68%
Greece 16/01/2008 168 20 945 97.93%
Spain 02/08/2007 1 336 748 69.00%
Group: Baltic
Estonia 21/07/2008 355 832 626 42.94%
Latvia 16/09/2008 412 228 563 71.18%
Lithuania 09/09/2008 405 451 345 43.34%
Note: Transition Dates as identified by the Markov-Switching model on the DCC-G ARCH volatility series o f  the 
stock m arket indices. The Lead/Lag column reports the difference between the crisis transition date and the 
“guideline date” (1/8/07). For example, Denmark experienced the financial crisis in 10/8/2007 (10 days after the 
“oflicial date”). Days not in Crisis Regime and Days in Crisis Regime identify how many days each country was in 
“crisis m ode” after the transition date.
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Table 8(b). Crisis Transition Dates, Duration and Intensity.
Country Crisis Transition Lead/Lag Days not in Days in Crisis
Date Crisis Regime Crisis Regime Intensity
Group: RAMS I
Czech Republic 09/01/2008 161 490 480 49.48%
Hungary 28/11/2007 119 417 583 58.30%
Poland 06/08/2007 5 467 615 56.84%
Slovenia 04/01/2007 -209 632 602 48.78%
Group: RAMS II
Bulgaria 12/11/2007 103 604 408 40.32%
Cyprus 17/01/2008 169 142 822 85.27%
Malta 29/07/2008 363 456 370 44.79%
Romania 07/01/2008 159 420 552 56.79%
Slovakia 18/09/2008 414 319 470 59.57%
Group: Worldwide
US 07/08/2007 6 633 448 41.44%
Euronext 100 22/01/2008 174 502 459 47.76%
VIX 28/02/2007 -154 695 500 41.84%
VSTOXX 26/07/2007 -6 644 445 40.86%
Group: BRICS
Brazil 05/09/2008 401 531 267 33.46%
Russia 24/07/2008 358 354 475 57.30%
India 21/01/2008 173 530 432 44.91%
China 20/04/2007 -103 519 639 55.18%
South Africa 03/07/2008 337 461 383 45.38%
Note: Transition Dates as identified by the Markov-Switching model on the DCC-G ARCH volatility series o f  the 
stock m arket indices. The Lead/Lag column reports the difference between the crisis transition date and the 
“guideline date” (1/8/07). For example, Denmark experienced the financial crisis in 10/8/2007 (10 days after the 
“official date”). Days not in Crisis Regime and Days in Crisis Regime identify how many days each country was in 
“crisis m ode” after the transition date.
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Table 8(c). Crisis Transition Dates, Duration and Intensity.
Country Crisis Transition Lead/Lag Days not in Days in Crisis
Da*e Crisis Regime Crisis Regime Intensity
Group: GCC
Bahrain 12/08/2008 377 267 549 67.28%
Kuwait 08/09/2008 404 438 359 45.04%
Oman 28/07/2008 362 477 350 42.32%
Qatar 11/08/2008 376 378 439 53.73%
Saudi Arabia 09/07/2008 343 414 426 50.71%
Group: Asia & Africa Developed
Hong Kong 03/08/2007 2 384 699 64.54%
Japan 17/01/2008 169 647 317 32.88%
Korea 30/07/2007 -2 614 473 43.51%
Singapore 30/07/2007 -2 435 652 59.98%
Taiwan 30/07/2007 -2 443 644 59.25%
Group: Asia & Africa Developing
Egypt 07/07/2008 341 341 501 59.50%
Indonesia 17/01/2008 169 591 373 38.69%
Jordan 06/06/2008 310 575 288 33.37%
Lebanon 26/11/2007 117 715 287 28.64%
Malaysia 30/07/2007 -2 650 437 40.20%
Morocco 09/09/2008 405 279 517 64.95%
Philippines 16/09/2008 412 587 204 25.79%
Thailand 20/06/2008 324 506 347 40.68%
Tunisia 01/04/2008 244 500 411 45.12%
Note: Transition Dates as identified by the Markov-Switching model on the DCC-GARCH volatility series o f  the 
stock market indices. The Lead/Lag column reports the difference between the crisis transition date and the 
“guideline date” (1/8/07). For example, Denmark experienced the financial crisis in 10/8/2007 (10 days after the 
“official date”). Days not in Crisis Regime and Days in Crisis Regime identify how many days each country was in 
“crisis m ode” after the transition date.
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Table 9. Crisis Transition Dates, Duration and Intensity.
Country Crisis Transition Date Crisis Intensity
Median Mean Variability Median Mean
Scandinavian 9 5.33 9.07 53.06 52.81
Core EU - 5 -8 .0 0 73.72 65.84 60.82
PUGS 9 36.40 73.80 69.00 70.74
Baltic 405 390.67 31.09 43.34 52.48
RAMS I 62 19.00 165.67 53.16 53.35
RAMS II 169 241.60 137.63 56.79 57.35
W orldwide 0 5.00 134.12 41.64 42.98
BRICS 337 233.20 206.86 45.38 47.24
GCC 376 372.40 22.39 50.71 51.82
Asia & Africa Developed - 2 33.00 76.05 59.25 52.03
Asia & Africa Developing 310 257.78 139.14 40.20 41.88
Note: Removing Greece from the PUGS will give 62.9% and 63.9% m edian and m ean intensity' respectively. 
Removing Cyprus from the RAMS II will give 50.8% and 50.4% m edian and m ean intensity' respectively. 
Variability is the SD o f  the m ean lead/lag indicator w ithin a group.
Table 10. Regression Output for industrialization and Crisis Intensity.
Dependent Variable Crisis Intensity Crisis Intensity
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Average Industry -0.422 (0.006)***
Industry (2009) -0.384 (0.009)***
Constant 0.736 (0.000)*** 0.705 (0.000)***
Observations 49 49
R 2 14.82% 13.55%
W hite x 2 3.989 (0.136) 4.265 (0.118)
Note: Industry m easures the average (over 2000-2009) percentage value added to the country’s GDP 
by industry and manufacturing sectors. Industry 2009 is the percentage value added to the country 's 
GDP by industry and manufacturing sectors in 2009 only. Numbers in brackets show p-values.
The W hite test shows no presence o f  Heteroscedasticity.
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Table 11. Average Intra Group Correlations (alGC).
Country Groups Average Correlations Change in Correlations
Before After Median Mean SD p-value
Scandinavian 68.80% 70.50% 2.62% 2.55% 0.87% 0.015**
Core EU 49.26% 50.77% 4.83% 5.20% 4.45% 0.017**
PIIGS 59.35% 60.54% 3.38% 4.25% 6.57% 0.207
Baltic 26.83% 28.63% 7.00% 6.38% 1.42% 0.004***
RAMS I 36.48% 38.53% 6.33% 6.15% 2.43% 0.007***
RAMS II 4.72% 5.25% 10.32% -2 4 .5 8 % 78.84% 0.517
Worldwide 58.85% 59.76% 2.35% 2.16% 0.95% 0.011’ *
BRICS 26.11% 28.42% 8.28% 9.87% 4.08% 0.003***
GCC 6.11% 7.13% 10.94% 12.73% 8.17% 0.018**
Asia & Africa Developed 56.75% 57.12% 0.00% 0.69% 0.90% 0.149
Asia & Africa Developing 14.60% 13.61% 4.84% 5.22% 19.78% 0.449
Note: The table reports the average correlations before and after the crisis for every country group 
separately (i.e.the Scandinavian group only includes the correlations DEN-SW E, D EN-FIN and SW E-FIN). 
The crisis period is assumed to start when at least one country (o f the correlation pairs) is in crisis regime.
Table 12. Average Inter Country Correlations (alCC).
Country Groups Average Correlations Change in Correlations
Before After Median Mean SD p-value
Scandinavian 34.71% 36.04% 3.83% 4.17% 0.53% 0.001***
Core EU 31.00% 32.20% 4.01% 4.08% 0.82% 0.000***
PIIGS 34.08% 35.37% 3.83% 4.01% 0.76% 0.000***
Baltic 17.47% 18.45% 5.07% 5.43% 3.39% 0.081*
RAMS I 28.43% 29.81% 6.73% 5.36% 3.65% 0.021**
RAMS II 11.98% 13.67% 3.03% 10.84% 14.84% 0.667
Worldwide 31.38% 31.08% -1 .4 2 % 3.58% 9.35% 0.777
BRICS 24.00% 25.57% 7.19% 6.08% 2.40% 0.001***
GCC 6.01% 7.50% 37.51% 23.21% 28.00% 0.030**
Asia & Africa Developed 27.50% 27.93% 1.66% 0.76% 1.58% 0.066*
Asia & Africa Developing 13.75% 14.35% 4.24% 6.12% 6.12% 0.067*
Note: The table reports the average correlations before and after the crisis for every country vis-a-vis 
every other country in the sample (i.e. 26 pairs o f  correlations o f  Denm ark are included in the analysis. 
The crisis period is assumed to start when at least one country (o f the correlation pairs) is in crisis regime.
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Conclusions and Proposals for Further Work
In  the last tw o decades, GCC countries have em barked on a revenue diversification 
plan to reduce their dependence on non-renew able and highly volatile hydrocarbon incom e. 
A m ong the business sectors that have been expanding, the financial sector has received the 
greatest attention.
B ahrain  has evolved as a financial hub o f  the GCC and the w ider M iddle E ast region 
w hile the equally  prom inent financial sector o f  the UAE has specialised in the real estate 
m arket. W ithin the financial sector, Islam ic banks have enjoyed considerable grow th and 
the G C C  has evolved into the largest m arket for Islam ic finance. The arising attention 
Islam ic finance has acquired in the afterm ath o f  the 2007 financial crisis, w e undertook 
com parative studies o f  Islamic and conventional banking, and o f  the perform ance o f  the 
G C C  financial sector.
A fter a b rie f introduction outlining the background o f  the G CC countries w e com pare 
the evolution o f  cost, revenue, profit and technical efficiency in the tw o banking system s. 
O ur analysis proceeds by applying a decom position technique to our efficiency estim ates 
into tw o com ponents; one attributed to m anagerial inadequacies and one reflective o f  the 
different w ay o f  business and financial products that Islam ic banks utilise. M oreover, as 
part o f  the financial ratio analysis, we apply a bootstrapped version o f  the equality' o f  m eans 
test to correct for any sm all sam ple bias. O ur results suggest that Islam ic banks have higher 
efficiency in generating revenues and are at least as profit efficient as conventional banks.
376
5 Conclusions and Proposals for Further Work 377
Follow ing large investm ents in hum an resource developm ent, the cost efficiency gap ob­
served during the first years o f  the period under study has been closing down. This is 
attributed to the h igher quality o f  m anagerial s taff em ployed by Islam ic banks, w hich is 
verified by the decom position o f  D EA  efficiency scores and the significantly h igher p ro ­
ductivity  change in Islam ic banks over the study period. N evertheless, the Islam ic banking 
modus operandi rem ains significantly less efficient than the conventional m odel.
The th ird  chapter investigates the differences betw een failure risk in the tw o bank 
types. We find that Islam ic banks have significantly low er failure risk. We adopt a novel 
survival tim e m odel allow ing for unobserved heterogeneity  using bank-specific variables 
perta in ing  to three blocks o f  the accounting statm ent, nam ely balance sheet, incom e state­
m ent and financial ratios in addition to country-w ide m acroeconom ic indicators. We ev­
idence d ifferent m arginal effects to the failure risk in the tw o banking system s. H igher 
capitalisation  decreases failure risk for conventional banks, w hereas the opposite is ob­
served for Islam ic banks. The im portance o f  liquidity m anagem ent in Islam ic banks is 
highlighted as their h igher liquidity preference gives rise to low er failure risk. M acroeco­
nom ic factors have greater significance for Islam ic banks w ith inflation having the highest 
m arginal effect upon failure risk. This is expected as Islam ic banks use asset-backed con­
tracts w hile debt use is shunned. We find evidence o f  increased likelihood o f  co-failure 
(contagion) w ithin the conventional banking sector. N evertheless this effect is not statisti­
cally  significant for Islam ic banks, a finding related to their "tailored-m ade" products and 
practises.
5 Conclusions and Proposals for Further Work 378
The fourth chapter investigates the financial sector o f  the G CC during the 2007 fi­
nancial crisis and com pares to other developing and developed financial m arkets. A  D C C - 
G A R C H  and M arkov-Sw itching fram ew ork allows an endogenous unique identification 
o f  the crisis transition  date for every country. O ur findings show  that all countries w ere 
hit by the financial crisis w ithin a period o f  18 m onths. F inancial contagion is verified 
statistically  for all countries under study yet tw o additional m easures, duration and inten­
sity, show  im portant differences betw een the countries. M ost im portantly we show that, 
w hile developing countries experience financial contagion, they experience it later and less 
severely than developed countries. A  distinction o f  financial contagion effects into regional 
and global provides supportive evidence o f  a G CC financial sector that is becom ing in­
creasingly  aligned to global financial m arkets. The GCC, show  som e evidence o f  global 
contagion arising from  their linkages w ith the outside world in term s o f  investm ents, ser­
vices and dem and for real estate. A com parison o f  the G CC w ith the EU shows that the 
G CC have the best o f  two worlds; the benefits o f  integration, as they constitute a very ho­
m ogenous group o f  countries, w ithout m ost o f  the evils o f  contagion, as they are affected 
about a year later and less severely. B ahrain, the m ost financially advanced country in the 
region, is affected at a higher lag than other countries w ith prom inent financial sectors (e.g. 
M alaysia, H ong Kong). This is plausibly attributed to the prom inence o f  Islam ic banks in 
B ahrain, their investm ents into infrastructure projects, prohibition o f  debt contracts, lower 
failure risk  as w ell as h igher profitability and liquidity indicators.
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